Meiyen Lyz Matsumura Intro to International Relations, Essay 1 Wisdom versus Science in the State Department In comparing the wisdom outlook to the scientific aspects of the functioning of the State Department can we tell the true process and underlying, implicit and relevant operations of the complex organism. The wisdom and scientific outlook is amply explicated by “International Relations: Wisdom or Science” by Charles A. McClelland and “The Behavioral Science Approach to International Relations: Payoff and Prospects.” It will be determined that the State Department, does, in fact utilize the “wisdom” method far more than the scientific method, which is used more thoroughly in research and the attempts to extract data from facts. This is true while the State Department takes information and compartmentalizes them with faith in the facts and data introduced, and without any doubt of the process of the forwarder or the issue analyst. Science and wisdom are similar because they are both ways to respond to empirical questions, neither deals with morality, each selects a few “relevant” facts from a much more complex reality, because we can’t handle all the facts. These facts are chosen by operational terms and hypothesis. The science approach utilizes Behavioralism, and posits that, as aforementioned, science is not diametrically opposed to wisdom, since both respond to empirical question without attending to morality. Science has a “preoccupation with questions of how things work, of how the variable combine, and of possible and probable outcomes,” which is quite similar to the wisdom method, both take a piece of complex reality and then form a hypothesis to test the data and outcomes, with a thorough sense of processing. The science method is composed of the following 1) the search for generalizations, patterns of behavior which apply to many examples or cases 2) to test general statements against reality 3) process must be replicable 4) results independent of the researcher. A problem in the science method is how to move from general statements to specific cases. The next process of science research is to compare hypothesis to a chunk of reality in a way that can be replicated by the reader, making results persuasive.The process must be transparent, and it must be replicable. The hypothesis must be testable, about what s thought to exist, how certain things appear to be related, or how something operations. the hypothesis waits proof or disproof, furthermore the hypothesis must fit observable facts. Then is the harvesting of results by integration findings from an array of tests. Finally when the evidence is warranting, the likelihood of probability is stated and presented. Wisdom on the other hand, is of a different origin and process and orientation. Once wisdom is present it is implied that the information because so ingrained in individuals it literally seems like they are a coherent whole, the person becomes the information and is heavily tied to the information like there is 100% unity and accountability between information and person. This person may represent a high level of specialization, as a specialist, with a intense and almost gruelsome particular sphere, gruelsome in intensity achieved by pure stamina, imagination, well thought out construction and hard work, and a sphere that is only particular to small, defined, and specialized area, with well cut out and well established boundaries. The ideal situation is known as a a collection of specialists, than specialize in their own small sphere but integrate the data, facts, hypothesis, operational definitions, and conclusions toward something finalized and developed, and integration accommodating many parts indeed, to yield a bigger and comprehensive solution or perspective that would in turn yield a masterplan or master visage of the collection of each subsection of specialization. This individuals that specialize become possessed with a kind of educated intuition about how to sort facts into relevance and forming a prospect of likelihoods. Due to the limited sphere of intense studying, the aspects of the subject that are focused on are highly specialized and unique, that would be difficult to attain through a perusing eye of a nonspecialist, who have neither the time, energy, basis, educational background, and skills of insight as a specialist. In wisdom method the researchers focus on a few cases with many variables, for instance, one geographic region but with many factors such as politics and economics and military. Since the intuition of these specialists cannot be shared, we cannot recreate the mental process that has yielded facts and conclusions and data, we have to take the results as is, the work is not replicable and all trust is on the researcher that the process by which he has arrived at the result is academic, thorough, and valid. The State Department is less scientific that wisdom oriented. It does not look for patterns but solves particular problems by directly contacted various offices that may be presented as an influential and significant component to a multi-faceted prospect of piece of information that has wide spread causations and implications in the diplomatic, press-related, social, economic, military, ideological, and religious worlds and facets. There is less a reliance on science but a transmission of one entity through various loopholes and exits and in the meantime, and a creation of a number of evaluations on the other entrances and exits this entity must make. It is a forward moving pattern from side to side briefly, the process of data collection and pre-lift action vertically, then up and down a number of steps, which is not in a display to be patternized across a huge scope of precedents and similar cases in the line of categorized detail and craftily and intellectually chosen bits of history to be applied to the present. The facets must be taken into account first as the complicated categorizing of the bureaucracy has it necessary that one issues, passes, for instance in the “Assistant Secretaries for Policy Planning, European Affairs, African Affairs, and Near and South Asian Affairs” (Ogburn 201) or, for a single telegram, “the Secretary of State, the Under SEcretaries, the Deputy Under Secretaries, the counselor… the Policy Planning Staff, the Bureau of African Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs…..Bureau of Intelligence and Research…Department of Defense, and the CIA” (Ogburn, 204). Therefore the Department prefers to look at entities when a forward moving mindset, rather then putting them on a comparative and intellectual scale to assess the nature and likelihoods of patterns. This is an instance of wisdom over science. Many specialists are used, as aforementioned in the tactics of multi-specialist decision making and integration, Ogburn states that “the desk officer and the officer in charge are always at hand to provide the detailed information only specialists possess, while in the intelligence bureau, country analysts and branch chiefs will be putting in 10 hour days and 6 or 7 day weeks” (Ogburn 201). The formulation of many specialists working simultaneously and in conjunction is possibly the master plan of wisdom, which is all the most prevalent in this situation. When the A officer does research, he focuses solely on his country and having a formal written agreement passed along different parties. His situation just did not end up in the intelligence branch of this vast bureaucracy. The research is not sufficient enough to seek replication, which requires data and a hypothesis, measuring some notion against a piece of reality to extrapolate information and make predictions. In my opinion A was trying to send messages about the dire situation in country A, so that appropriate action could be taken. The A representative is not given enough respect as “it finally leaves the Bureau with the Assistant Secretary’s signature, the memorandum is considerably revised, and further change awaits it. The Department of Defense cannot provide the desired recoilles rifles and ice fighters. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs cannot offer any undertakings at this stage with respect to the question of membership in United Nations agencies. The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs rules out a request of the President to invite the A Prime Minister for an official visit because the number of those invites is already to large” (Ogburn, 208). Representative A tragically failed, and the quality of wisdom was overlooked. Ogburn’s hypothesis is that while the bureaucracy of the State the Department is highly complex, a simple proposition posed at the wrong and unfortunate times is out of the factor of hands of specialists and wisdom experts that could give the proposition more credibility, and allowing for the proposition to be less easily dismissed and more readily accepted as a proposition with urgency and proper evaluations and wisdom based intellectual backing. Reality of the system can only be replicated in small parts, mostly the ways that Ogburn has described the flow of propositions messages and information. We cannot replicate the wisdom of the multitude of specializes working in every single layer, vicinity, and geopolitical region and aspect of the process of finalization and decision making. It is the nature of wisdom, wisdom is simply not replicable. If the scenarios given to us are hypothetical, the conclusions that Ogburn is trying to assert is that the wisdom rules the system, and the system is highly fallible, enmeshed with the fallibility of human nature, lack of attentiveness, and lack of incentive. It seems like something so effective and complex should be able to be mapped out like a picture of a mechanics of a car with the formulas on the side, it cannot, and as much as we’d like to see how transparent and functional this grand organism is, perhaps more grand than the functioning of a car, we simply cannot put everything down on paper besides the superficial aspects, of how the information or prospects moves among various parties which each have various functions, and we can also find illustrated the joints of the essay where we see some human fallibility, what the writing does in part is dictate the actions of mere employees, who have set themselves up in a hierarchy, with others taking precedence before others, and how a proposition like that of A could be ignored and disregarded on so many multifarious levels. The scientific aspects of replication and generalization are typically hard to find. Replication is defined yet denied in pertinence to the Ogburn system, as aforementioned. However generalizations, tests that see what behavior which apply to many examples or cases, are present on the research level on the far reaching specialists, which use generalizations to come to a specific hypothesis or conclusion, however this yields on occassion a “likelihood” statement, which is very much looked forward to, however this kind of generalization on the parts of specialists are so highly implied and ingrained in their educational intuition, unless they do a formal statement on every single point seen and every single transfer of ideas from their mind, if so they would at the same time, waste much time and energy into making for the mere sake of something replicable, while people would save time and energy if they just believed in the sheer magnitude and credibility of the specialists’ minds. On the topic of generalizations, we also see a typical set of behavior and case that indicates a proposition, such as the from Representative A, is better received when it has concurrences and approvals from various departments, a form of consensual multilateralism on the bureaucratic level that would give an idea greater power and props. The State Department does indeed form hypothesis, that indicate a plan of action and a plan that is best believed in for a desired outcome, whether for approval, ratification, being sent to be further analyzed, to be taken seriously by multiple factors, to address all issues comprehensively, and long and short term effects and ramifications within society and as within what defines the State Department system as an organism with many parts and functions. The hypothesis must create the best yield out in the world and within the diplomatic and intelligence world. A hypothesis is set to test the data and outcomes, and I believe there is a form of data or advisement behind every single State Department action, whether it dictates the flow of a piece of work, or the actual effect in society once the work is established, the State Department remains well advised, with a good backing of data, and in the meanwhile strives to achieve the most effective outcomes through the formation of well sounded and well established hypothesis, drawing from many different inner departments and words from all kinds of bureaucrats, diplomats and intelligence specialists. These hypothesis are tested against reality once they are thrown into the very reactive and sensitive world, and once received by the world, the State Department will receive feedback, positive, neutral or negative but for the most part constructive, and this is the result of the test of the hypothesis against a very real and responding reality. The general flow of information can be replicated, however the wisdom of the specialists unfortunately cannot, attesting to the years of training these specialists must have and diligence within a very specialized area of study. The State Department uses a large number of cases and large number of variable. It is all encompassing, it covers issues that cover depth and span, from human issues to the issues of mundane weather and transportation. Therefore because of the sheer size of the data, information is branches into numerous categories, a lot of hypothesis are formed everyday, almost every hour, and alot of the hypothesis are being thrown out and tested in reality, and overall the State Department is a send and receive mechanism, always in the flow of these things, received constant and perpetual feedback, but being a machine that is not only recipient or reflective, but idea and hypothesis generated, alive with specialists and various facts and a multitude of analysis. The State Department functions under the wisdom outlook because the text and information are collected from specialists, at least specialists or people who have knowledge in the specific message, and reorganized through processing and evaluation by different individuals to determine a wholesome and cohesive statement or response to the initial message, that is further carried out with specialized or executive processes. Not a single person who files this information necessarily is a specialist, however specialized the message may be, it is gathered for evaluation by sources already given credibility, for finalization since “no man can understand the sweep of international relations” himself (McClelland, 3). Those who send specialized messages to the Department may be considered information gatherers and students in their own right, in order to have a message processed through the State Department there by be a viability, comprehensiveness, credibility, and relevant quality to the message, with a writer who is adept with the synthesis of “facts” and “general meaning.” Likewise through the State Department, the topic and general theme of the message is narrowed down to be compartmentalized into different factions and title of the recipients, since we can handle the complex dilemma, issue, or problem at stake all at once, each relevant and significant part of the information is dealt with single handedly and precisely until it can be brought up to a large department forum or specialized department forum, to be thoroughly and adequately assessed and dealt with. The State Department cannot deal with the normative values of information, subjective feeling has no place in serious political dealings. People want to deal with uniformities, recurrences and likelihoods because current political domestic and global affairs are under close scrutiny, with many actions on the part of the State Department and American government having huge and wide spreading implications and repercussions. Furthermore the actions of the American government is scrutinized by many other nations that consider the United States the prototype of a successful and capitalistic state, or criminal state by engaging in the War of Terror and removal of terrorist groups, that will not only scrutinize the state but form positive or negative judgements on the entity. Other actors are non government organization, international organizations, NATO and so on. The US presents a global reputation that must be followed through with information about “likelihoods” in order to make the best most reasonable and effective decision, that will further contribute to a well reputed international standing. “Likelihoods” are significant on the impending now, it isn to about the past and past errors, which have most part successful contributed to an equalization of the error. “Likelihoods” answer the question: “what now?” And although the past is quite significant all orientation and preoccupations are ingrained in “what is now?” and “what are our implications if we make the wrong decision supported by false or inadequate data that has caused us to come to the wrong conclusion of action?” In addition however it may seem that the functioning of the State Department and description provided by McClelland is dominantly in the matter of “wisdom,” there are some “scientific aspects” to be noted, even though these features are not as prominent as the wisdom method. On note is the similarity between wisdom and science in that both use empirical questions and dont attend to morality. Taking a piece of reality to form a conclusion is mutually utilized. There is however no use of testing general statements against reality. Instead of moving from general statements to specific ones, the State Department takes information as given, although it may break the information down to a narrower classification. It is important that the hypothesis fits observable facts, as the information provided to the State Department must be well grounded. The scientific outlook also employs probabilities and likelihoods, which is necessary for the determination of current affairs policies in the State Department. If Ogburn is a specialist he may be a specific specialist but we cannot say, we can assume at most he is mildly a specialist at journalism or the recording of external information. His qualities and his method to this writing on the State Department must be accepted as viable in order for the material he has presented is to stay relevant and valid. We can assume from the style and comprehensiveness of the writing that he has some journalistic skill and therefore has credibility as a mere journalist, there is no further information given, he has skills like specialists possess wisdom that cannot be contended with, however skill and a repository of information are somewhat different. And his method is fairly detailed and transparent so the method seems to say the least, fine. It may not be truly valid to the fact of reality, but a simulation, however it serves its duty at depicting the transitions and functions of the State System. The method is not specified, the interviewing process, tracking of messages within the system, they are not explicated therefore we have to more than not trust in the qualities of Ogburn, it is not in the science method because the process is not explicated in a manner than could be replicable and there is not real hypothesis either. We have to trust Ogburn like we trust a specialist, which would lend the situation to look like it is wisdom based, however Ogburn is not even a true specialist, and if he is, it simply isnt explicated. So it is definitive that we definitively cannot know, but only trust, and in that manner, even though it seems hardly like science and hardly like wisdom, if there was a comparison to be made, wisdom would have to marginally triumph.
Posted on: Fri, 03 Oct 2014 23:22:51 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015