My studies suggest that the river south of Harrisburg was only fordable between York Haven here in York County and Bainbridge over in Lancaster County, and that ford was uncrossable because of recent high rains. In fact, the 20th Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia, which guarded the ford, had to use rowboats to escape across the river when Jubal Earlys 17th Virginia Cavalry approached them. I am not aware of ANY other fords in York County along the Susquehanna. There may have been a couple up in Cumberland County closer to Harrisburg but again, the river was running high and swift in late June 1863, especially after prolonged rains in mid-June and again on the 25th and 26th. That left the Columbia-Wrightsville Bridge as the only formal crossing south of Harrisburg all the way down to Conowingo, Maryland. Hence, its military importance and the need for the 27th PVM to guard it. Lees orders to Ewell were to take Harrisburg if it comes within your means. Ewell certainly was not in a hurry to get there, which implies to me that neither he nor Lee planned an all-out assault to seize the city. In fact, Ewell idled for two full days at Chambersburg gathering supplies while Governor Curtin and General Couch strengthened Harrisburgs defenses. And, Jubal Earlys actual orders were to burn the Columbia-Wrightsville Bridge to keep reinforcements from Philadelphia from arriving and threatening the Confederate flank. I think Lee desired Harrisburg, but that was not his #1 goal. He wanted to garner as many supplies and horses as possible, threaten the state capital (taking it only if practical), and then defeat the Yankees on Northern soil. If Harrisburg was the ultimate prize, then Ewell should have kept going without pausing so long, sending his cavalry up to Bridgeport much earlier to harass the defenders and having Rodes march his men much more aggressively into position for an attack. He would also have ordered Early to move into position to support the attack.Hookers movement north was certainly faster than Lee imagined, and time ran out. I believe Ewell would have at least tested the defenses more aggressively on Monday, June 29 in preparation for a major assault on the 30th if he thought they could be turned easily, but he was not going to risk losing a division in a fruitless attack if he found the militia well entrenched and ready to fight. If they fled before he advance, then I think he would have tried for the bridge. However, keep in mind that just like at Wrightsville, the state militia was prepared to destroy the Camelback covered bridge and the nearby Cumberland Valley Railroad bridge to keep the Rebels away from Harrisburg. If those two bridges went down, then Ewell had no way to cross the river without a lengthy march north to the next bridge, which incidentally was also to be fired if the Rebels made a serious attempt to seize it. So,the short answer is that Harrisburgs position behind the Susquehanna likely saved it. Lee would certainly have stormed the city if it was on the west bank, but it was not, of course. Hence, the if it comes within your means discretionary order. Get supplies and draw the Yankees into battle, but Hookers unexpected aggressive force-marching of his army (until he lost his job on June 28 to Meade) caused Lee to give battle a few days before he planned to do so. Several observers here in York County believe (based on CSA official reports and what Earlys officers told the populace) that Lee intended to give battle on a line between York and Carlisle (his communications route between Early and Ewell), most likely along Yellow Breeches Creek near Dillsburg. Early was to head there while A.P. Hill was to march to York That, of course, never happened because Lee found out on June 28 through the spy Harrison that the Yankees were much closer than expected.
Posted on: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:44:20 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015