Natural Law Theories: Criticisms The non-universality problem. This criticism points out that so-called natural beliefs are not shared universally, or even generally, among people or cultures. In fact, a comparative study of legal systems indicates that the normal state of affairs is cultural pluralism and a diversity of legal rules which are culture dependent. Neither Grotius nor Lewis would concede that the law of nature is a function of human agreement. That is, the existence of the law of nature does not in any way depend on whether people follow it. Because a law of nature jurisprudence accepts biblical revelation, it is not confined to what people can reason from an observation of the world. In other words, the Bible is the only objective measure of what constitutes the rules of the law of nature. When people embrace laws contrary to biblical revelation, it may only indicate the extent to which people are in rebellion against the Creator. Such rebellion does not mean that the law of nature does not exist. The validity of the criticism of non-universality entirely depends on the non-authenticity of biblical revelation, which was shown not to be a well-reasoned position. The vagueness problem. This criticism notes that a natural law theory based solely on a reasoned observation of the universe will yield little in the way of specific legal rules. In fact, whatever legal rules are derived will be vague and difficult to apply in any particular case. A recent natural law theorist has framed the inner morality of law in solely procedural terms, that is, that law should have the following attributes: 1) generality of application; 2) promulgation of the law to the party affected; 3) prospective legal operation (no ex post facto laws); 4) intelligibility and clarity; 5) avoidance of contradictions; 6) avoidance of impossible demands; 7) constancy or permanence through time; and 8) congruence between official action and declared rule. The implication is that natural law contains no rules of substantive content. See, Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law. However, a law of nature jurisprudence, in which recourse is had to the verbal revelation of Gods law in the Bible, provides a source from which we may derive many rules of substantive law. Historically, this was often done. For example, James Madison argued in favor of the U.S. Constitutions scheme of separation of powers based on reason and experience, or if you will, natural law principles. See, The Federalist No. 47. Such a scheme has support from the experience of ancient Israel and even the language of Isa. 33:22. Madison would be astounded at the inability of modern scholars to discern this basic principle of substantive law from nature. The naturalistic fallacy. This criticism recognizes that natural law theory contains no objective criterion of truth. After all, natural law can, and has, been bent in any direction people have wanted. If the criterion is reason, what makes one persons reasoning better than anothers? Another way of stating this objection is that values (or ought) cannot be derived from facts (or what is). Accordingly, all legal values are infused into the facts by the observer. However, this criticism, however, is itself founded on an objective criterion of truth, that is, that it is objectively reasonable to assume that all reason is subjective. It could be argued that this criterion is itself unreasonable and subjective. Thus, the objection is self-defeating. Although the use of reason is a valid means of ascertaining legal truth, it is not the exclusive means, nor is it the most authoritative means. Whatever we reason to be a rule of the law of nature must be checked against, and is controlled by, Gods law revealed in the Bible. It is the validity of the Bible which lends greater certainty to knowledge of a rule and guards against a continued and corrupted use of reason. The problem of ontological dualism. Ontology is a term referring to the nature of reality. According to this criticism, belief in a transcendent God necessarily involves two realities, whereas only one reality exists. However, a law of nature jurisprudence does not presuppose the existence of two realities. There is only one reality, but that reality has both a spiritual and a physical component. This criticism is just a restatement of the age-old mind-body problem philosophers have struggled with for many years. Human experience indicates that people have both a mind and a body, and these are not exactly the same. Philosophers have been unable to explain how these two realities coexist and interrelate with each other. A common solution to the problem is to assert that the mind does not exist apart from the body and thoughts are merely chemical and electrical in nature. Such a reductionist approach postulates that the only things which really exist are physical (that is, only matter and energy) in nature, and that God cannot exist. However, if a transcendent and immanent God does exist, as discussed above, then the reductionist hypothesis must be wrong. There is no inherent contradiction in God, a spirit, having created people with both a physical body and a spirit. That God would be unable to govern the creation He has made by laws He has revealed makes no sense. The only thing that makes sense is that God can, and does, reveal His laws to us and hold us accountable to them.
Posted on: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 00:42:33 +0000
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