One rationale for this escalation of crime and murder is that few consequences accrue to those responsible. In most years, fewer than 20 per cent of violent crimes are ever solved.1 Even when police and prosecutors mount a case, it generally takes several years before it is brought to trial. During the intervening period, ample opportunities exist to kill or intimidate witnesses. After being criticized for inaction for years, T & T’s government is taking clear steps towards legal reforms that might prevent such practices. Presently being debated by the country’s parliament is anti-gang legislation, including powers to allow the tapping of telephones and the holding of suspects caught with illegal guns for up to 60 days without bail. But the violence in T & T has other roots too. Drawing on field research undertaken in 2009, this report finds that T & T’s police-led efforts to curtail gun violence are mitigated by the government’s direct financial support to urban gangs via public welfare programmes. In exchange, come election days, these gangs have been frequently called upon to turn out loyal supporters and physically menace would-be opposition voters. These tactics are credited with helping the present regime cling to power in the context of an electorate narrowly divided by race. Meanwhile, critics and even some senior members of government allege widespread police corruption. While recognizing that they may be unfairly tarnishing individual officers and units, these sceptics question the effectiveness and willingness of police to crack down on fellow officers who facilitate and profit from crime. Because of such stories, and because they are perceived as unable to check the spiralling violence, public trust in the police is low (Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, 2009c). To change this dynamic, national politicians may need to increase the activities of the more disciplined elements within the police while implementing programmes that do not enhance gangs outright. Put another way, probes may be required of sections within the police force and of possible mismatches of governmental policies that affect gangs. Finally, security forces may need to change their tactics. Vigorous policing may only go so far regarding the situation in Port of Spain. With this in mind, following the killing of a soldier home on leave, the police and army recently attempted to conduct a stronger counter-insurgency-style operation—the army and police have been stationed on street corners in the concentrated areas where drug- and gun-related crime is high. However, this operation lasted only a few days and was more concerned with finding the soldier’s killers than attempting to break the authority of local thugs. Without changing policing tactics, without modernizing anti-gang laws, without investigating corruption within the police, and without confronting the semi-official support extended to gangs, the likelihood appears modest of overcoming gun-related crime any time soon.
Posted on: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 23:24:38 +0000
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