People who think that all wars are won by superior morale put the cart before the horse. It is very very rare for an army to be demoralised before it even engages the enemy. On the contrary, men seem to get the blood pumping when they know battle is imminent, and theyre often even eager for it. A desire to come to grips and test their mettle is not evidence of demoralisation. Now that phenomenon has distinct causes. The best way to demoralise soldiers is to avoid battle entirely, that implies you have no faith in your men and perhaps none in yourself. It also implies fear on your part, fear that youll lose. Such stances are not missed by soldiers. The second best way to cause demoralisation, obviously, is to lose battles. But even lost battles dont necessarily result in demoralisation if the men fought well and acquitted themselves well. It is only in the most disastrous of battles, where the retreat is bungled and chaotic, or where the commander proved himself utterly inept, that morale is broken. Understanding these factors, we realise that demoralisation is a symptom of defeat rather than a cause. To say that one country won a war because it was more determined is nonsense. For it won the engagement(s) using superior tactics which then in turn resulted in the enemys demoralisation. For example at Königgrätz. Benedek deserted the field and left his men to scramble over the Elbe bridges as best they could in the most haphazard of ways, and it was obvious that the Prussians were elated by their triumph and the Austrians miserable. But for the whole day the Austrians had fought well, and were in good spirits. Mollinary had led them to victory in Swiep Forest where they acted spiritedly to drive the Prussians out. And for the whole afternoon they were itching to attack the Prussians and eagerly waiting for Benedek to give the command. They waited in vain, and with the sudden arrival of the Prussian Second Army on their right flank, their line was subjected to immense pressure and at last buckled. It was only at that moment that the Austrians became demoralised and broke ranks. But to say they lost because of this is completely incorrect. They had already lost due to Benedeks poor leadership and the careful timetables calculated by Moltke. So it was not superior Prussian determination or morale that won the day and the war. It was Moltkes clever conduct of the battle. When Mollinary attacked the Prussians in Swiep Forest the King wished to reinforce them with his reserves. Moltke reminded His Majesty that the reserves would be necessary later in the day, and that the Prussians would have to swallow being defeated at Swiep. Though the King was unhappy, he listened to his generals advice. In the meantime Moltke was pushing the Second Army to arrive with all haste while he pinned the Austrians in place on their centre and left. The Prussian attacks were well timed, and the pressure on the Austrian right became a rout when Moltke committed his reserves that he was saving all day to join in a general advance all along the line. It was this that defeated the Austrians and caused their demoralisation. A similar case could be made for the French at Waterloo, who certainly fought with great energy until the arrival of the Prussians in force, especially since Napoleon had lied and told them that it was Grouchy returning with reinforcements. When the Guard had been driven back by the British, and the French realised that it was not Grouchy but the Prussians, their nerve failed. But again, to say thats why Napoleon lost Waterloo is nonsense. He lost Waterloo because Wellington picked superb defensive positions for his soldiers, and because Grouchy failed to either intercept the Prussians or reinforce Napoleon. These twin factors resulted in French demoralisation. So the reality is that if an army is demoralised it is because it has already been defeated, or because its commanders have no faith in it. To simply say one army won because it was more determined is intellectual laziness and impossible to sustain against any serious scholarship, since it ignores every other pertinent factor, any of which could be of much greater import. No competent historian will ever make such a contention, especially since nebulous concepts like morale are impossible to quantify. On the eve of an engagement how can anybody establish that one side or the other was more determined of victory? Simply consenting to accept battle implies a resolution to win it. No commander who is convinced he will lose a battle will accept one. It is also insulting to the men who gave their lives in their countrys service. How could one be willing to die but not be committed to victory? What more could they possibly sacrifice for it? It is an argument based solely on ignorance and arrogance. Presupposing your soldiers are somehow inherently superior to those of others just because, and glossing over the other components influencing events. Clausewitz is famous for identifying the fog of war, and recognising that any little thing can go wrong and cost an army the battle. So if you dismiss everything with a cozy assurance that you can explain every battle by saying the losers just didnt have the guts to get the job done, then military history isnt your calling.
Posted on: Sat, 16 Aug 2014 01:48:24 +0000
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