Please tell me this logic is wrong. Everything about civilization depends upon electrical power. A Carrington event, one in which there is a Coronal Mass Ejection, or CME, could fry electrical systems including satellites, electrical grid transformers, and electronics in almost everything that was not protected by a Faraday cage. There would be about a 20 hour warning provided that satellite communication and detection devices from satellites were able to function long enough to give warning. There are ways to mitigate the problem, and the link below gives some recommendations. This is our governments attempt to understand and prepare for such an event. As is the case with such studies, the areas studied are incomplete, and the recommendations made have gone un-heeded. This study was done at the beginning of 2011. In 2012 there was a movement in Congress to address these issues and in particular how to protect nuclear power plants from loss of cooling for Spent Fuel Pools. Once again, there has been no action regarding this initiative. So my conclusion then is that since there are very severe threats to civilization, and since we recognize those threats and do not take action to deal with them, and in fact do the opposite of what we should be doing, then the problem is only getting worse. How do you protect yourself? 1. Get a portable gas powered generator and store it in a Faraday Cage. 2. Install a whole house/business surge protector between the electric service meter and your service (circuit breaker) panel. See the HD2 Home/Business Surge Protector. 3. Plug all individual electronics into a surge protector. Click here to see a full selection of surge protectors. 4. Encourage all of your neighbors to do the same. To be the only household in your neighborhood with power will make you a target. At this time there is little evidence that power companies are taking the steps necessary to protect the national power grid from a NEMP or a CME. In all likelihood, it will take Legislation from the U.S. Congress to force power companies to spend the money necessary to harden the national power grid. Go to EMPact America to learn how to make your voice heard by your congressional representative. It would take 2 to 5 years to re-build our national power grid if we were hit by a Carrington-sized CME. The U.S. Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse predicts that within the first year of a total failure of the power grid, 60 to 80 percent of the population would not survive. The only thing that we can do right now to change this mortality rate is to purchase a portable generator, store it in a Faraday cage and encourage all of your neighbors to do the same. If our way of life in the United States is to be preserved, every household should possess a portable gas-powered electric generator and protect it within a Faraday Cage. - See more at: empandsolarprotection/2012/04/which-is-the-greater-danger-a-solar-flare-or-a-nuclear-emp/#sthash.vBsQajz2.dpuf oecd.org/governance/risk/46891645.pdf Countries located in northern latitudes, such as Canada, the United States, and the Scandinavian nations, are extremely vulnerable to geomagnetic storms. Power systems located in these countries are more likely to experience significant GICs because of their location in the northern latitudes, the soil type (igneous rock) surrounding electrical infrastructure which is a somewhat better conductor, and the fact that transmission networks in these countries cover longer distances to the load center (an area that has high demand for power) (Kappenman and Albertson, 1990). Power systems located in the northern regions of the North American continent are extremely vulnerable because of their proximity to the Earth‘s magnetic north pole (Kappenman et al., 1990). Countries farther south also can be susceptible to geomagnetic storms but the severity of consequences is likely less than for those in the northern latitudes. … Additionally, emergency and medical systems could be strained and food supplies dependent on just-in-time delivery could face shortages (NAS, 2008). Leading experts on geomagnetic storms state that potential effects from major geomagnetic storms on the U.S. power grid could persist for multiple years and in turn, ―could pose the risk of the largest natural disaster that could affect the United States.‖ (U.S. House Homeland Security Committee, 2009). Government agencies, along with international firms (construction, agricultural, oil and gas), use precision geolocation services reliant on GPS signals to carry out their operations. Geomagnetic storms can degrade the strength of and distort signals emitted by GPS satellites. The consequence of such a disruption is that GPS receivers ―miss a user‘s exact location.‖ For example, errors in location given by the GPS signal could affect positioning operations of deep-ocean drilling platforms, which could result in the platform changing its position and causing a drill line to break (NAS, 2008). Geomagnetic storms also have the potential to damage satellites permanently, but signal degradation is a more common consequence of this space weather phenomenon … The potential for loss of life is low in this scenario, restricted to indirect loss of life associated with the loss of electricity and the resulting cascading effects on other critical infrastructures. The loss of electricity could cause mass transit and passenger rail systems to fail and traffic signals to stop working, both situations where accidents could ensue. The loss of refrigeration could affect those who rely on medications that must be kept cold. Water shortages due to the failure of electrical pumps to convey the water or power the purification plants could also lead to acute exposure to toxicants or disease. Firefighters would not have access to water to put out fires and hospitals would not have access to water to take care of at-risk patients. In each case, however, other circumstances beyond a geomagnetic event are necessary to lead to injury, illness, or death. … In the event of an extreme geomagnetic storm resulting in permanent internal damage to satellites, launch capacity is insufficient to satisfy replacement needs. In 2009, 78 satellite launches occurred worldwide. This represented a decrease of 40 percent from 2008, a trend explained by global macroeconomic conditions. Global launch capacity under normal circumstances would seem to be approximately 100 to 110 satellites annually. At first glance, this capacity would seem adequate to launch 25 satellites to replace damaged commercial communications satellites after an extreme geomagnetic storm. But, these 25 replacement satellites would represent additional demand above and 34 beyond existing estimates forecasting demand for 20 new commercial communications satellite launches annually between 2010 and 2019 (FAA, 2010). … Other First-Order Consequences In addition to the electrical power sector and the satellite communications sector, a geomagnetic storm could cause first-order disruptions in the following sectors: wireline communications, transportation (rail, aviation, mass transit, and pipelines) and IT. Out of these sectors, the freight rail transportation sector is the only sector with second-order disruptions. These include: critical manufacturing, defense industrial base, food and agriculture and commercial sectors. Second-order disruptions stemming from first-order disruption to the rail transportation sector lessen over time and are not expected to extend beyond a few weeks at most. … Given the lack of electric power described in the scenario, the most effective means for communication might be word of mouth or radios and phones. The sheer number of people affected may be sufficient for self-organization (with organization being the second stage of social unrest). Similarly it is possible that such populations would be self-mobilizing (with mobilization being the third stage). Work stoppages and school closings certainly would provide a large number of people with the time and availability for large-scale protests and demonstrations. The fourth stage of social unrest, organized civil violence, would be unlikely. In past power outages, looting has occurred (and would be highly likely to recur), but deliberate and organized civil violence seems much less likely than isolated violence or small outbreaks of destructive or maladaptive activity. ...
Posted on: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 11:28:28 +0000
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