Power, Authority, and the Intentional Mind (UPDATED to include part of Section 2.) My primary goal in this work is to demonstrate the politicization of some thoughts; another way to say this is I want to show that, at least, one thought I have, like some thinking I do, is a thought that is not permitted, by some Government, by some Corporation, or by some single person. Secondary to that, I want to elucidate upon this claim that technology is a mechanism of power. The reasons for my goals are provoked by two principal concerns. First, an intuitive idea that, sometimes, thought differs from thinking. Here, I am going to say that, sometimes, the content of a person’s thought and the content of their thinking differ. So, I will consider more closely in what sense, and to what extent, my suspicion will be upheld. Second, my feeling that new technologies afford people new ways of expressing thoughts (i.e. text message, Instagram post, Facebook status update, writing thoughts down and publishing a book, etc.), but, also, supplying access to new ways in which to apply power over the individual. The blueprint for my proposal is as follows. In section 1, I explain my thesis of Intentional thought. I distinguish between thought and thinking, which describes two different modes of mind, and provide treatment for both. Any theory of mind, of how consciousness functions, of how thoughts can be about things, is going to need to distinguish between thoughts and thinkings. So, more specifically, I will lay out exactly in what sense a person’s thought might differ from their thinking. In section 2, I conceive of the generation of the social group, of society, and give a fundamental account for it. But, this paper is not just about the formation of a social network through an exchange of thoughts, transactions of thinkings. It is a paper about Power, Authority, and the Intentional mind. So, the overarching theme of section 3 is of the emergence of the political realm and of the politicization of some thoughts, of permissible and of prohibited thought. But, a person is both body and mind, so, in the first part, I discuss the politicization of bodies in space and time. I give an analysis that is similar to Foucault’s. I maintain that the space of body of prisoner and citizen, the body’s actions in prison and society, its gestures and sounds, its meaning and significance, is an object of political discourse and convention. In the second part of section 3, I call attention to the politicization of minds in space and time, wherein I insist that the thoughts persons have, usually indicated by the thinkings they do in physical acts or speech acts, are an object of political discourse and practice. In the final section of this paper are the implications of my analysis. Technology is everywhere and not one person escapes its effects. Section 1. Thought, like thinking, is an Intentional mode of mind. I think upon careful introspection that any reasonable person will conclude they have thoughts; so, as a preliminary declaration, I want to say that minds have thoughts or thought-events; and, going forward, I will only use the terms “thought” or “thought’d”. I will say things like, “His thought ‘The car[BMW] is black’”, and, “He thought’d ‘The [Black]cat is on the perch”. Pay attention to the notation I am using. In the previous thoughts both “BMW” and “Black”, being a part of the reference, respectively, are part of the content of the thought but this doesn’t require them to be a part of the content of thinking, of the utterance, of the vocalization, or gesture. It is most important for me to make clear my fundamental commitments in this paper; I presuppose knowledge of the works of other philosopher’s, such as Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Sluga’s “Thinking as Writing”; but, most importantly, I take for granted to a great extent John Searle’s Theory of Mind. His basic assumption in Intentionality and Speech Acts, as well as, “What is Language”, was that some physical actions and all language are Intentional acts of mind; this fundamental supposition carries over to thought and thought-actions (i.e. acts transforming thoughts) like thinking, imagining and feeling, which, after this point, I will cluster under the term “thinking” but, sometimes, I will use “thought-in-action”, “think act ”, or “think’d”. I will say things like, “His thinking ‘The car is black’”, and, “His speaking was his thought-in-action”, and “Behind every think act is its thought”, and, “He think’d ‘The cat is on the perch’”. Before speaking about my distinction, I want to emphasize my position that the expressions of thinking (i.e. gestures and sounds, linguistic and physical) derive from the content of thought but this doesn’t entail that the two do not come apart, which is my concern here. Within the category of modes of mind, I want to distinguish between thought and thinking. But, at least, on Searle’s Theory of Mind, there is no distinguishing between the two, because, for the person, their thinking is always an accurate presentation of thought. However, the mechanism for securing thinking still depends essentially on the content of the thought. So, for instance, if I am thinking ‘The car is black’, my thinking doesn’t give me any descriptive material, since it gains it from thought through its presentation of content. Of course, I’ve already alluded to the difference between thought and thinking and the fact that, I think, some of the content of thought is not represented by thought-in-action. On the one hand, I can say I think’d ‘The car is black’; but, on the other hand, I can say I thought’d ‘The car[BMW] is black’. In both cases, I’ve referred to the same thing, more precisely, ‘car’. Yet, for Searle, thinking expressed my thought and provided a legitimate presentation of it. I disagree. Theories of Mind should probably ask, “Is thinking always an accurate presentation of thought?” Another way to put this might be to ask if it’s possible that thinking fail to express some of the content of the thought that produced it. That is, can thinking fail to specify some of the conditions of satisfaction of the content of the thought that brought it about? It seems clear to me that we should say for a child that the content of their gestures, the semantic content of utterances, and the content of the thoughts that produce them do not differ, and cannot come apart. Consider the case of a child that is trying to exchange thoughts and thinkings with a parent. Let’s imagine a 2 year old child. The child engages in gestures such as waving their arms around in the air, makes sounds, maybe a vocalization like “GHAH” or “BOOWHA”, which express the content of the child’s thought. Though I agree with Searle about the Internalist Account of Mind, I claimed, sometimes, thought and thinking differ. Typically, one expresses thought by way of either gestures, sounds, or some combination of the two. However, noting the role of thinking, we should question whether or not thinking expresses thought in its entirety. Remember, on a Searlean account, the question is answered by the direct presentation of the content of the thought. That is, in the thought ‘The car[BMW] is black’, “BMW”, being part of the reference, is, necessarily, part of the content of thinking, which means it is part of the content of the gesture or speech act. While I agree that thinking is given a direct presentation of the content of the thought that produces it, the problem here is this does not entail that, necessarily, thinking express, in its entirety, the content of the thought that produces it. Some of the very subtle features of the content of the thought that produce thinking don’t have to be made explicit during think acts. Suppose while at a dog park I say to my friend, pointing, ‘The cat is on the perch’. Which ‘cat’ have I referred to with my thinking? After all, I have two cats and there is no cat in the dog park. And, where on the ‘perch’ has my thinking referenced? In the case I just mentioned, my speaking is supposed to indicate my thought-in-action. However, it doesn’t seem to completely identify the content of my thought. And, at least, on Searle’s view, we’d have to say either the thought behind thinking did not determine the reference (i.e. which ‘cat’ I was thinking of or where on the ‘perch’ I had in mind) or thinking did not make explicit some of the content of the thought. True, the content of thought determines the content of thinking. However, sometimes, thought-in-action fails to express some of the very subtle features of the content of the thought that produces it- whether subject, location, or time. We now have, at least, one way in which, sometimes, a person’s thought and thinking differ. With a basic structure of mind in place, I would like to clarify my project. So far our theory of Intentional thought takes the following shape. Thought, like thinking, is an Intentional mode of mind. Think acts express thoughts, although some of the very subtle features of the content of thought itself are not, necessarily, expressed during the act. For the rest of this paper, thought and thinking are crucial both to the generation of society and to the emergence of the political realm. Central to these is the claim that, sometimes, thought and thinking differs. And, whether or not there is a difference between someone’s thought and thinking is crucial to the tactics of institutions (i.e. the Corporation, the State) and individuals. Section 2. The social group is the generated by exchanges of thoughts, transactions of thinkings. In light of the account I have just given, in this section, I discuss society. To begin, I want to say that our social group is not the product of power but is generated by human exchanges of thoughts, transactions of thinkings. By “society” and “social”, I understand, at least, two conditions. First condition: in order for an exchange or transaction to be social, it must include two or more separate entities. Second condition: in order for entities to make a successful transaction or exchange of content, there must be a common discourse for understanding meaning, for comprehension of each other’s messages. For the reader, it is critical to understand that both Searle and I draw a distinction between language and a common language. For example, in order for two separate people, Parent and Child, to communicate, they need a common discourse for understanding each other’s messages. There are, of course, two questions that pervade my thoughts. To most, the first is not unfamiliar, “What is language?” Searle says it entails the Intentional imposition of meaning on things (i.e. sounds, vocalizations, pen marks, physical movements, etc.). For the purposes of this paper, I am satisfied with his treatise; however, I wonder, is thought an effect of language or does language function to capture Intentional material that expresses the topology of a thought? Rather, the question might be better asked, “Could the brain have thoughts absent a language?” Of course, though, the focus I have, in this section, is tailored to my second question, “What role do thought and thinking play in the generation of society?” We know, already, Thinker utters, using a language, imposing meaning on a sound, during a think act, which expresses the content of thought. For example, a rock falls, crushing a person’s foot. The person utters, “Ɏ”, which expresses the content of the thought. Consider what Searle says in Making the Social World. He wants to argue that the formation of the group enters the realm of social upon people’s exchanges of thoughts, transactions of thinkings, in a common language, but, that a common language requires a collective intentionality regarding the meaning of things, regarding the meaning of signs and symbols, and, it includes certain protocols for successfully agreeing. On Searle’s view, everyone in the social network is a conduit of its power. Notice that for two separate entities to agree upon the meaning of a thing, necessarily, each must lay out their initial conditions of satisfaction, and, then, layer onto those conditions additional conditions of satisfaction. For example, a person points at (P) and says, “O”. A different person says, “U”, while pointing at (P). The reader might imagine that, in regards to a common language, knowledge of whether or not a person’s thought and thinking differ is fundamental to successfully agreeing upon the meaning of things. Say we are agree ‘A is B’, but one of us thought’d ‘A is B[A]’, while the other thought’d ‘A is B[B]’, then did we think’d and mean the same thing when we agreed? No. In fact, if I think’d ‘The car is black’ but thought’d ‘The car[BMW] is black’, and, if you think’d ‘The car is black’ but thought’d ‘The car[Porsche] is black’, then it doesn’t seem our thinking agree, ‘The car is black’, even though we think it does. Let’s return to technology. To begin with, power, I understand, we discover in an economy of the exchange of thoughts and thinkings. But, power is being reinscribed into technology. ...to be continued (AR).
Posted on: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 04:33:43 +0000
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