Presumably the rise of China entails the decline of the United States. Two pieces of conventional wisdom in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy debates. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization—the integration of national economies and resultant diffusion of technology from developed to developing countries—and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. An alternative, though less prevalent, perspective rejects both of these assumptions. In this view, U.S. power is durable, and globalization and America’s hegemonic role are the main reasons why. The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or “declinist,” perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China’s growth by “[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy” and subdue China’s ambitions by “disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia.” If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia. Over the last two decades, globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens have expanded signiªcantly, yet the United States has not declined; in fact it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. The widespread misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of analytical ºaws, the most common of which is the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.-China power balance from data that compare China only to its former self. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China’s per capita income, value added in high-technology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude that China is catching up. This focus on growth rates, however, obscures China’s decline relative to the United States in all of these categories. China’s growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up. This article proceeds in three sections. First, I discuss the theoretical foundations of the declinist and alternative perspectives. Second, I test these two perspectives empirically. Finally, I discuss the dangers of the false belief in American decline. hegemony is not just preponderant power, it is “structural power.” It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after fighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”
Posted on: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 20:16:39 +0000
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