Report blames Nehru, his favourite general, IB chief for 1962 China war defeat For the first time, the famous Henderson Brooks report detailing the reasons for Indias humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 has been made public. The leaked report squarely blames the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, his favourite army officer Lt Gen BM Kaul and the then director Intelligence Bureau (DIB) BN Mullick for the military debacle. The report was made public Monday by Neville Maxwell, a former journalist at The Times, London, and author of one of the most well-known books on the war, Indias China War. All these years, he had held on to the report, a copy of which he had been given earlier. Maxwell wrote on his website that the report was being made public as he wanted to end his complicity in keeping it a secret. Curiously, his website was no longer accessible hours after he uploaded the report. A copy is now available on the Hindustan Times website. The report was prepared by Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat on the instructions of the then Chief of Army Staff General JN Chaudhuri. Curiously, he left out the role played by Army HQs from the scope of the report. However, the functioning of the army headquarters has not been touched in the report on the advice of the Chief of Army Staff, Brooks and Bhagat had said in the final version of the report. Much of the trouble began with Nehrus Forward Policy, which was militarily unsustainable. Nehru had instructed the military to continue building military posts in areas claimed by the Chinese while receiving assurances from Mullick that there would be no reaction. The report said the thinking that the Chinese would not react to Indias establishing new posts with force was contrary to the military intelligence appreciation. Worse, the role played by Lt Gen Kaul as the Chief of General Staff led to the 1962 debacle. The report said the Indian side would not have precipitated matters till it was better prepared. But for that to happen, the General Staff at Army HQs should have assessed the situation realistically and accordingly informed the NEFA (North East Frontier Agency, present-day Arunachal Pradesh), the report said. Other damning parts of the report show the Indian army did not act on the basis of its own strengths but on the erroneous belief that the Chinese would not react. It also notes that militarily it is unthinkable that the General Staff did not advise the government about the weakness of the Indian side and the armys inability to implement the Forward Policy. While noticing there might have been pressure from the defence ministry, the reports authors said it was Lt Gen Kauls duty to tell the government that the Forward Policy was untenable. But Lt Gen Kaul repeatedly ordered Forward Policy must be carried out, over ruling the protests made by the armys Western Command. In 1962, Western Command was in charge of the entire western and northern borders right up to Ladakh. In a castigating observation, the report noted that to base military actions and jeopardise the security of troops on suppositions and beliefs put across at conference tables indicates either acceptance of such belief or a militarily immature mind. In fact, the report notes that while it has tried to keep away from mentioning personalities, it had no option but to look at the role played by Lt Gen Kaul, who had taken over the newly-formed IV Corps by October 1962. The report provides details about the orders given by Lt Gen Kaul the Indian army was in no position to carry out. These orders were given to hold on to posts and bridges. It particularly singles out Lt Gen Kauls decision to keep crucial army Brigades in tactically unsound positions. Between October 10 and 20, the report states there was a major period of indecision as Lt Gen Kauls troops began to face major setbacks. After several Indian positions fell to the Chinese onslaught during this period, Lt Gen Kaul requested a visit to Delhi brief Prime Minister Nehru. The report notes that a meeting took place with the Chief of Army Staff Gen PN Thapar, the DIB, the cabinet and foreign secretaries and other luminaries. While minutes of the meeting were not available, the report drew on the Eastern Army Commanders report and found complete indecisiveness on the part of the senior political, bureaucratic and military leadership. Curiously, newspapers reported the meeting and stated that a decision had been taken to evict the Chinese. But, as the report points out, no decision was taken. In fact, the report found it strange that these meetings were too top secret for minutes to be kept, yet they were announced in the newspapers. The leaked report just a month ahead of the 2014 general elections has already stirred up a spate of reactions. The BJP has already called for the document to be made public.
Posted on: Tue, 18 Mar 2014 17:44:26 +0000
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