Study: Iyad Quneibi, Model of Moderate Salafism: (Study By Ahmed Abazid; Translation by Dani Murad) (Zaman Al Wasl)- A Jordanian-based Jihadist cleric Eyad Quneibi, announced in the end of August that he will stop commenting on the Syrian affairs temporarily, due to the intense criticism he faced flowing his recent statement about ( the concept of Sunni alliance) in which he commented on “Ahrar Al Sham” for joining the initiative of “adherence to Gods command” or “Eatasemo” ,which involves 40 rebel factions in Syria, forming the largest alliance of opposition fighters. Qunaibi, was blamed for accusing the initiative of treason, and for his attempts to break up any unification initiative, and leaders of Ahrar Al Sham such as (Abuabdallah al-hamwei, abu Yazan al-shami) were the first to criticize the “theorizing” of Quneibi from abroad. In the following, we will try to describe Quneibi’s speech and his position in the jihadist map, in addition to his most prominent problematic stances. The local Syrian revolutionary and the global jihadist : Syria’s situation was no different from most of the Arab repressed courtiers because of dictatorship, absolute monarchy, human rights violations, and political corruption, consequently the country was affected by the Arab spring in 2011, however the emergence of the Syrian revolution and its stages were immersed in localism, not only in the causes of its eruption, in which the Islamic, national, and local reasons mixed together, but also for the huge base of people who joined it, therefore the revolution was somewhat a reviving of the local person in the face of the authoritarian, which dominates the country as an occupier. With the development of the Syrian revolution to armed action, in summer of 2011, and with the spread of free Syrian army (FSA) as a general phenomenon in Syria, the jihadist movement” began to emerge through “Al Nusra Front”, which was first announced on 24 January, 2012, and evolved into the end of the same year to be one of the most effective powers on the ground, yet its development coincided with an increasing number of immigrants who joined the fighting in Syria, mostly from jihadist salafi organizations, enrolling in the rows of Al Nusra and other Islamic factions. This phenomena of “immigrants flocking to the Syrian revolution” was because of the Islamic parties in Syria such as “The Muslim brotherhood” who failed to adopt a jihadist speech and did not send or receive volunteers to fight in Syria, therefore the “jihadist Salafi approach” was the only choice left for volunteers, and to make matters worse, regime’s sectarianism and recruiting Shiite militias (Iranian, Lebanese, Iraqi, and Afghan) increased the jihadist movement and gave a credibility to Assad’s sectarian basis of the conflict. But the biggest transformation was the declaration of the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria “ISIS” in April 9, 2013, creating the deepest crisis experienced by both, the global jihadist movement and the Syrian revolution, and this state now controls vast areas in Syria and Iraq. And despite the localization of the revolution in its beginning, this characteristic whether in its peaceful or armed stages, has made the revolution one of the most supported causes, and gained an overwhelming Arabic and Islamic support in the recent decades, in addition to being embraced by the “Salafi” movements, who in the beginning didn’t find any problem with the revolution’s flag for example, considering it a sign of a fair cause that they support. In contrast, the entry of al-Qaeda and the Jihadist Salafist movement in general, provided the jihadists theorists with a double support, and that support was linked to the jihadist factions in particular, and also led to the involvement of the West in the heart of the Syrian conflict, and after the struggle was only limited to the Syrian regime, it became a global one. Moreover, the globalization of the conflict attracted more foreign jihadist experiences from the Caucasus, Afghanistan and Arab countries, and introduced new tactics and fighting capabilities that were unusual among local factions, and despite weakening the Syrian regime in more than one axis, it gave it great credibility to the image of “terrorism” which the regime has been trying to portray about the revolution. Not to mention that making the conflict more ideological, led to many theories on the application of Sharia ,the purity of faith and the establishment of the caliphate, which dominated the revolutionary society as a whole, and this ideological struggle became the decisive factor in many of the paths taken by the revolution, or failed to take, and therefore the jihadists supported fighting in Syria as al-Jihad al-Shami and the cause of the nation, and despite their globalization, they supported the revolution which is sunk in it localism. And the intensive presence of the Salafi Jihad speech in the Syrian case, and its ability to influence and draw paths, even among the factions who are not ideologically or organizationally affiliated with it, can be understood if we examine the religious institutions in Syria, since it’s noticeable that no religious Sheiks were involved the revolutionary movement except for a few abroad, creating a vacuum and a platform that needed a jihadist speech appropriate for the impact of war (for details, see the study revolution of the abandoned by the writer). Jihadi media: Denunciation of modernity from the inside The generalization of “reviving the past” in the global jihadist situation and portraying it as the regaining of eternal desert was the result of the Orientalistic trend in studying the Islamic phenomena” which avoided understanding Jihad in depth. Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, talked about an academic paradox in the Western social studies, and he said: “we study our phenomena as sociology while we study other’s cases as a branch of anthropology”, therefore, what is practiced here as an objectively neutral approach induces a colonial war that left its physical method to use the symbolic field. And despite its prevalence in media, this caricature and Orintalistic image of Jihad was “shortened” in the field of research and serious studies, especially in the Arab world, in order to avoid understanding it, because they ideologically rejected the subject and considered it unworthy of studying. On the contrary, the west raised discussions about this Jihadist phenomenon, and there were “philosophical and sociological uncertainties in understanding it, parallel to the security and intelligence studies of the evolution of these movements, which considered them as “insurgencies” operating against the international system and they fight their war and renew their tools from inside this system. That was the answer of Jacques Derrida when asked about the terrorism of September 11, saying that that the most terrifying fact in that terrorism that it was an inside operation, because the people who blew up the towers used American techniques of modernism to destroy American achievements, and the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard considered the bombing of two towers as an act of terrorism that can not be understood in isolation from the globalization of terrorism, and that al-Qaeda is an anti-violence movement, against America’s globalization of Jihad. Perhaps the most striking manifestation of modernity and contemporary in the jihadist phenomenon was in media, where it was noticeable that the jihadist speech invaded this field, spreading ideas and mobilizing people by using text messages, cassettes, and even jihadist forums created a generation of websites’ theorists who are able to strongly influence the inner jihadist conflicts without being known as individuals. In the last decade, the “virtual jihadist world” has transformed to social media websites such as (Twitter, Face book, YouTube, etc.) especially with the influence of the latter on the events in the Arab world, and Twitter was mainly used by the Khaliji people” because it’s the most universal and favourite among jihadists, more than Face book which is preferred by people who are less interested in the jihadist or financial dimensions like (the Levant and Egypt in particular), and that explains the distribution of jihadist ideologues on the sites and the extent of follow-up they gain. And based on this point, Quneibi can be considered an influential jihadist among supporters from (the Levant and the Egypt), more than influencing the Gulf circles (Jazrawi). Many noted in reply to Quneibi’s statement on (the concept of Sunni alliance) to the fact that he is a pharmacist” and has no right to talk in legitimate affairs, in fact, this criticism was one of the reason of his success and why his speech spread out, overcoming the challenge of modernity and scientific excellence, by being a bearer of Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of Houston, with an excellent average, and therefore he undermines the past image of jihadists. Quneibi was arrested late 2010 by the Jordanian intelligence, to be released in the beginning of 2013, and from that point he became an influential phenomenon affecting Islamists in general and jihadist movements in particular who increased with the fall of Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt and following the spring of Arab revolutions, and his huge base of followers can be observed in Friday sermons in the Jordanian capital Amman, or in his own speeches which are common among popular and Islamic circles, not necessarily affiliated with the jihadists. yet, Quneibi had many problematic stances from democracy that do not differ much from other Salafi jihadists, but his speech is more modern and closer to everyday language, without being isolated from the issues of Islamists, as when he referred to Erdogan’s good qualities or the sufferings of the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas’s heroism, warning always of the danger of reconciling with the democratic model “Kafer”. In his speech, Quneibi tries to build a popular base, using a moderate language that solves all the problems and shows itself as a pure model, a language suitable to impose itself as a reference for those looking for an answer to relief their conscience in the time of temptation, as this speech fights moderation and extremism”. This conditional support of issues, the more it shows tolerant with the other, but it (according to Habermas’s communicative theory) rejects the concept of tolerance because it means it’s opposite. Quneibi contributed in rationalizing the jihadist speech, and had a clear impact in reducing IS’s growing trend by gaining more potential advocators of the State, depending on his moderate speech, in addition to that, he helped unlock the isolation which supporters of the jihadist movement imposed on themselves by rejecting Islamic and non-Salafi jihadist revolutionary movements, to transform them from estrangement and hostility, to criticism and correction. Quneibi in the Syrian Revolution Quneibi’s stance from the Syrian revolution is not different from the general framework that we identified in the previous part, where he worked on building a bridge of communication with a popular cause, in order not to isolate the jihadist movement from the popular incubators, yet this communication is done through jihadists’ references and foundations of rejecting democracy and “national projects , condemning in the same time IS’s extremism against the people and nation. Moreover, Quneibi criticized the term “Brothers of methodology” or “ brothers of Manhaj”, stressing on the importance of solidarity among brothers of religion”. The fact that this speech is moderate and keen to maintain it popular base, that does not mean that it always adhere to positions away from radicalism”. For example Abu Maria Al-Qahtani considered fighting ISIS and expelling them from Syria and Iraq a priority using in expressing that the harshest language. While Quneibi who is more moderate and less attached to the jihadist salafi, opposed fighting ISIS, or accusing them of treason, even considering them enemies at all, instead he tries to attract them to his side. This distinction can not be understood without specifying the the audience which defines the problem between both of them, because Qahtani’s audience are fighters and jihadists on the ground ,who face ISIS for months, therefore he aims from his speech to stop the expansion of the organization and its attacks, while Quneibi’s audience “ are supporters” of the new young jihadists, who identify with their massive number, the public opinion in the virtual space, therefore he presents to them an ideal theoretical speech to keep them away from Extremism and Secularism. Quneibi criticized the Islamic Front when announced in November 22 /2013, since it aimed to establish a national project that contradicts with the global jihadist project that includes all nationalities, and most importantly for declaring a political project that is different from Salafi Jihadi project , to the extent that he criticized the factions in Syria and prohibited fighting under their flag. In addition to that, he objected on ISIS’s violations against Ahrar Al Sham and other factions, but warned of fighting against it, and his famous quote (waiting for the first shot) was adjacent to the outbreak of war against IS, because he considered fighting IS as the holocaust of mujahideen, which will only satisfy the international system. Quneibi prioritized unifying Jihadists rows over the revolutionary “agendas” which sees in ISIS, a threatening project that destroyed the revolution existence. And since the beginning of the current year, stances toward IS have become the millstone for all discussions and classifications in the jihadist circles of the Syrian Revolution, and therefore Quneibi was keen to show an ideal stance by some times criticizing both IS’s violations and fighting it in the same time, or criticizing the state’s extremism, and blaming other factions for their compliance to the West. In more than one speech , Quneibi mentioned IS’s arguments and excuses to fight the Syrian factions and Al Nusra Front, and in one of his speeches about “al-Sahwat”, a term used by IS to describe its opponents and classify the Syrian fighters to 14 factions, depending on their stance of democracy ,Sharia, and the establishment of caliphate. According to him, the jihadist project has no problem with the free army and whether its fighters are religious or non religious, but the problem lies in the danger of having an opponent project that has international anti- jihadist links, such as “Hazem movement” and “Syria’s revolutionaries Front”, who always referred at in the virtual jihadist world as being secular”, puppet and agents to the international system. This accusation was behind the light criticism directed to “The Islamic Front” ,and then the comments made on the revolutionary Charter of Honor and despite using soft language to establish a perfect balance and contribute to the rationalization of the situation) Quneibi was more intense towards the military and political project “the initiative of Eatasemo” which if it’s implemented, it will cause the loss of (Ahrar Al Sham) the closest ally to the jihadist Salfi movement and will lead to a semi-detachment from the internationalist jihadist project. In his speech, Quneibi explains the concept of Sunni Alliance, saying : “ it’s justified to fight with heretic or non religious fighters as long as the goal is legitimate, but that cant be applied if these fighters are fighting on behave of the international system, which is known for its complicity against people of al-Sham and their struggle, and he distinguished between neutralizing these West-agent factions until toppling the regime, and uniting with them to achieve a goal that they were not originated to achieve in the first place, on the contrary their aims are to contain al- Sham revolution and strengthen the regime of Bashar Al Assad. In this statement, Quneibi ambiguously accused some factions of treason and betrayal, and warned of dealing with them, which means it’s necessary to fight them, the thing that erupted a volcano of criticism against him. However, he denied more than once these criticisms, Since he generalized the accusation to put general rules and never accused a specific faction, yet his stance was mainly to avoid embarrassment in front of ISIS accusations to its opponents, because when these faction unite with (Hazem and Syria’s revolutionaries Front) it will prove to IS’s supporters that they are traitors and therefore the state cant gain any supporters anymore. Again, Quneibi’s statement was mainly focusing on the theoretical problematic issues, and never found a workable solution for the threats that the Syrian revolution is facing, except for preventing arguments that will stir an internal conflict and shed the blood of all revolutionaries. More importantly than anything, the fighters’ hesitance to fight the state, considering its militants “Muslims and Mujahideen”, even if IS practice its extremism against these fighters, was the main reason that led to the state’s vast geographical expansion and its brutal crimes against thousands of the Syrian factions or Al Nusra Front, and therefore considering ISIS militants as “brothers” was the most dangerous thing in Quneibi’s speech, as it’s seen by the revolution’s sons. Conclusion: The impact of the “jihadist theories” on the Syrian revolution can’t be fully understood without noticing the absence of the religious elite in Syria and their failure to produce or adopt a jihadist speech from the womb of currents religious communities, without the growing globalized jihadist movements and its members of immigrants. Iyad Quneibi rationalized the jihadist speech away from isolation, and in the same time had a clear impact in resisting (IS) wave by providing an alternative balanced and more modernized speech while maintaining the salafi Jihadist principals and references. At the same time, he contributed to encouraging the speech of sedition and isolation, the most important speech that increased hesitance among young FSA fighters, and doubled the state’s capacity of seizing vast lands and killing large number of these revolutionaries and fighters. This speech cant be understood in isolation from the language and target audience, which led to the last clash, when Quneibi accused the Syrian factions of treason, and was so keen on the importance of the brothers of faith, capping this clash by temporarily stopping to comment on al-jihad al-Shami, leaving us to measure the impact of the presence or absence of this speech among other growing discourses, the most revolutionary or the most extreme. And despite the starry-eyed idealism which is essential for the continuation of the war, it seems that the battle requires clear position on the fronts, and Quneibi’s idealism in accepting two contradictions at the same time is not possible, which once again proves that Aristotle’s theories such as (the law of Non- Contradiction) is more used in the Islamic circles than Plato.
Posted on: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 02:05:33 +0000
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