THE UKRAINE - THE DAY AFTER I admit to having felt very - TopicsExpress



          

THE UKRAINE - THE DAY AFTER I admit to having felt very depressed yesterday. Now on the day after the moment has come to take stock: 1. I wrote on a thread on Mark Slebodas Page that the resistances northern front had collapsed. I now realise that this was wrong and that those who were saying otherwise - first and foremost Leos Tomicek who was replying to me on the same thread but also the Saker and Anatoly Karlin - were right. On the contrary Strelkov successfully extricated 90% of his troops and 90% of his equipment from a situation where the junta were claiming to have had them surrounded and has consolidated them in what appears to be a stronger military position. The fact that Strelkov was able to do this speaks highly of his qualities as a commander and of the discipline and morale of his troops. I would point out that there has been no mass surrender, no mass of prisoners or captured equipment for the junta to parade and no sign of any significant desertions from Strelkovs force. There has also incidentally been no sign of any cheering civilians greeting their Ukrainian liberators. I only make the last point because Poroshenko continuously talks about liberating Ukrainians who are supposedly being held hostage by the resistance. The silent streets of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk give the lie to that claim. (NB: I make the last point not because anyone who reads this Facebook page seriously believes Poroshenkos absurd claims but because it is worth pointing out to anyone who either does or who pretends to). 2. Though it must in military terms be an epilogue to the heroic defence of the two towns, reports this morning appear to the confirm that there is still some fighting going on in both Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. The courage of whoever is still resisting in these places is astonishing and should not be forgotten whatever happens next. 3. It is perhaps worth saying (though difficult to say) that when Slavyansk rebelled against the junta in April the junta was still in control of Donetsk. As recently as May the junta was even seeking to hold one round of its sham round table talks there. Donetsk is now firmly under the resistances control. There are apparently no more troops answering to the junta there and according to reports that were coming out yesterday the resistance has finally captured Donetsk airport (though I am not absolutely sure that this is the case). 4. Meanwhile the Russian government preserves its silence. The only information it has provided is that it has given details of a telephone conversation Lavrov had yesterday with Steinmeier and Fabius in which they supposedly all agreed on the need for implementation of the Berlin Statement. The latter required an unconditional, unlimited ceasefire and three party talks to be mediated by the OSCE and Russia. In a telephone conversation with Biden on Thursday Poroshenko tried to link the issue of the ceasefire with the return to the juntas control of two border posts which have been captured and which are still held by the resistance. In a telephone conversation Merkel and Hollande had with Poroshenko on Friday that particular linkage was rejected with Merkel insisting that the Russian offer of Ukrainian monitors in Russian border posts fully satisfied the requirements for a ceasefire. Poroshenko then sabotaged the three party talks which were supposed to happen on Saturday by refusing to convene them either in Donetsk or in Russia. The resistance leaders for their part refuse to travel to an EU capital because of the risk they might be arrested there. Poroshenkos refusal to allow the tripartite talks to take place in Donetsk or in Russia was a transparent device to sabotage them. The reports the Russians have released of Lavrovs conversation with Steinmeier and Fabius show that the Germans renewed their commitment to the talks and to the ceasefire as agreed in Berlin and promised to resolve the question of the venue. Frankly, it is an insignificant question. Obvious venues for the talks might be Geneva (the traditional venue for such talks) or Minsk where Lukashenko has attempted to preserve some appearance of neutrality in the conflict. 5. My opinion of the diplomatic process remains what it was yesterday. As it stands it is effectively deadlocked. Left to himself Poroshenko with the support of the US will go on coming up with one pretext after another to postpone the ceasefire and the talks. He will only change this position if the Germans and the French force him to. They in turn will only pile the diplomatic pressure on Poroshenko if the Russians start to put real pressure on them. For that to happen the Russians need to state clearly what their red line is and what they will do if Poroshenko crosses it. 6. In other words the Russians must now harden their position significantly even if the intention remains to try to resolve this crisis diplomatically. In my opinion it is quite clear what that red line should be: an assault on Donetsk and Lugansk of the sort just experienced by Slavyansk and Kramatorsk 7. Those who understand these things better than me say that Donetsk and presumably Lugansk are more defensible than Slavyansk and Kramatorsk were. It is also the case that as Anatoly Karlin says an assault on Donetsk and Lugansk of the sort we have seen in Slavyansk and Kramatorsk would trigger a humanitarian catastrophe on an altogether different scale from that which we have seen up to now and that this would make the case for Russian intervention much easier. 8. Having said this, the priority must be to prevent such a humanitarian catastrophe from taking place - not allowing a humanitarian catastrophe to happen in order to make use of it later. That would be too cynical and ruthless certainly for me. That is why the Russians need to make their position clear now.
Posted on: Sun, 06 Jul 2014 13:59:19 +0000

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