The Nixon administration began providing such substantial assistance to Israel as part of a Cold War strategy devised by Henry Kissinger, who served as secretary of state during the Yom Kippur War and before that as National Security Adviser. Kissinger based his strategy on the assumption that in attacking Israel, Egypt and Syria were principally interested in regaining territory—the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights—lost in 1967 during the Six-Day War. From a strategic perspective, one of that war’s most important outcomes was demonstrating Israel’s great military skill. With this in mind, in 1973 Kissinger reasoned that if Israel’s military, using American weaponry, could defeat Soviet-supplied Arab forces, Arab leaders would recognize: first, that they could not regain territory from Israel by force, even with Soviet support; second, that diplomacy was therefore their only option; third, that the U.S. was the only power capable of maintaining good relations with both Arab and Israeli leaders; and fourth, that they should accordingly break their alliance with the Soviet Union and seek closer relations with the U.S. In addition to weakening the Soviets’ hold on Arab leaders, this strategy would deprive Arab radicals of their militant platform while strengthening Arab moderates who favored a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In sum, this strategy would accomplish four strategic goals: “to reduce Soviet influence, weaken the position of Arab radicals, encourage Arab moderates, and assure Israel’s security.”4 Kissinger also understood that American aid could moderate Israel’s approach to the Arabs. Arab leaders insisted as a precondition to peace that Israel withdraw from territory conquered in 1967. Israel, for whom this territory was a valuable buffer against its neighbors, was reluctant to return it without a security guarantee. Kissinger believed that American military aid could provide the assurance Israel wanted and thereby make the concessions needed for peace possible. Peace, in turn, would diminish Soviet influence over Arab states.5 The history of Israeli security agreements since 1973 reflects Kissinger’s basic calculation. Each time Israel has considered making a territorial concession, it has looked to U.S. aid to ease its security burden. In 1979, when Israel agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, the U.S. gave Israel $3 billion in aid to help pay for redeploying its troops from Sinai and rebuilding air bases in the Negev. Following the 1998 Wye River Accords, Congress approved $1.2 billion in special aid to help fund Israel’s pullout from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.6 When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, it requested special assistance from the U.S. to cover the redeployment costs although Congress ultimately denied the request despite President Clinton’s efforts.7 Similarly, when Israel was negotiating a return of the Golan Heights with Syria in January 2000, Israeli and American media reported that Israel would seek $10-17 billion in U.S. assistance for military upgrades to compensate for the loss of the strategically valuable Golan.8 In short, when Israel calculates the costs of peace, American aid figures heavily in the equation.
Posted on: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:27:36 +0000
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