The central problem in the philosophy of science is that of demarcation, i.e., of distinguishing between science and what I terms ‘non-science’, under which heading I rank, amongst others, logic, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and Adlers individual psychology. I accept the validity of the Humean critique of induction, and indeed, wish to go beyond it in arguing that induction is never actually used in science. However, I do not concede that this entails the scepticism which is associated with Hume, and argue that the Baconian/Newtonian insistence on the primacy of ‘pure’ observation, as the initial step in the formation of theories, is completely misguided: all observation is selective and theory-laden—there are no pure or theory-free observations. In this way I would like to destabilise the traditional view that science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology; in contradistinction to this, I hold that there is no unique methodology specific to science. Science, like virtually every other human, and indeed organic, activity, I believe, consists largely of problem-solving.
Posted on: Mon, 27 Jan 2014 05:21:54 +0000
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