The reason we usually eschew the term determinism in relation to calvinism is because the will of God is not determined (properly speaking) by anything outside itself, and is as the confession describes it, most free. So when defined as Clark carefully defines it perhaps Christianity does fall under the heading of a form of determinism, but because God was free to have done other than He did or nothing at all (He being blessed in Himself apart from the creation) He does not seem to be determined even if all that exists besides Himself in some sense is (but those determined things determined in different ways; for foreordination of all works of men and angels in a different sense than the orbit of the planets). Is the will of God determined as a metaphysical compliment of the eternality of his decrees? Or are the eternal decrees metaphysically subject to the divine nature? And if so is the divine nature itself subject to the possible entailments of a creation that would please the divine will? Thus making the will of God determined in some sense by the outcome of the creative determination? If God could not have done other than He has we fall into several difficult riddles as to His supposed freedom. If He could, we fall into many riddles about how existence is a form of determinism when everything is not finally determined. Excerpt from Chris thinking about Gordon H. Clark and Determinism
Posted on: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 14:06:05 +0000
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