The traveller, though he is impelled by the peculiar libidinal forces which define his personal sense of being in oneself, as an inscrutable determination of wanderlust in shmagent b, is actually the leverage given the non-reflexive subject, shmagent b, to arrange agent a’s affairs according to these instinctual, and habitual, designs, provided for him by his commitments to an employer to whom he owes his service. But this service is a predicate of a demand taken as the gift of an identity semblant, agent a as traveller, and so, accordingly, the traveller’s service is owed to his habitus, and his identity semblant yet again, making coherent the participation of employer and employee as mutual determinants in a self-enfolding disclosure of normativity as such. “[vii]Having a life, being alive, continues to happen to” him “through a kind of haptic circuit that fuses power and habit, potentiality and custom, into an active, living-decaying disposal of” his “being, a losing-becoming of” his self “among other active dispositions”. Just so, being is a state of negotiation between the diverse forces which enliven the world of the subject. Being in oneself is being at home in one’s skin, just as being for oneself entails doing what it takes for keeping the soul sheathed in one’s skin. But, in the assimilation of desires that compel the traveller to provide care for himself, even on his journey, there is no refuge from the absolute authority of the other shmagent b who inscrutably mediates his demand for satisfaction—in the way of exercising his normative legal rights as master of the property the traveller holds in his body unconsciously, as debt against future expressions of his actual employment read against the actuality of the bottom line for the employer in the present, i.e. in relation to absolute referent of the other’s desire [which is the bottom line for shmagent b, a tautological incursion of the triebe into the very vellity of the other as embodying the position of tyrannous master to an ‘I’ in agent a]. The money, and social infrastructure which allow him to articulate his demand for novelty are only a partial determination of the being in himself of the traveller, so as to be free to be in himself the traveller must first successfully be for himself by answering the demands of the other shmagent b as employer. In traveling away, in escaping the call of duty, or in capitulating to its expeditious demands, the traveller is called to realise that his way to mastery, his vocation and avocation were what had always already lain latent in his sense of being in oneself as a general concept accorded to a hypothetical agent a; he realises that his being in oneself finds its full expression only, and only, in his being for oneself in the other [who is the inscrutable shmagent b, yet again!]. For if he had not desired to travel, and was compelled by he who cannot comprehend being the traveller because he is an aleatory fiction, or shmagent b, it must be that the employer is allied to the unthinking traveller shmagent b who is determined externally by the bottom line as conceived of by the employer’s ego ideal. Though I find sustenance for my body in the employer’s fairness there remains a niggling remainder of the bondage which responsibility imposes upon its respondent, namely such as in the considerations of the shmagent b whose sole aim is to explicate my drive to work at this actually underpaying, and overly demanding job as it impresses itself upon me as the alienation of my immediate desire to, perhaps, travel for my own pleasure, or even to stay put, and not play at being a traveller. lacquesjacan.wordpress/2013/10/25/a-psychoanalytic-phenomenological-critique-of-the-idea-of-travel-as-cognitive-enrichment/
Posted on: Sun, 27 Oct 2013 10:59:50 +0000
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