Turvallisuusanalyysi Viron sähköisestä äänestysjärjestelmästä. As we have observed, the procedures Estonia has in place to guard against attack and ensure transparency offer insuf- ficient protection. Based on our tests, we conclude that a state-level attacker, sophisticated criminal, or dishonest insider could defeat both the technological and procedural controls in order to manipulate election outcomes. Short of this, there are abundant ways that such an attacker could disrupt the voting process or cast doubt on the legitimacy of results. Given the current geopolitical situation, we cannot discount state-level attacks targeting the system in future elections. Due to these risks, we recommend that Estonia discontinue use of the I-voting system. Certainly, additional protections could be added in order to mitigate specific attacks, but attempting to stop every credible mode of attack would add an unmanageable degree of complexity. Someday, if there are fundamental advances in computer security, the risk profile may be more favorable for Internet voting, but we do not believe that the I-voting system can be made safe today. https://estoniaevoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/IVotingReport.pdf
Posted on: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 08:43:09 +0000
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