Why the umbrella collapsed By DUMELANG SALESHANDO Compliments of the season! The beginning of a New Year presents an opportunity to reflect on the successes and failures of the past year and use the accumulated experience to plan for the future. For the Botswana opposition parties, 2011 ended on a rather somber note. The collapse of the talks around the formation of the Umbrella Party was a low moment that has possibly pushed the confidence level of the public on the ability of opposition parties ever working together to its lowest levels. As the four opposition parties that had engaged in the talks for the better part of 2011, we had hyped up the public expectations that there will be a mother of all battles in 2014 when the collective takes on the BDP that appears tired and lacking a sense of renewal. We owe it to the nation not only to explain what went wrong, but also to apologize for our failure to deliver according to expectations. On behalf of the BCP, I offer our sincere apologies to all those who had invested their trust in our efforts to deliver a new party composed of the four negotiating partners. Though I remain convinced that the BCP did all that was possible to save the project, I am aware of the fact that no one party can claim to be whiter than snow and completely without blame for the disappointing conclusion. I also know that there is going to be a concerted effort by the four parties functionaries to point fingers at former partners and seek to portray them as more guilty for the collapse. Before the waters get muddied by such political propaganda, I wish to explain some of the difficulties that dominated the negotiations, in particular to explain the position adopted by the BCP at the talks. It must be understood that the Umbrella Model did not require the negotiating parties to disband. The plan was to have the BCP, BMD, BNF and BPP to continue existing as independent political formations that would minimize competition amongst them but rather promote the interests of the umbrella party that they will all be members of. The reality is that the parties are not ready or willing to disband and belong to a completely new animal with no reference to their old names, colors, symbols and slogans. The umbrella represented a half way stop to a complete merger. Continuing to hold on to individual identities inherently meant that there will be some competition amongst the partners, which competition will be geared at promoting the interests of each of the partners where they clashed with those of the other negotiating partners. This is normal political friction where you have coalition governments the world over. As was to be expected, when the four parties negotiated the allocation of constituencies, each sought to protect their interests with vigor. Their individual interests clashed and there was no agreement on how to settle the disagreements. The conveners stated as follows in their report to the party leaders, When they started to negotiate on the allocation of constituencies among them, the four opposition parties agreed eight criteria that would guide such allocation. Of the eight, the criterion of party incumbency proved the most intractable, eventually leading to a deadlock in the said negotiations. For the BCP, incumbency obtained through defection cannot be equated to incumbency secured through victory at the polls. We know from our own history that defections by sitting members of parliament or council are hardly ever accompanied by massive exodus of the rank and file. In 1998, the BCP had 11 defectors who were our incumbents in Parliament. Some of us assumed at the time that we were going into the 1999 general election with 11 constituencies in the bag and will come out of the elections with more than 11 seats, given that we were drawing large crowds to our rallies. Lo and beholdwe came back with only one seat! At the last general election of 2009, ten years after the 1999 general elections, we could still not make a meaningful impact in some constituencies like Kanye and Lobatse where we had been incumbents. The truth is that a number of the constituencies where MPs had defected from the BNF to the BCP, remained BNF strongholds. The experience of high profile politicians defecting to newly formed parties is not only limited to Botswana. In South Africa the split of the ANC and the highly publicized formation of COPE by leading politicians who were members of cabinet, parliament and premiers of important provinces led to some commentators to think that this marked the end of the ANC and a new giant called COPE. As at the last elections in South Africa, the ANC scooped 264 seats in Parliament while COPE only managed to secure 30 seats. This result diminished the fire in COPE and they seem to be on a downward spiral, with the more conservative Democratic Alliance posing the main challenge to the ANC. I know that some of my friends in the BMD contend that the BCP 1999 case study as well as that of COPE does not apply in their case, I am however still to hear what magic wand they used to defect with the majority of BDP supporters in the six constituencies they currently hold. It was therefore not unreasonable for the BCP negotiating team to propose that incumbency, particularly incumbency secured through defection, must be balanced with other considerations. Our view was that where any opposition party obtained over 40% of the popular vote in the last election, such a party must be allowed to represent the Umbrella. The negotiating parties had already agreed that all constituencies where the combined vote attained by the opposition was over 40 percent, such a constituency must be classified as winnable for the 2014 elections. It should therefore have been easy for others to accept that any opposition party that managed to single-handedly obtain over 40 percent of the votes cast in a constituency, stood the best possible chance of winning that constituency for the Umbrella in 2014. The 40 percent threshold meant that the BCP laid claim to Francistown South and South East South where there were BMD incumbents. The BCP however laid no claim to Gaborone West South where it was the second most popular party after the BDP in terms of the last general election results. This was on account of the fact that we had come second to the BDP with only 23 percent of the votes cast and could not claim to be in a strong position to win the constituency. At the time when the conveners declared a deadlock, of the six constituencies that BMD had demanded through incumbency, the other negotiating partners were only willing to allow them to contest in Lobatse and Gaborone West South. The BNF negotiating team insisted that they were better placed to win Kgatleng West where they had secured 36 percent of the votes in the last elections. The BCP negotiating team on the other hand contended that they be allowed to contest Francistown South, Maun West and South East South. The BMD had also indicated that in addition to the six seats they claimed through incumbency, they should be allocated six more constituencies that are classified as winnable. Concerning BDP strongholds where the opposition fared badly in the last elections, the BMD had no firm demands to make, leading some to ask why they seemed to fear the BDP strongholds if they have indeed significantly weakened the party. The above was the picture going into the Oasis meeting where the party leaders were asked to now break the deadlock. A number of meetings were held between the parties in the buildup to the Oasis meeting to try and narrow the differences. One possible solution was to open up to primaries in all areas where there was disagreement, as was proposed by the conveners. This recommendation was rejected by the BCP and the BNF because we simply do not have the resources to mount such primaries. Primaries would have meant that the different parties should first conduct internal primaries to determine the most popular candidate who will then proceed to the second leg of primaries that now includes other contestants from other political parties. This was going to have a severe financial pinch on the candidates who contest multiple primaries. They would have had to use their limited family resources to contest a party primary, possibly go through some appeal process if there is a dispute to the results and a possible rerun. The same process would then have to be repeated at the level of the Umbrella, after which they will be emotionally, physically and financially run down and then left to face the BDP millions of pula with no financial backing from the Umbrella. This was unnecessary suicide. The other problem that we all know about primaries is that they almost always leave party members aggrieved and highly polarized as the culture of internal contest is not yet deeply entrenched in Botswana political parties. Though the BCP has a known track record of stability, we have in our short period of existence made at least one appearance at the high court as a party member sought the intervention of the courts to assist them to be declared the legitimate party representative. Other parties in the opposition as well as the BDP have had a greater dose of their own members dragging them to the courts over primary election results. We remain convinced that primary elections are the most democratic method of choosing candidates, which is why for all constituencies that were to be allocated, the BCP under the umbrella candidates would have been chosen through primaries. However, to suggest that we should settle for two-tier primaries was to deliberately plan for unnecessary chaos. Within one party it is always a nightmare to produce an acceptable voters roll, what more of four parties voters rolls? During our bilateral talks with the BNF, we agreed that there was need to improve the list of constituencies that the BMD had been offered to come as close as possible to their wish list. Though we may not have agreed with some of their positions such as incumbency, we knew what their desires were and appreciated the importance of having them as partners. At the level of incumbency, of the six they had requested we improved the list from two constituencies that were offered before the deadlock to five. The BCP compromised on the principle of allowing a party with over 40 percent of the votes cast and included Francistown South on the list of constituencies to be contested by the BMD. Our assumption was that they will also see the need to make some concession as negotiation is a give and take process. Our assumption was proved wrong as the BMD insisted on getting 100 percent of their demands on incumbency. Whilst I appreciate that it is the only thing that the BMD has and therefore should protect with all the energy they have, it was important to also appreciate that the only thing that the BCP and BNF have is their support bases that they have built over the years. The value for a defection by an MP cannot erase the political capital possessed by the negotiating partners. Insisting on incumbency as an absolute consideration was therefore a nonstarter. Otherwise it would have meant that as and when more BDP MPs defect from the BDP in marginal constituencies for opportunistic reasons, we would have had to automatically make way for them. Ultimately you could have the former BDP MPs dominating the Umbrella in all the marginal constituencies leading to 2014 being a year of the Khama BDP versus the Umbrella BDP. Would this have been the regime change we all wish for? We then had to deal with the issue of the winnable constituencies. There were no strong reasons as to why BMD insisted that other opposition parties should make way for them in their strongholds. It would have made sense for the BMD to demand more of the BDP strongholds as their value add to the opposition cooperation project. This notwithstanding, the BCP and BNF agreed to allow BMD three more winnable constituencies where the combined opposition had secured over 40 percent in the last elections. From the BDP strongholds, we proposed that they take up four constituencies, bringing the total to 12 constituencies (five incumbency constituencies, three winnable constituencies and four BDP dominated constituencies). Compared to what the BMD had been offered by the negotiating teams which was two constituencies under incumbency, two winnable constituencies and six BDP strong-holds, this marked a significant shift by the BCP and BNF to meet the demands of the BMD. This was the final offer, which unfortunately was not accepted as the BMD insisted on their wish list that had been rejected by the other parties during negotiations and mediation. There are some in our society who feel that we should have just given in to all the demands of our partners for the sake of the project. The desire to defeat the BDP is understandable; they have certainly become a liability to the country. Contrary to the view that others might hold concerning the spirit of cooperation, I hold a different view. I am not content with being an opposition MP and wish there could be a change of government before 2014. I however believe that any agreement amongst the opposition parties must be a durable one that will survive the harsh challenges that will come with being a government. If you go into government with a partner who can never take your views into account but one who insists on her principles being upheld lock stock and barrel, then you are contracting for self-induced disaster. I may be wrong, but this remains my position and I am still to be convinced that a deal at all cost should have been the way to go. For all intents and purposes, the Umbrella is now dead and buried. There is need to guard against the four parties being consumed by anger and the need to punish each other. This is not the end of the world. For the BMD and the BCP we jointly have a responsibility to deliver on the coalitions that run Gaborone and Francistown city councils. Our partnership in these councils could collapse if we give in to politics of sabotage. We also have a BCP-BNF coalition running the Kgatleng District. We still have a responsibility as the collective opposition to deliver on our mandate in Parliament, keeping the BDP executive in check until the next general election. If we choose to behave like ditched lovers and go for each others throat, we will only further tarnish our image in the eyes of the voter. This may be the time for each party to reflect on the best possible options now that the Umbrella has collapsed. The umbrella may have been the most ideal, but if it is not attainable, other options must be looked at. The fact that for the first time since the 1998 split, the BNF and the BCP convened at a negotiating table and had no disagreements between themselves marked a major leap forward which must not be left to waste. After all, of the 46.7 percent popular vote attracted by the opposition in the last general election, 43.4 percent of this was attained by the BCP and the BNF while the rest went to other opposition parties. It is not all doom and gloom, after all every dark cloud has a silver lining. Any new proposal that excludes either the BCP or the BNF will just be an expression of greater failure and not motivated by the need to ensure meaningful electoral contest. The collapse of the talks was indeed a dark cloud for the opposition; but let us now look for the silver lining on the rim of the cloud.
Posted on: Thu, 04 Sep 2014 03:14:31 +0000
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