Would Turabi go to the palace as a president?? Analysis : Abd Allah Rizig Abu Simazeh The initiative of national Dialogue, proposed by the ruling NCP, entered the impasse. After the severe intervention of the security authorities to prevent the public conference of the opposition coalition in the League yard in Shambat last Saturday. The ruling party, by that behavior, showed again his attitude opposed to liberties, while all political forces are insisting on those liberties as a basic condition to create a dialogue friend climate and one of its first requirements. Police forces has used teargas to disperse the audience and participants to the public meeting of the opposition held in the office of the Sudanese conference, a leading party of the opposition coalition. First, the police closed the common yard in which the conference was planned to take place. This evolution occurred one day after the first public meeting between the ruling NCP, headed by Al Bashir, and the Popular Conference of Dr. Turabi, that ended a rupture of more than a decade. This attitude put the popular conference, which is still officially a partner in the opposition coalition, in a critical position. The Popular Conference defected from the NCP in 1999 under the pretext of lack of public liberties, multiparty and popular participation after a long contest of power. It finds itself obliged to redefine its attitude towards the last evolutions that began with the debate of Darfur students that finished with the murder of one of them and finished with the prevention by force of Shambat public conference of the opposition and to confirm its declared attitude concerning public liberties. The party should also reconsider the relation between its attitude and its bilateral dialogue with the ruling party. In addition to the interior situation, where the ruling party is continuing its exclusionary approach which contraries its call to National Dialogue, the bilateral dialogue between the NCP and PCP is taking place in inappropriate external circumstances. The situation is marked by an ebb tide of Islamism and the islamists being obliged to change their offensive attitude by a defensive one. This has thrown its shadows on the relation of the Sudanese regime with its Arab periphery, particularly the axe of Cairo- Riyadh which began to take a leading position in the regional confrontation with the Islamists and their centers of power, especially Qatar and Iran. All that should have les the PCP to choose a reversibility line concerning the bilateral dialogue and maintain its membership in the opposition coalition. Some people thought that the convergence between the two Islamic parties is a beginning of a wider unification of “Ahl Al Qibla” or all those who adopt Islamic political projects. But I dare say that disagreement between the two parties was not about Islam. It is a divergence about power that has got no religious covers. The Islamic Front (NIF) was a heterogeneous mixture of religious currents, which not are not united but by the only objective of seizing power. So, essence of the dispute was power and not religion. Consequently, the reunification will be between men of power and not men of religion in case of an unlikely agreement on a power-sharing. If ever happened, such an agreement should be in the form of non-democratic rule, characterized by severe centralization of power, all the power, in the hands of one man. The ruling party, as shown be its previous experiences, has had neither ideas nor visions on the base of which it dialogues with others. Usually, the NCP was limiting itself to offering different governmental positions in the center and regions (Ministers, State Ministers, Governors, Councilors…etc) under the title of Power - Sharing. In the case of armed opposition, the NCP was used to offer an additional option of (security arrangements). Anyhow, dialogue with NCP means nothing else but listening to its voice or its echo. The incapacity of the PCP to regain the power created by its leader and its failure, in a decade of struggle in many fronts and by several means finished to this sort of tactical convergence that might lead it to accept a proposition of power sharing without abandoning its ambition that one day Turabi may go to the Palace as President according to the original plan of the 30 June 1998 coup that planed to transfer power, all power to the Islamic movement as explained by Al Mahboub Abd Al Salam in his book about the first decade of Al Inqaz. Besides excluding the option of abandoning the divergence and the strategic surrendering to the reality imposed by division of 1999, the ambitions of the PCP leader and the heritage of violent struggle will continue to charge their relationship with tense tensions and lack of confidence. All that will make of the current situation of convergence just a (warrior break). In this context, Oussama Tawfeeq, a leader of Reform Now party, ruled out, in an interview, the possibility of Turabi falling in what he called the trap of the approach any bilateral agreement). Kamal Omer, political secretary of the PCP, affirmed in a declaration to the Saiha newspaper of last Monday that the meeting of his party, headed by Turabi, with the NCP, headed by Al Bashir, didn’t adopt any bilateral agreements, attitudes or conventions”. The return of Turabi to the republican Palace as President, required by the current convergence between the two parties, may add a new burning material to the repressed conflict inside the ruling NCP, about the succession of Bashir in case he stuck to his declaration not to run for the 2015presidential elections. This can reproduce the conflict and the struggle between the Palace and Mansheya (residence of Turabi). The PCP tried, through past years, to enhance itself by coalitionس with other political parties beginning by SPLM to the National Consensus Forces Coalition (NCFC). Its objective was never to change the regime by a democratic one but to restore the power that he lost, in the framework of the current regime that Turabi contributed to its creation. The objectives of PCP have always been different from the goals of other political forces, with which it allied temporarily. While the convergence of the Popular e and the National Conferences occurs under the banners of uniting (Ahl Al Qibla) and the Islamists, in the shadow of the intensification of blockade on the regime, which puts it in front of an inevitable rupture with Iran, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood and its derivatives, it seems to be like swimming against the current, upwards towards confrontation with the Pacific Regional., under the banners unite the people of direction and the Islamists, in the light of the intensification of the blockade outside the system, which puts him in front of an inevitable break with Iran and Qatar, with the Muslim Brotherhood and their derivatives, as a swimming against the current, upwards towards a confrontation with the regional periphery. In the other hand, the incidents of Thursday and Friday have marked a qualitative change in the attitude of the opposition, which stepped forward in the direction of restoring the initiative, docking masses poised to be ready for confrontation whatever sacrifices required might be. The public conference to which supporters of NCFC came without permission of the authorities is the first activity full of sense since the popular uprising of September that left tens of martyrs. The funerals of martyr of Khartoum University were a rehearsal for the manifestation of Shambat that had been dispersed by the security. The representatives of the opposition forces insisted on rejecting dialogue and called to oust the regime. This was a turning point of the relation between the regime and the opposition, tending to violent confrontation instead of consensus and convergence. This shall put the PCP once again in a position of popular isolation. In this confrontational context, Youssef Sidiq, chairman of the information Comity of the opposition coalition (NCFC) affirmed to the Akher Lahza newspaper that “the opposition is sticking to its four requirements of dialogue. There should be no dialogue before the instauration of public liberties, cease fire in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, release of all detainees and prepare convenient climate for the dialogue”. The NCP is also sticking to his for great (No)s : No to dismantling of Al Inqaz, no transitional government, no national government and no adjournment of the fixed date of elections…
Posted on: Wed, 19 Mar 2014 18:06:29 +0000
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