A closer look at Ukraines revolution by Bob Neary storify/thecrackedbob/ukrainian-revolution-not-what-it-seems Ukraine in recent weeks has become a flashpoint of ethnic identities straining to assert themselves amid what appears to be orchestrated regime change by globalist interests. Late February saw Russian aligned Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych deposed – a man who, while undoubtedly corrupt, was democratically elected. In the 2010 presidential election he won 49 percent of the vote compared to rival Yulia Tymoshenko’s 45 percent. Previously in 2004-05, Tymoshenko – an advocate of Ukrainian membership in the EU – led the Orange Revolution whereby the assets of numerous oligarchs were seized as state property. Two among them were Rinat Akhmetov and Dmitry Firtash – both of whom are very wealthy natural resource, banking and media magnates in Ukraine, coming by their fortune during the fallout of the Soviet Union. Writing for Spiegel Online, Christian Neef did an outstanding investigative piece detailing these mens’ presence in Ukrainian politics. In 2004, Akhmetov and Firtash backed Yanukovych’s first presidential bid. However, amid mounting allegations of fraud and street protests that would later be dubbed the Orange Revolution, Yanukovych lost in the run-off. Years later, after fleeing prosecution, Akhmetov invested himself in Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. After being hounded by the previous establishment, Akhmetov no doubt sought to recover his losses. Firtash likewise learned from the Orange inquisition and when Yanukovych ascended to the presidency in 2010, both he and Akhmetov stacked parliament and ministries with their own representatives. All the while, Ukraine has been sinking economically. Faced with the prospect of defaulting on its debts before May, the government was in talks with both the EU and Russia for a bailout. Of the $20 billion requested, Brussels was only able to supply $800 million, while Moscow extended an offer of $15 billion as well as cheaper gas prices. The discrepancy between dollar amounts gives the impression that Europe was trying to force Ukraine’s hand. It worked. Yanukovych ended up siding with Russia, a decision that remains popular in the ethnically Russian eastern part of the country. Western Ukraine, on the other hand, favored the EU deal. When protests erupted in response to the decision – especially when security forces killed protesters by the dozen – both the oligarchs holding Yanukovych’s strings knew they’d have to cut him loose. This shady power structure has been overtly misrepresented in western media. The degree to which Firtash and Akhmetov have manipulated the government speaks volumes to the political machine in Ukraine. In Russia, Putin has brought the pirate businessmen of the Yeltsin and Gorbachev years under Kremlin control, whereas in Ukraine they still run the show. Given the rampant back channeling that established the interim government, it’s no mystery why Moscow denies its legitimacy. Russia’s growing involvement in the Crimean peninsula stems from a much larger geopolitical endeavor. In 2011, Belarus and Kazakhstan partnered with Russia to begin forming a Eurasian Union. Taken in a very simplistic light, the idea is to bring former Soviet states back into the Russian sphere of influence. Though the real impetus behind a Eurasian Union is two-fold. Its geographic origins can be traced to the “Intermediate Region” theory put forward by Greek historian Dimitri Kitsikis. The general premise being that the Eurasian continent is composed of three distinct civilisational regions; east, west, and intermediate – the last comprised of the area between the Middle East and North Africa, Istanbul being its natural capital. It’s a mammoth piece of real estate that has been fought over since antiquity. And, as the theory suggests, one historically hovering somewhere in-between European and Asian influence. On the sociopolitical side, Russian political theorist Alexander Dugin tediously cogitates on the ideological foundation for a Eurasian Union. Grounded in his hypothesis of developing a fourth political theory – by rejecting liberalism – the Eurasian movement relies on ethnocentrism to fuel an “anti-American revolution.” That last sounds much more alarming than it is, being written some fifteen years ago. Dugin has since learned to be more methodic in his rejection of western hegemony. The man is a political scientist, not a general. In an interview published Jan. 30, he stated that: “We cannot divide the world today in the Cold War style.” What’s unfolding in the Crimea is less the Russian takeover it’s being billed as, than it is Russia looking after it’s ethnic interests. Contra western misunderstanding of the region, Crimea isn’t Ukraine. It’s a semi-autonomous region inside Ukrainian territorial borders with its own parliament and, until 1995, its own president. The majority of the region’s 2.3 million inhabitants identify as ethnic Russians. Since the Crimean secession referendum has been moved forward to March 16, people that have been the reluctant prize in a game of tug-of-war now have an opportunity to confirm their sovereignty. What will push things over the edge is unsolicited intercession by the U.S.
Posted on: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 00:00:01 +0000
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