A fascinating paragraph in a recent David Remnick profile of former ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul pronounced Barack Obamas foreign policy leanings mysterious, inscrutable, and almost hypocritical: Obama’s advisers and the Washington policy establishment have all spent countless hours trying to square the President’s admiration of George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft—classic realists—with his appointments of interventionists like McFaul, Rice, and Samantha Power. In the end, one leading Russia expert, who has worked for two Administrations, told me, I think Obama is basically a realist—but he feels bad about it. This goes to show mostly that the Washington policy establishment engages in a lot of tedious conversations. Its pretty clear to me that Obama is a realist, as are almost all leaders of almost all countries, and that he doesnt particularly feel bad about it at all. Nor should he. Hes actually quite good at it. To its detractors, realism is a policy of cynicism — one that, in the name a cold-hearted national interest, leaves on the table a bounty of humanitarian gains ripe for the plucking. A small amount of military assistance should be able to secure Kurdish autonomy, a useful and humane objective that is achievable at low cost The more generous view is that realism is a policy of limits. A recognition that for a moral foreign policy to do any good in the world it must be feasible, and that even the mightiest empire the world has ever known faces daunting challenges when it attempts to remake the domestic politics of foreign countries. A recognition that the long-term ability of the United States to do any good for anyone hinges on maintaining domestic strength and advancing foreign goals in cost-effective ways. In Ukraine, for example, Obama has not opted for the path of maximum punishment for Russia. He has opted instead for the path of punishing Russia as hard as possible at minimum cost to the United States. Russians are paying a higher price for the conflict than are Europeans, and Americans are paying a lower price still. Putin hasnt had a change of heart, but Ukrainian forces are steadily advancing on rebel-held territory and Russia is becoming more and more of a pariah. Steady gains at minimal cost dont make for great speeches, but they do put American influence on a sustainable basis. In the Middle East, of course, we appear to have descended into a state of total chaos. But its a chaos that is not incompatible with our main objectives in the region. Israel is more secure than ever. Not just beneath its Iron Dome but because Hamas has been cut off from Iranian patronage, and Hezbollah is too busy fighting the Assad regimes enemies in Syria to open a northern front against the Jewish State. The Syrian civil war itself is a humanitarian disaster. But in a war between a vicious government and a rebel cause full of its own vicious jihadis, a brutal stalemate that sucks up resources is an acceptable outcome for the United States. The damage of the war, though real, has little direct impact on America and the costs of attempting to dive in and resolve the situation would have been prohibitive. Well do what we can, when we can do something useful on the cheap doesnt quite have the glorious ring of JFKs vow to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship. In the Persian Gulf, key US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are perfectly secure from external aggression, pumping oil in peace even as the progress of solar power and fracking reduces our long-term dependence on these questionable regimes. Which brings us to Iraq. A policy of assisting Kurdish forces against ISIS while declining to do much to help the Iraqi government reconquer the rest of the country packs a lot less emotional punch than a stern declaration of Americas commitment to fighting this truly evil group would. And yet its the right call. The Kurdistan regional government is friendly to the United States, is viewed as legitimate by the Kurdish population, and has demonstrated considerable fighting skill in the past. A relatively small amount of American military assistance should be able to secure their continued autonomy, a useful and humane objective that is achievable at low cost. For the Iraqi government to entirely reconquer its lost Sunni hinterland, by contrast, would be considerably more difficult. It is also not entirely clear what the point would be, in terms of concrete American interests. Its far from obvious that a strong unitary Iraqi state is in the interests of the United States or reflects the desire of the Iraqi people. As in Syria, stalemate between Sunni-held and Shiite-held territories could be ugly — but an acceptable form of ugly. Dont expect to hear it in a Rose Garden speech, but the main oil fields are down south near Basra in firmly government-held territory. Meanwhile, democracy marches on. The Arab Spring has mostly been a disappointment, but the new regime in Tunisia is real enough. Indonesia is poised for its first peaceful, orderly, transition of power to an opposition presidential candidate. China is friendless in East Asia. Well do what we can, when we can do something useful on the cheap doesnt quite have the glorious ring of JFKs vow to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship. But it does have the advantage of being a sustainable, sensible approach to 21st century world affairs. And its working.
Posted on: Sat, 09 Aug 2014 16:30:04 +0000
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