AFTER UKRAINE, RUSSIA BEEFS UP MILITARY IN ARMENIA AND KYRGYZSTAN Silk Road Reporters Oct 24 2014 Published by John C. K. Daly October 24, 2014 For years Russia has complained about what they describe as NATOs expansion eastward. Noted diplomat-historian George F. Kennan in 1997 clearly foresaw the consequences of such actions when in 1997 he wrote in a newspaper commentary, Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the post-Cold War era. Such a decision may be expected... to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. The 1997 NATO Madrid Summit invited the first countries of the former Warsaw Pact - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - to join the alliance. Worse for Moscow was to follow. At the NATO Nov. 2002 Prague Summit, not only were former Warsaw Pact members Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia invited to begin accession talks, but former USSR republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well. NATO membership for both Georgia and Ukraine has been discussed at subsequent summits, and at the most recent summit held in Britain Sept. 4-5 NATOs web page noted that the alliance increased support to Ukraine in the wake of the crisis with Russia and continued condemnation of Russias illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. For better or worse, the Ukrainian crisis, which began late last year, has worsened Russian-Western relations to their lowest level since the 1991 breakup of the USSR. Russia has now belatedly begun to push back, strengthening its bilateral relations with a number of post-Soviet republics and using both the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO - current membership Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, observer states - Afghanistan and Serbia) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - member states China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; observer states - Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan; Dialogue Partners - Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey; guests - the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]) to increase its Eurasian military capabilities. On Oct. 15 Colonel General Viktor Bondarev, head of the Russian air force, briefed reporters on Moscows intention to accelerate efforts to create a CSTO unified air defense network in response to the Ukrainian crisis reenergized NATO. The plans outlined by Bondarev indicate that NATOs intensifying of activities on Russias periphery rather than cowing the Kremlin are instead leading to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. Bondarev stated that within Russia By 2020... 47 airfields, including in Crimea and in the Arctic, will be renovated under the state armaments program, adding that by 2025 the Russian air force will have restored and reopened over 100 military airbases. Outlining plans outside Russia, negotiations with Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua to establish bases for Russian strategic bombers continue. Even before the conflict in Ukraine erupted, in 2013 Russian fighters were deployed to the Belarus Baranovichi airbase as part of the countries integrated regional air defense network and Russia announced that it would station fighter aircraft at a Russian-built airbase in Lida, Belarus, near the border with Poland and Lithuania. Bondarev announced that the Russian air force now plans to establish a new airbase in the Belarusian city of Babruysk, which will be home to a squadron of Russian Su-27 fighters. As Belarus shares frontiers with NATO members Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, Moscows message could hardly be more clear. It is in Russian aviation deployments further afield in the post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia CSTO member states that NATO will be unable to mount substantive countermeasures. In the Caucasus, Russian-Armenian relations have been fairly stable throughout the post-1991 era, with security and economics being the main areas of cooperation. As Azerbaijan has drifted over the last two decades into the Western orbit because of its energy wealth, Armenia has remained firmly allied to Russia, with the two nations emphasizing Russian involvement in negotiating a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle as a co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been mediating the broader Azeri-Armenian conflict since March 1992. Given the strained nature of its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia sees military-political cooperation with Russia as an essential element of its security and defense policy. Besides Russian military bases in Armenia, Russian border guards assist Armenia in protecting its borders with Turkey and Iran. Armenia is an active CSTO member, the only member of the CSTO in the South Caucasus. Russia is also Armenias main investor, with its total exceeding $3 billion through 2012, mainly in the energy and communications sectors. Underlining Russias deep involvement in Armenias transport sector, a Feb. 2008 agreement between the Russian and Armenian governments transferred Armenian Railways to Russian Railways subsidiary, South Caucasus Railways for 30 years. The agreement committed the Russians to investing $230 million in Armenia during the first five years of operations and subsequently an additional $240 million. Armenia also purchases natural gas from Russia at preferential rates, with only Belarus receiving a better price. In the wake of deteriorating Western-Russian relations over Ukraine, the Russian air force is upgrading the Soviet-era Erebuni airbase in Armenia, which houses the Russian 3624th Air Base and currently hosts a squadron of MiG-29 fighters and Mi-24 attack helicopters. As the Ukrainian crisis deepened, in Jan. the Russian Southern Military District press service confirmed that a contingent of Mi-24P attack helicopters, Mi-8MT and Mi-8SMV military transport helicopters were scheduled for deployment at Erebuni later in the year. Underlining Russias strengthening presence in Armenia, 3,000 Russian and Armenian military personnel from Erebuni and other facilities on Oct. 13-19 held military preparedness joint exercises, which included Erebuni MiG-29s, at Armenias Kamhud and Alagyaz training facilities. Besides Erebuni, the Russian 102nd Military Base is in the Armenian city of Gyumri. In stark contrast to Ukraines years-long haggling with Russia over the terms of its lease of Sevastopol for the Black Sea Fleet, in Aug. 2010, Russia and Armenia agreed to prolong the Gyumri lease agreement until 2044. Russia provides Armenia with armaments, investment and political support, for which Armenia reciprocates by providing territory for Russian military base deployment, thereby contributing to the preservation of Russias presence in the South Caucasus. Since the Ukrainian crisis erupted, Russias strengthening of its military presence in Armenia sends a strong message to neighboring NATO member Turkey, as well as NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) associates Georgia and Azerbaijan. Farther east, Bondarev noted that Russia is negotiating with Kyrgyzstan to reconstruct the Kant airbase outside the capital Bishkek to support Russian strategic bombers, which currently houses a Russian fighter squadron under CSTO auspices. In many ways Kyrgyzstan and its air bases represents the height of the more than decade-old shadow Great Game conflict for Central Asia between Russia and the West, which began in earnest after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S, after which Washington sought military access to Central Asia to mount military operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The U.S. by the end of the year had acquired air bases at both Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan, only to lose them later through inept foreign policy. The U.S.-Uzbekistan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed Oct. 6, 2001, less than a month after the 9-11 attacks, permitted the U.S. to station up to 1,500 U.S. troops at the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase 90 miles north of the Afghan border. The following month, the Manas airbase was established on Dec. 4, 2001, under the joint Kyrgyz-U.S. SOFA. The Pentagon selected Manas above Kyrgyzstans other 52 airports because its 14,000-foot runway, originally built for Soviet bombers, could be utilized by USAF C-5 Galaxy cargo planes and 747s to support Operation Enduring Freedom. In contrast, Russias Kant airbase, 12 miles outside Bishkek Kant and just 20 miles from Manas, was established in Oct. 2003, nearly two years later, its first military base outside the Russian Federation since the 1991 collapse of the USSR. In 2013, as events in Ukraine deteriorated, on Oct. 27 Russian air force commander Viktor Sevastianov, visiting Kant to mark the 10th anniversary of its founding, announced that the number of planes based at Kant, then consisting of 10 Sukhoi fighters, two Mi-8 helicopters and roughly a dozen other transport and training airplanes will at least double by this December. The previous month Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement allowing the Russian air forces to continue operations at Kant until 2032 with possible five-year extensions, in exchange for Moscows writing off $500 million in Kyrgyz debt. On July 29, 2005, due to Washingtons mixed diplomatic signals straining relations over the May 2005 tragedy in Andijan, Uzbekistan, under the terms of the SOFA Uzbekistan told the U.S. to vacate K2, which was completed in Nov. 2005. After the departure of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan, Manas, 400 miles and 90-minutes flying time to Afghanistan, became the main hub for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, processing more than 5.3 million U.S. servicemen, 98 percent of all military personnel involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, with 1,200 U.S. servicemen performing aerial refueling, personnel and 42,000 cargo airlift missions, according to Colonel John Millard, commander of the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing and Manas base head. But Washingtons inept policies towards Kyrgyzstan eventually soured bilateral relations over Manas. Kyrgyz complaints included inadequate rent, corrupt fuel contracts and environmental concerns. Things came to a head on Dec. 6, 2006, when 20year-old U.S. soldier Zachary Hatfield shot and killed 42 year-old Kyrgyz Aleksandr Ivanov, an ethnic Russian Kyrgyz, at the airbases entry gate. Ivanov worked for Aerocraft Petrol Management, which provided fuel services for Kyrgyz and international civilian aircraft. Hatfield maintained that he fired in self-defense after Ivanov approached him with a knife. Despite promises to make Hatfield available to the Kyrgyz judicial system, the Pentagon whisked him out of the country, greatly angering the Kyrgyz population. In addition, Russia was offering various forms of financial assistance and soft loans which went unmatched by Washington, deeply mired in its dealings with corrupt President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who in April 2010 in the face of massive demonstrations fled the country. On Nov. 8 2011, newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev announced that he would close Manas when its lease ran out in 2014. On June 3, 2014 American troops vacated the base and it was handed back. Not surprisingly, in the wake of NATOs expansion and Western protests over Ukraine, Russia is shoring up its military and economic presence in the post-Soviet space where possible, whether through bilateral arrangements or multilateral organizations such as CSTO. Given that on Oct. 10 Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, launching on Jan. 1, 2015, which is dominated by the sheer weight of the Russian economy and Kyrgyzstan has applied as well, it seems certain only that Western influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, particularly in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan can only diminish further, even as NATO steps up its patrols around Russias borders. Dr. John C. K. Daly is a non-resident Fellow at the Johns Hopkins Central Asia Caucasus Institute in Washington DC. silkroadreporters/2014/10/24/ukraine-russia-beefs-military-armenia-kyrgyzstan/
Posted on: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 02:51:13 +0000
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