ASIA ADJUSTS TO RUSSIAS STANDOFF WITH THE WEST Northeast Asian diplomacy is changing as the conflict between Russia and the Western powers over Ukraine radiates outward. U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-Hye each met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the nuclear security summit in The Hague on Monday; Russian President Vladimir Putin canceled his plans to attend. On Tuesday, Obama will meet with Park and with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Though the leaders have much to discuss regarding nuclear security and broader relations in the Pacific, most important to watch is their maneuvering related to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Asia and the West view Russias resurgence differently. The United States and the European powers share suspicions that Putins efforts to rebuild Russias influence in its periphery constitute a threat to their interests, despite their varying degrees of appetite for confrontation. In Japan, China and South Korea, the Russian revival has generated more abundant energy supplies and business opportunities, without too worrisome an increase in security threats. However inapt the Cold War analogy may be to todays situation in Europe, it is especially inapt in Asia. But Russias moves affect regional policies in different ways. Japan and South Korea increasingly view Russias revival of purpose in East Asia not only as a means of lowering energy import bills and expanding investment opportunities but also of helping to balance China. In addition to possible bilateral deals with Russia, South Korea sees opportunity in Russias recent progress in long-delayed infrastructure initiatives with North Korea. Meanwhile, though Japan will never approve of Russian territorial seizures, it currently has unusually high hopes of reaching some kind of settlement with Moscow over the disputed Kuril Islands. Tokyo also seeks a level of defense cooperation with Russia and hopes eventually to sign a peace treaty. The Japanese need to be able to focus more intently on the Chinese threat. The need to maintain solidarity with the United States -- the chief protector of both Japan and South Korea -- while Washington attempts to isolate Russia has made the situation awkward, but neither American ally can afford to take an overly critical stance toward Russia at this time. For its part, Beijing has acted exceedingly cautious throughout this crisis, maintaining its standard diplomatic strategy of laying low, calling for peaceful resolution through dialogue and avoiding taking sides. Clearly, China often cooperates with Russia, rejects American alliance expansionism and opposes meddling in the internal affairs of other countries -- especially attempts by America or its allies to fuel popular protests and topple governments. Though China seeks market access in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine by itself is a relatively minor interest in the region. More important, as the confrontation between Russia and the West continues, Beijing sees a chance to gain strategic space that would be invaluable as it wrestles with increasingly disruptive internal matters -- political purges, economic slowdown, social fragmentation and domestic terrorism. If the United States believes it must build stronger economic and defense relations with countries on Russias periphery, it will lose resources that could otherwise go toward strengthening its pivot to Asia. Insofar as a more aggressive Russia prompts the Europeans to accelerate energy diversification, the conflict also gives China more leverage in its energy negotiations with Russia. If China can continue to foment distrust between Japan and South Korea -- the natural rivalry between which constantly troubles American alliance management -- and retain its influence in North Korea, then it may be able to buy itself the relative external stability it needs. These days, however, it is harder for China to lay as low as it has in the past. Beijing is happy to be courted by both the Americans and the Russians, but playing the middleman incurs risks. Moscow and Washington are not as trapped in an antagonistic relationship as they once were, and both have options for punishing Beijing if it presses its advantage too far. China must be uneasy with Russias method of taking Crimea -- it does not like the idea of justifying separatism by popular referendum. Beijing also fears Moscows threat of expanding citizenship abroad and extending military protections to Russians everywhere. This Medvedev Doctrine has important implications for Beijings economic outreach to Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and theoretically even Mongolia. Moreover, Beijing knows better than to underestimate the U.S. ability to operate in Pacific and European theaters simultaneously.
Posted on: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 10:49:13 +0000
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