Afghanistan, in 2014 and beyond. By: Faheem Nazimi The international engagement to stabilize and help rebuild war-torn Afghanistan after the U.S.-led military intervention in 2001, in response to al-Qaeda’s September 11 attacks, has had a transformative effect in helping Afghanistan re emerge from two decades of conflict. It has also helped pave the way for a nascent constitutional order, a revitalized economy, and a fast-paced social and generational mobility. These achievements have been accompanied, however, by numerous challenges and setbacks. The economy of Afghanistan, despite the infusion of uncounted millions of US dollars in international assistance and investments as well as remittances from expatriates, has not been significantly improved. Afghanistan still remains poor and highly dependent on foreign aid. Roughly half the population suffers from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, employment and adequate education. International donors have remained committed to the post-conflict reconstruction by trying to improve access to these basic necessities; however they are not committed to creating a self-sustaining state economy that can survive the withdrawal of outside intervention, something that can bring rapid and sustainable economic growth to Afghanistan, also known as the second phase of post conflict reconstruction. The billions of dollars being invested by the international community in military intervention and security initiatives cannot succeed without jobs for the people and businesses to employ them, with international markets to generate the income the country needs. No consensus has yet been reached on the extent to which the United Nations (UN)-mandated mission in Afghanistan, which has been part of a wider international effort to help with stabilization, state building, and reconstruction, has achieved its primary objective of weakening the threat to global security from transnational actors that use terrorism as a tool. The cost of this war, which has now become the longest in U.S. history, has been steep in terms of human losses, both Afghan and foreign, and of civil-military expenditures. Furthermore, chronic insecurity, weak governance, impunity, and corruption on the Afghan side are causing anger and resentment in the population, most of whom view the international engagement as a unique opportunity to put an end to years of conflict and help rebuild their country. In terms of regional dynamics, as the NATO mission comes to an end in 2014, countries are hedging to deal with a diverse set of emerging scenarios. Relations are complex and driven by differing priorities. The Afghan transition process could either help reduce conflict and weaken the hold of radicalized groups by facilitating regional stability and growth or have the opposite effect. On the international donors’ side, fatigue compounded by global economic constraints and the gradual loss of public support have undermined political backing for the mission and are expected to contribute to reduced funding levels. Relations between the Afghan government and the West have experienced both highs and lows, affected by issues ranging from civilian casualties to prisoner transfers. Despite varying perceptions about the past decade of engagement and the current state of the mission, the future of Afghanistan in terms of stability, better governance, and economic sustainability will, to a large extent, depend on decisions that Afghans, regional actors, and international stakeholders make and on how the intermediate transitional period will be managed. Mistrust of neighbours seen as interfering is widespread, as is the belief that regional dynamics have a major impact on Afghan stability. Terrorism is deemed as sourced outside the country, and the Taliban’s strength is seen as tied to external factors. Border demarcation issues, most believe should be addressed through a consultative process, as should water rights through international mediation, to help de-escalate regional tensions and act as confidence-building measures. A negotiated political end to the conflict is considered ideal, as is a U.S. and Pakistan role in that process. Most do not believe that the Taliban would agree to the current political order or constitution, but some are willing to negotiate elements of democratic values and gender rights. Although some Afghans express cautious optimism, most are concerned that they have much to lose in terms of relative security, better livelihoods, and new opportunities. If the state is too weak to manage the transition or if security forces fragment, Afghans fear that the gains of the last decade will either be seriously diminished or lost. As all sides enter the current mission’s endgame phase, actors are being forced to re- evaluate their strategies and tactics. Afghans in particular are confronting a daunting set of challenges, including the handover of security responsibilities to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the political process that includes elections (presidential and provincial council in 2014 and parliamentary in 2015), attempts at reconciling with armed opposition groups, and, finally, the impact of less foreign aid to support the economy and perform state-building functions, will certainly determine the future course of Afghanistan. Never the less, the renewed effort of Afghan reconciliation efforts has given new hopes that 2014 may be the year when Taliban would form permanent part of the Afghan political mainstream and relative peace is established. The Afghan war has taken its toll on all parties involved. They all seem to be tired of fighting Some Taliban leaders have accepted the fact that they can not continue to fight any more and would rather take the negociation course as the best option to save Afghanistan from further blood shed and destruction.
Posted on: Wed, 05 Jun 2013 11:22:16 +0000
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