Afternoon to the end of the Battle of Brandwyine It was at this point that Squire Cheyney, whom we mentioned earlier, frantically rode seven miles to the Ring House to deliver a manic message of warning to Washington which was greeted with skepticism. Cheyneys message, along with several other reports, finally convinced Washington — Howe was now to the rear of the American right. By about 2:00 P.M., after receiving these new reports of Howes movements that Washington recognized the dreadful truth: Howe had successfully moved around him and was positioned to attack from the north. Howes column was at that moment nearing the end of a grueling seventeen-mile march in sweltering heat, the fog having burned off early that morning. The British crossed the west branch of the Brandywine at Trimbles Ford at about 11 oclock and then marched east, crossing the east branch at Jeffries Ford about three hours later. They had to cross these two branches in up to three feet of water. At 2:30 P.M. the tired men were given leave to throw themselves down on some heights to the east of the ford and rest for an hour. Bland sighted an advanced party of Howes column about two miles southeast of Jeffries Ford at a quarter after one oclock, but his scribbled note conveying this information to Washington came too late. By this point, with the British already moving toward his rear, Washington had no choice but to make defensive dispositions. He therefore ordered his reserve of Stirlings and Stephens divisions to take up positions near Birmingham meeting- house, a small Quaker church on the east side of the road leading southeast from Jeffries Ford and about two miles north of Chads Ford. Directly across the road to the west was Birmingham Hill, a small eminence that was nevertheless reasonably well-suited for defense. Sullivan had meanwhile received another report from Bland of British movements in the Rear of my Right about two miles Coming Down. The colonel added that he had seen Dust Rise back in the Country for above an hour. The situation demanded swift measures, and Washington responded by ordering Sullivan to abandon Brintons Ford and join Stirling and Stephen near Birmingham meeting-house, where Sullivan would take overall command of the three divisions. While putting his division into motion, Sullivan encountered Col. Hazen, who declared that the enemy were Close upon his Heels, testimony backed up by the almost immediate sighting of the British advance guard. Sullivan rushed his men to take up positions to Stirlings left on Birmingham Hill, with Stephens division already in place on the right. Inadequately trained as the Americans were in drill, this nevertheless took some time, especially given the rough terrain. Howe knew his dominating position and could afford to show a Cheerful Countenance to his officers, with whom he chatted amiably as he observed the American deployments. His troops meanwhile formed into line for the critical assault on Birmingham Hill. The attack began at about four oclock, before Sullivans division had a chance to take up proper positions on the American left. On the right, Stirling and Stephens well-sited 3 and 4 pounder guns, which had been dragged up the hill with tremendous effort, tore holes with canister and grape shot in the ranks of the advancing Hessian jägers and British grenadiers. The British were forced to halt and take cover a short distance from the base of the hill. The small arms fire was terrible, wrote one jäger, the counter-fire from the enemy, especially against us, was the most concentrated. Sullivans men hurried to take up their positions but were forced to march through a narrow lane, where Hessian grenadiers who had clambered up the slope picked them off by the dozens. On this side of the hill, the Hessian grenadiers and the Guards were to their delight able to advance out of the line of fire of the American artillery. Their assault threw Sullivans men into utter confusion. Sullivan himself was away on the right conferring with Stirling and Stephen, but Brigadier General Preudhomme de Borré, the French commander of the 2d Brigade who commanded in Sullivans absence, fled with his men (he was forced out of the service after the battle). On the way down the hill Borré showed Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Smith of the 4th Maryland some scratches on his cheek, which he said had been done by the English firing fish-hooks, but more probably by the briars. Sullivan had meanwhile returned to rally his men, but no Sooner did I form one party but that which I had before formed would Run off. The fight for Birmingham Hill was nevertheless far from over. Hazens Regiment, still in good order, formed up on Stirlings left facing the Hessian grenadiers. The British at the base of the hill had meanwhile brought up cannon to bombard the American artillery, but though outgunned the American gunners returned fire as long as possible. The Enemy Soon began to bend their principal force against the Hill, Sullivan later wrote, & the fire was Close & heavy for a Long time & Soon became General . . . five times did the Enemy drive our Troops from the Hill & as often was it Regained & the Summit often Disputed almost muzzle to muzzle. Several companies of the British 1st Light Infantry, hoping to gain the east slope of the hill, attempted to bypass the Birmingham Meeting-house, but here they were met by a withering fire from Colonel Thomas Marshalls Virginia Regiment stationed behind the meeting-house wall. The British infantry sustained severe casualties before they were able to gain a blind spot on the slope out of sight of both Marshalls men and the artillery on the hill. At this point Howe and Cornwallis ordered a series of attacks on the left, right and center of the hill, gradually forcing the Americans off with substantial casualties on both sides. Hazens regiment was all but shattered by the Hessian grenadiers while Stirlings division retreated in fairly good order; most of Stephens division was disorganized if not routed altogether, a fate that was prevented by a gallant rearguard action of Woodfords Virginians. After an hour and forty minutes of what General Conway called the most Close & Severe a fire he ever saw, the British had possession of the hill; but not, Sullivan claimed, till we had almost Covered the Ground between [the hill] and Bremingham [sic] meeting House with The Dead Bodies of the Enemy. After the loss of Birmingham Hill, the American priority for the rest of the battle had to be the successful withdrawal of the remainder of the army. There could be no question of reforming either Sullivans or Stephens divisions, which were no longer effective fighting formations. Conway was, however, able to form a second defensive line out of his 3d Pennsylvania brigade on another small hill a short distance southeast of Birmingham Hill. The British came on quickly, routing in the process those remnants of Stephens division which had been too slow to retreat. Unfortunately for the Americans, Conways men initially resisted boldly but, lacking bayonets themselves, were averse to facing the British bayonet charge and broke very suddenly. The Marquis de Lafayette, who had come to observe the attack and attempted to rally Conways men, received a British musket ball in the leg and had to be carried off the field. What remained of the three divisions fled a mile further east to Dilworthtown, just north of which place Greenes division was forming up. Washington had dispatched Greene to this place after learning of the fall of Birmingham Hill, and he now arrived to supervise the positioning of Greenes troops. By this time the 1st division was the last fresh American division on the field. Knyphausen had assaulted Waynes and Maxwells positions around Chads Ford at five oclock, rapidly driving them back and capturing all of Procters guns. The position at Dilworthtown was therefore critical if the rest of the army (including Armstrongs militia, which had not been engaged but was busy retreating eastward) was to be preserved. That this position held until sundown was partly because of Washingtons careful positioning, at Sullivans suggestion, of Brigadier Generals Peter Muhlenbergs and George Weedons brigades respectively on the front and flank of the British advance. As the Hessian grenadiers marched on Dilworthtown, Captain Johann Ewald wrote, they received intense grapeshot and musketry fire [apparently from Muhlenbergs men] which threw [the Hessians] into disorder, but they recovered themselves quickly, deployed, and attacked the village. Brigadier-General James Agnews brigade of redcoats, occupying at Ewalds suggestion a hill on the flank, ran into several American regiments of Weedons brigade, preparing to fall upon the Hessians flank. At this point, Ewald wrote, there was terrible firing, and half of the Englishmen and nearly all of the officers of these two regiments (they were the 44th and 64th regiments) were slain. Fortunately for the British, an English artillery officer arrived opportunely with two six-pounders on Weedons flank, breaking up their attack. By this time it was growing dark and Greenes men could follow their compatriots to Chester while the British remained in Dilworthtown, tending the wounded of both sides. The Americans fought valiantly, but they had been outwitted on the rolling hills along the Brandywine. Nightfall finally brought an end to the battle. The defeated Americans retreated to Chester. The bulk of the army arrived by midnight with the remainder trickling in until dawn. General Howes exhausted men camped on the battlefield and the surrounding countryside including the farmyards of Benjamin Ring and Gideon Gilpin. British Captain John Andre wrote in his journal, Night and the fatigue the soldiers had undergone prevented any pursuit. Lieutenant James McMichael of the 13th Pennsylvania Continental Regiment wrote that this day for a severe and successive engagement exceeded all I ever saw. The casualties reflected the bitterness with which it was fought. Had the attack on Birmingham Hill begun earlier, the defeat may have turned into a rout. Howe could thank fortune, his superior intelligence gathering and the efficacy of the British bayonet for his victory. The Americans, for their part, were beaten but not broken; they knew very well that in general they had stood up well to the professional British soldiers. It was not without reason that Washington wrote John Hancock from Chester shortly after midnight: Notwithstanding the misfortune of the day, I am happy to find the troops in good spirits; and I hope another time we shall compensate for the losses now sustained. You can view an animated battle map on this website. You can view Battle of Paoli, Battle of the Clouds, or the Battle of Brandywine. pbpfinc.org/animated-battle-map/
Posted on: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 23:00:01 +0000
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