BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT • Uighur militants conducted a suicide attack in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on October 23, sending a message that the insurgency in China’s Xinjiang Province, which saw its deadliest year ever in 2013, is spreading for the first time to majority Han Chinese cities of eastern China • The wide coverage of the attack in international press and Chinese social media will force visitors to add “terrorism” to their list of concerns and heighten tensions between Hans and Uighurs; this could affect investment and tourism and undermine China’s promotion of Xinjiang as an “ethnically harmonious” Eurasian economic hub • The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi, who blames China for the “oppression” of Muslim Rohingyas in his native Burma, issued a video statement with members of the Uighur-led and Pakistan-based Turkistan Islamic Party in July 2013, saying China will be the “number one enemy” in the future; this attack may signal a new wave of attacks inspired or directed from sanctuary in Pakistan, that could complicate China-Pakistan relations • The Beijing attack resembles suicide vehicle bombings and “ramming” attacks conducted since 2008, on Han Chinese pedestrians and security officers in Xinjiang. Background On October 23, 2013, five people, including three attackers from a single family, were killed and dozens of tourists injured when a car rammed into a gate in Tiananmen Square and exploded. At first, China blocked off the scene and suppressed news reports, but later revealed that the suspects in the “terrorist attack” were Uighurs from China’s westernmost Xinjiang Province. Although Xinjiang saw its worst violence in July 2009, during four days of Han-Uighur ethnic riots in Xinjiang’s capital of Urumqi and a subsequent rise in attacks on Han pedestrians and security officers, the violence was confined to Xinjiang until now. Analysis The attack in Beijing’s historic, political and cultural heart of Tiananmen Square will remind the Chinese government and Hans that “inner China”—a term Uighurs in Xinjiang use to refer to the rest of China—is not immune to attacks. The attack will also reinforce the perception among Hans that Uighurs are responsible for the “chaos” and “instability” that Xinjiang has seen since 2009, and that the government is justified in suppressing Uighur nationalism and dissent in Xinjiang. This includes promoting Mandarin language and Communist symbolism (a towering statue of Mao Zedong looks over Kashgar’s main square, for example) and discouraging largely mainstream Islamic practices such as eating halal food, fasting during Ramadan, praying five times a day, and growing a beard or wearing a headscarf. In turn, Uighurs in cities of southern Xinjiang, such as Kashgar and Hotan, that retain their Uighur character—as opposed to Urumqi, which is “Han-ified”—will increasingly resist Chinese rule. Clashes in Xinjiang between Uighurs and Han migrants from “inner China,” as well as with Han security officers, will become more commonplace, and the cycle of violence between Hans and Uighurs will accelerate. There have been five major clashes in Xinjiang in 2013, including on April 23, in Kashgar, police clashed with a group of Uighars making explosives and in possession of “jihadi propaganda materials,” resulting in 21 deaths among police officers and militants; June 26, 15 Uighurs used daggers and Molotov cocktails during an attack on a police station, with over 50 deaths; and June 28, in Hotan, police acted to break up a mosque sermon and arrest the imam, with over ten Uighurs killed, and subsequent violent protests in a main square. They key issue is whether the deeply rooted local grievances of Uighurs, coupled with operational and ideological support from the 300-member Uighur-led Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Pakistan, will spur an increase in attacks and capabilities of Uighur militants in Xinjiang. While the TIP did not claim responsibility for any of the five incidents in Xinjiang in 2013, its leader, Abdullah Mansour, issued a Uighur language video statement that the jihad operation on April 23 in Kashgar was in response to Chinese Communists killing and imprisoning Islamic teachers and scholars, the domination of Uighurs by Chinese culture, and the banning of headscarves for women and beards for men. The three al-Qaeda-connected TIP leaders prior to Mansour—killed by the Pakistani army (Hasan Mahsum) and US drone strikes (Abd al-Haq Turkistani and Abd al-Shakoor Turkistani)—had also issued similar propaganda statements. The TIP will likely either claim or praise the attack in Beijing in coming weeks. The suicide attack in Beijing was not the first attack of its kind in China and resembled previous TIP attacks in Xinjiang. On October 1, 2012, China’s National Day, a motorcycle-borne suicide attacker killed 21 border guards Yecheng, a city in Xinjiang near the border with Pakistan. The TIP later claimed the attack. Similarly, “ramming” has been a common tactic in Xinjiang. Uighur militants killed 17 Chinese security officers in Kashgar in August 2008, when they rammed a truck into officers marching near their base. In an attack on July 31, 2011, TIP militants rammed a truck into Han pedestrians at an outdoor event in Kashgar and then stabbed the victims, killing ten. The TIP claimed responsibility for the attack and showed a video of the militants during their training in Pakistan. China is increasingly concerned that Uighur militants, including some who trained in Pakistan, are transiting Turkey and fighting in Syria, which is raising the profile of “Turkistan” on the international extremist agenda. Moreover, in July 2013, for the first time, China openly stated that Uighur militants were training in Pakistan—a not-so-subtle rebuke of China’s “all-weather friend” and key ally vis-à-vis India in South Asia. Though not mentioning TIP specifically, a veritable who’s who of alive and dead al-Qaeda leaders have issued statements supporting “Turkistan”: Abu Zar al-Burmi, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan mufti, ‘Abd al-Malek Droukdel, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leader, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Khalid al-Husayanan al-Kuwaiti, late senior leaders of al-Qaeda core, as well as Ayman al-Zawahri, current nominal al-Qaeda chief. As a result, Uighur militancy may be locally rooted but not impervious to its being globalized, much to the detriment of China’s counter-terrorism efforts, since repressing Uighur militants at home will not impact the momentum of the TIP and “Turkistan” on the extremist agenda abroad. FORECAST • China’s idea of promoting economic development in Xinjiang, including labeling Kashgar as the “New Shenzhen,” will fail to reduce Uighur-Han tensions; rather tensions will continue to escalate because little is being done to address Uighur grievances • The TIP and other Central Asian extremists will continue to exploit new transportation routes into Xinjiang in order to smuggle anti-Chinese propaganda and inspire additional attacks, and they will train Uighurs in Pakistan to carry out attacks in Xinjiang, eastern China, and potentially on Chinese interests or personnel abroad • Although Pakistan will be unable to eliminate Uighur and Central Asian extremists safe havens on its territory, the Chinese-Pakistan “all-weather friendship” will persevere, although China may pressure Pakistan to allow increased access to bases in northern Pakistan and at the strategic Gwadar Port near Karachi.
Posted on: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 16:43:07 +0000
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