Battle of Chickamauga September 19 File Chickamauga Sep19 1.png Rosecranss movement of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas s XIV Corps the previous day put the left flank of the Army of the Cumberland farther north than Bragg expected to find when he formulated his plans for an attack on September 20. Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden s XXI Corps was concentrated around Lee and Gordons Mill, which Bragg assumed was the left flank, but Thomas was arrayed behind him, covering a wide front from Crawfish Springs (division of Maj. Gen. James S. Negley , the Widow Glenns house (Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds , Kelly field (Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird , to around the McDonald farm (Brig. Gen. John M. Brannan . Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger s Reserve Corps was spread along the northern end of the battlefield from Rossville to McAfees Church.Eicher, p. 581; Woodworth, p. 85; Hallock, p. 67; Lamers, pp. 322-23: Esposito, map 113. Braggs plan was for an attack on the supposed Union left flank by the corps of Maj. Gens. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Sr. John Bell Hood and William H. T. Walker screened by Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest s cavalry to the north, with Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham s division held in reserve in the center and Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne s division in reserve at Thedfords Ford. Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman s division faced Crittenden at Lee and Gordons Mill and Breckinridges faced Negley.Connelly, pp. 201-02; Woodworth, 84; Robertson (Spring 2008), 6; Lamers, p. 327; Eicher, pp. 580-81. The Battle of Chickamauga opened almost by accident, when pickets from Col. Daniel McCook, Jr. s brigade of Grangers Reserve Corps moved toward Jays Mill In search of water. McCook had moved from Rossville on September 18 to aid Col. Robert Mintys brigade. His men established a defensive position several hundred yards northwest of Jays Mill, about equally distant from where the 1st Georgia Cavalry waited through the night south of the mill. At about the time that McCook sent a regiment to destroy Reeds Bridge (which would survive the second attempt in two days to destroy it), Brig. Gen. Henry Davidson of Forrests Cavalry Corps sent the 1st Georgia forward and they encountered some of McCooks men near the mill. McCook was ordered by Granger to withdraw back to Rossville and his men were pursued by Davidsons troopers. McCook encountered Thomas at the LaFayette Road, having finished an all-night march from Crawfish Springs. McCook reported to Thomas that a single Confederate infantry brigade was trapped on the west side of Chickamauga Creek. Thomas told Brannans division to attack and destroy it.Cozzens, pp. 121-23; Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 7-8; Tucker, pp. 126-27; Korn, p. 45; Lamers, pp. 327-28; Eicher, p. 581. File Waud Chickamauga.jpg .]] Brannan sent three brigades in response to Thomass order: Col. Ferdinand Van Derveers brigade moved southeast on the Reeds Bridge Road, with Col. John Croxtons brigade on his right. Col. John Connells brigade came up behind in reserve. Croxtons men drove back Davidsons advanced cavalrymen and Forrest formed a defensive line of dismounted troopers to stem the tide. Croxton halted his advance because he was unsure of Forrests strength. Forrest requested reinforcements from Bragg and Walker near Alexanders Bridge and Walker ordered Col. Claudius Wilsons brigade forward about 9 a.m., hitting Croxtons right flank. Forrest protected his own right flank by deploying the brigade of Col. George Dibrell, which ran into Van Derveers brigade and came to a halt under fire. Forrest sent in Brig. Gen. Matthew Ectors brigade, part of Walkers Reserve Corps, but without Walkers knowledge. Ectors men replaced Debrills in line, but they were also unable to drive Van Derveer from his position.Tucker, pp. 130-33; Woodworth, p. 87; Robertson (Spring 2008), 8, 19; Cozzens, pp. 124-35. Brannans division was holding its ground against Forrest and his infantry reinforcements, but their ammunition was running low. Thomas sent Bairds division to assist, which advanced with two brigades forward and one in reserve. Brig. Gen. John Kings brigade of U.S. Army regulars relieved Croxton. The brigade of Col. Benjamin Scribner took up a position on Kings right and Col. John Starkweathers brigade remained in reserve. With superior numbers and firepower, Scribner and King were able to start pushing back Wilson and Ector.Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 19-20; Tucker, pp. 133-36; Cozzens, pp. 135-48. Bragg committed the division of Brig. Gen. St. John Richardson Liddell to the fight, countering Thomass reinforcements. The brigades of Col. Daniel Govan and Brig. Gen. Edward Walthall advanced along the Alexanders Bridge Road, smashing Bairds right flank. Both Scribners and Starkweathers brigades retreated in panic, followed by Kings regulars, who dashed for the rear through Van Derveers brigade. Van Derveers men halted the Confederate advance with a concentrated volley at close range. Liddells exhausted men began to withdraw and Croxtons brigade, returning to the action, pushed them back beyond the Winfrey field.Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 21-23; Woodworth, pp. 87-88; Eicher, p. 582; Cozzens, pp. 141-51; Tucker, pp. 133-36. Believing that Rosecrans was attempting to move the center of the battle farther north than Bragg planned, Bragg began rushing heavy reinforcements from all parts of his line to his right, starting with Cheathams division of Polks Corps, with five brigades the largest in the Army of Tennessee. At 11 a.m., Cheathams men approached Liddells halted division and formed on its left. Three brigades under Brig. Gens. Marcus Wright, Preston Smith, and John Jackson formed the front line and Brig. Gens. Otho Strahl and George Maney commanded the brigades in the second line. Their advance greatly overlapped Croxtons brigade and had no difficulty pushing it back. As Croxton withdrew, his brigade was replaced by Brig. Gen. Richard Johnsons division of McCooks XX Corps near the LaFayette Road. Johnsons lead brigades, under Col. Philemon Baldwin and Brig. Gen. August Willich engaged Jacksons brigade, protecting Croxtons withdrawal. Although outnumbered, Jackson held under the pressure until his ammunition ran low and he called for reinforcements. Cheatham sent in Maneys small brigade to replace Jackson, but they were no match for the two larger Federal brigades and Maney was forced to withdraw as both of his flanks were crushed.Tucker, pp. 137, 142-46; Lamers, p. 329; Cozzens, pp. 156, 158, 186-88; Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 24-26; Woodworth, pp. 89-90; Eicher, p. 583; Korn, p. 46. Additional Union reinforcements arrived shortly after Johnson. Maj. Gen. John Palmers division of Crittendens corps marched from Lee and Gordons Mill and advanced into the fight with three brigades in line—the brigades of Brig. Gen. William Hazen, Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, and Col. William Grose—against the Confederate brigades of Wright and Smith. Smiths brigade bore the brunt of the attack in the Brock field and was replaced by Strahls brigade, which also had to withdraw under the pressure. Two more Union brigades followed Palmers division, from Brig. Gen. Horatio Van Cleves division of the XXI corps, who formed on the left flank of Wrights brigade. The attack of Brig. Gen. Samuel Beattys brigade was the tipping point that caused Wrights brigade to join the retreat with Cheathams other units.Cozzens, pp. 151-52, 183, 186-88; Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 40-41; Tucker, pp. 144-42; Woodworth, p. 89; Eicher, p. 582. File Chickamauga Sep19 2.png For a third time, Bragg ordered a fresh division to move in, this time Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart s (Buckners corps) from its position at Thedford Ford around noon. Stewart encountered Wrights retreating brigade at the Brock farm and decided to attack Van Cleves position on his left, a decision he made under his own authority. With his brigades deployed in column, Brig. Gen. Henry Claytons was the first to hit three Federal brigades around the Brotherton Farm. Firing until their ammunition was gone, Claytons men were replaced with Brig. Gen. John Browns brigade. Brown drove Beattys and Dicks men from the woods east of the LaFayette Road and paused to regroup. Stewart committed his last brigade, under Brig. Gen. William Bate, around 3:30 p.m. and routed Van Cleves division. Hazens brigade was caught up in the retreat as they were replenishing their ammunition. Col. James Sheffields brigade from Hoods division drove back Groses and Crufts brigades. Brig. Gen. John Turchins brigade (Reynoldss division) counterattacked and briefly held off Sheffield, but the Confederates had caused a major penetration in the Federal line in the area of the Brotherton and Dyer fields. Stewart did not have sufficient forces to maintain that position, and was forced to order Bate to withdraw east of the Lafayette Road.Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 41-44; Tucker, pp. 152-61; Cozzens, pp. 183-86, 230-34, 251-59; Woodworth, pp. 90, 98-99; Eicher, pp. 583-84, Korn, p. 47. File Brotherton Cabin.jpg At around 2 p.m, the division of Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson (Hoods corps) encountered the advance of Union Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis s two brigade division of the XX corps, marching north from Crawfish Springs. Johnsons men attacked Col. Hans Christian Heg s brigade on Daviss left and forced it across the LaFayette Road. Hood ordered Johnson to continue the attack by crossing the LaFayette Road with two brigades in line and one in reserve. The two brigades drifted apart during the attack. On the right, Col. John Fultons brigade routed Kings brigade and linked up with Bate at Brotherton field. On the left, Brig. Gen. John Greggs brigade attacked Col. John T. Wilders Union brigade in its reserve position at the Viniard Farm. Gregg was seriously wounded and his brigade advance halted. Brig. Gen. Evander McNairs brigade, called up from the rear, also lost their cohesion during the advance.Cozzens, pp. 196, 199-200, 214; Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 44-45; Woodworth, p. 92; Tucker, pp. 166, 172-73; Korn, p. 48; Eicher, pp. 582-83. File Chickamauga Sep19 3.png Union Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood s division was ordered to march north from Lee and Gordons Mill around 3 p.m. His brigade under Col. George P. Buell was posted north of the Viniard house while Col. Charles Harkers brigade continued up the LaFayette Road. Harkers brigade arrived in the rear of Fultons and McNairs Confederate regiments, firing into their backs. Although the Confederates retreated to the woods east of the road, Harker realized he was isolated and quickly withdrew. At the Viniard house, Buells men were attacked by part of Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law s division of Hoods corps. The brigades of Brig. Gens. Jerome B. Robertson and Henry L. Benning pushed southwest toward the Viniard field, pushing back Brig. Gen. William Carlins brigade (Daviss division) and fiercely struck Buells brigade, pushing them back behind Wilders line. Hoods and Johnsons men, pushing strongly forward, approached so close to Rosecranss new headquarters at the tiny cabin of Widow Eliza Glenn that the staff officers inside had to shout to make themselves heard over the sounds of battle. There was a significant risk of a Federal rout in this part of the line. Wilders men eventually held back the Confederate advance, fighting from behind a drainage ditch.Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 45-46; Cozzens, pp. 218-24, 259-62; Tucker, pp. 170-72, 174; Woodworth, p. 93; Korn, p. 48; Lamers, p. 331. The Federals launched several unsuccessful counterattacks late in the afternoon to regain the ground around the Viniard house. Col. Heg was mortally wounded during one of these advances. Late in the day, Rosecrans deployed almost his last reserve, Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan s division of McCooks corps. Marching north from Lee and Gordons Mill, Sheridan took the brigades of Cols. Luther Bradley and Bernard Laiboldt. Bradleys brigade was in the lead and it was able to push the heavily outnumbered brigades of Robertson and Benning out of Viniard field. Bradley was wounded during the attack.Tucker, p. 169; Cozzens, pp. 226-29, 289; Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 47-48; Woodworth, p. 93; Lamers, p. 331; Korn, p. 49. By 6 p.m., darkness was falling, and Braxton Bragg had not abandoned his idea of pushing the Federal army to the south. He ordered Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburnes division (Hills corps) to join Polk on the armys right flank. This area of the battlefield had been quiet for several hours as the fighting moved progressively southward. George Thomas had been consolidating his lines, withdrawing slightly to the west to what he considered a superior defensive position. Richard Johnsons division and Absalom Bairds brigade were in the rear of Thomass westward migration, covering the withdrawal. At sunset Cleburne launched an attack with three brigades in line—from left to right, Brig. Gens. James Deshler, Sterling Wood, and Lucius Polk. The attack degenerated into chaos in the limited visibility of twilight and smoke from burning underbrush. Some of Absalom Bairds men advanced to support Baldwins Union brigade, but mistakenly fired at them and were subjected to return friendly fire Baldwin was shot dead from his horse attempting to lead a counterattack. Deshlers brigade missed their objective entirely and Deshler was shot in the chest while examining ammunition boxes. Brig. Gen. Preston Smith led his brigade forward to support Deshler and mistakenly rode into the lines of Col. Joseph B. Dodges brigade (Johnsons division), where he was shot down. By 9 p.m Cleburnes men retained possession of the Winfrey field and Johnson and Baird had been driven back inside Thomass new defensive line.Woodworth, p. 100; Cozzens, pp. 263, 274-76; Tucker, pp. 176-85; Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 48-49; Eicher, p. 585; Korn, pp. 50-52. Casualties for the first day of battle are difficult to calculate because losses are usually reported for the entire battle. Historian Peter Cozzens wrote that "an estimate of between 6,000 and 9,000 Confederates and perhaps 7,000 Federals seems reasonable."Cozzens, p. 294. Planning for the second day At Braxton Braggs headquarters at Thedford Ford, the commanding general was officially pleased with the days events. He reported that "Night found us masters of the ground, after a series of very obstinate contests with largely superior numbers."Hallock, p. 70. However, his attacks had been launched in a disjointed fashion, failing to achieve a concentration of mass to defeat Rosecrans or cut him off from Chattanooga. Army of Tennessee historian Thomas Connelly criticized Braggs conduct of the battle on September 19, citing his lack of specific orders to his subordinates, and his series of "sporadic attacks which only sapped Braggs strength and enabled Rosecrans to locate the Rebel position." He wrote that Bragg bypassed two opportunities to win the battle on September 19:Connelly, pp. 201, 207-08. Bragg met individually with his subordinates and informed them that he was reorganizing the Army of Tennessee into two wings. Leonidas Polk, the senior Lieutenant General on the field (but junior to Longstreet), was given the right wing and command of Hills Corps, Walkers Corps, and Cheathams Division. Polk was ordered to initiate the assault on the Federal left at daybreak, beginning with the division of Breckinridge, followed progressively by Cleburne, Stewart, Hood, McLaws, Bushrod Johnson, Hindman, and Preston. Informed that Lt. Gen. James Longstreet had just arrived by train from Virginia, Bragg designated him as the left wing commander, commanding Hoods Corps, Buckners Corps, and Hindmans Division of Polks Corps. (Longstreet arrived late on the night of September 19, and had to find his way in the dark to Braggs headquarters, since Bragg did not send a guide to meet him. Longstreet found Bragg asleep and woke him around 11 p.m. Bragg told Longstreet he would take charge of the left wing, explained his battle plan for September 20, and provided Longstreet a map of the area.) The third lieutenant general of the army, D.H. Hill was not informed directly by Bragg of his effective demotion to be Polks subordinate, but he learned his status from a staff officer.Woodworth, p. 103; Cozzens, pp. 299-303; Robertson (Spring 2008), p. 50; Tucker, pp. 213-17; Eicher, p. 585; Knudsen, p. 55; Korn, pp. 53-54. What Hill did not learn was his role in the upcoming battle. The courier sent with written orders was not able to find Hill and returned to his unit without informing anyone. Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge one of Hills division commanders, was at Polks headquarters but was not informed that his division was to initiate the dawn attack. At 5 a.m. on September 20, Polk was awakened on the cold and foggy battlefield to find that Hill was not preparing to attack. He prepared new written orders, which reached Hill about 6 a.m. Hill responded with a number of reasons for delaying the attack, including readjustments of the alignment of his units, reconnaissance of the enemy line, and issuing breakfast rations to his men. Reluctantly, Bragg agreed.Tucker, pp. 221-30; Cozzens, pp. 301-03, 307-10; Woodworth, pp. 103-04; Korn, p. 54; Eicher, p. 586; Robertson (Spring 2008), pp. 50-52. On the Union side, Rosecrans held a council of war with most of his corps and division commanders to determine a course of action for September 20. The Army of the Cumberland had been significantly hurt in the first days battle and had only five fresh brigades available, whereas the Confederate army had been receiving reinforcements and now outnumbered the Federals. Both of these facts ruled out a Union offensive. The presence of Assistant Secretary of War Charles Anderson Dana at the meeting made any discussion of retreating difficult. Rosecrans decided that his army had to remain in place, on the defensive. He recalled that Bragg had retreated after Battle of Perryville and Battle of Stones River and could conceivably repeat that behavior.Cozzens, pp. 294-97; Tucker, pp. 195-98; Robertson (Spring 2008), p. 49; Lamers, p. 334; Korn, p. 52. Rosecranss defensive line consisted of Thomas in his present position, a salient that encompassed the Kelly Farm east of the LaFayette Road, which Thomass engineers had fortified overnight with log breastworks. To the right, McCook withdrew his men from the Viniard field and anchored his right near the Widow Glenns. Crittenden was placed into reserve and Granger, still concentrated at Rossville, was notified to be prepared to support either Thomas or McCook, although practically he could only support Thomas.Woodworth, pp. 105-06; Cozzens, p. 298; Robertson (Spring 2008), p. 50; Eicher, p. 585; Lamers, pp. 334-35; Esposito, map 113. Still before dawn, Baird reported to Thomas that his line stopped short of the intersection of the LaFayette and McFarlands Gap Roads, and that he could not cover it without weakening his line critically. Thomas requested that his division under James Negley be moved from McCooks sector to correct this problem. Rosecrans directed that McCook was to replace Negley in line, but he found soon afterward that Negley had not been relieved. He ordered Negley to send his reserve brigade to Thomas immediately and continued to ride on an inspection of the lines. On a return visit, he founded Negley was still in position and Thomas Woods division was just arriving to relieve him. Rosecrans ordered Wood to expedite his relief of Negleys remaining brigades. Some staff officers later recalled that Rosecrans had been extremely angry and berated Wood in front of his staff, although Wood denied that this incident occurred. As Negleys remaining brigades move north, the first attack of the second day of the Battle of Chickamauga started.Tucker, pp. 205-07; Cozzens, pp. 310-14; Woodworth, p. 106; Eicher, p. 586; Korn, p. 56; Lamers, pp. 336-39. September 20 File Chickamauga Sep20 1.png The battle on the second day began at about 9:30 a.m. on the left flank of the Union line, about four hours after Bragg had ordered the attack to start, with coordinated attacks planned by Breckinridge and Cleburne of D.H. Hills Corps, Polks Right Wing. Braggs intention was that this would be the start of successive attacks progressing leftward, en echelon along the Confederate line, designed to drive the Union army south, away from its escape routes through the Rossville Gap and McFarlands Gap. The late start was significant. At "day-dawn" there were no significant defensive breastworks constructed by Thomass men yet; these formidable obstacles were built in the few hours after dawn. Bragg wrote after the war that if it were not for the loss of these hours, "our independence might have been won."Hallock, pp. 73-74; Korn, p. 54; Woodworth, pp. 103, 106; Tucker, pp. 221-22; Cozzens, pp. 338, 320; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 19, 23; Eicher, p. 586. Breckinridges brigades under Brig. Gens. Benjamin Hardin Helm Marcellus A. Stovall and Daniel Weisiger Adams moved forward, left to right, in a single line. Helms Orphan Brigade of Kentuckians was the first to make contact with Thomass breastworks and Helm (the favorite brother-in-law of Abraham Lincoln) was mortally wounded while attempting to motivate his Kentuckians forward to assault the strong position. Breckinridges other two brigades made better progress against the brigade of Brig. Gen. John Beatty (Ohio) (Negleys division), which was attempting to defend a line of a width more suitable for a division. As he found the left flank of the Union line, Breckinridge realigned his two brigades to straddle the LaFayette Road to move south, threatening the rear of Thomass Kelly field salient. Thomas called up reinforcements from Brannans reserve division and Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer s brigade charged Stovalls men, driving them back. Adamss Brigade was stopped by Col. Timothy Robbins Stanley s brigade of Negleys division. Adams was wounded and left behind as his men retreated to their starting position.Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 19-21; Korn p. 55; Cozzens, pp. 320-37; Connelly, pp. 221-22; Tucker, pp. 233-43; Woodworth, pp. 107-10. The other part of Hills attack also foundered. Cleburnes division met heavy resistance at the breastworks defended by the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds. Confusing lines of battle, including an overlap with Stewarts division on Cleburnes left, diminished the effectiveness of the Confederate attack. Cheathams division, waiting in reserve, also could not advance because of Left Wing troops to their front. Hill brought up States Rights Gist Brigade, commanded by Col. Peyton Colquitt, of Walkers Corps to fill the gap between Breckinridge and Cleburne. Colquitt was killed and his brigade suffered severe casualties in their aborted advance. Walker brought the remainder of his division forward to rescue the survivors of Gists Brigade. On his right flank, Hill sent Col. Daniel Govan s brigade of Liddells Division to support Breckinridge, but the brigade was forced to retreat along with Stovalls and Adamss men in the face of a Federal counterattack.Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 20-24; Woodworth, pp. 109-11; Connelly, p. 222; Tucker, pp. 243-50; Cozzens, pp. 338-56. The attack on the Confederate right flank had petered out by noon, but it caused great commotion throughout Rosecranss army as Thomas sent staff officers to seek aid from fellow generals along the line. West of the Poe field, Brannans division was manning the line between Reynoldss division on his left and Woods on his right. His reserve brigade was marching north to aid Thomas, but at about 10 a.m. he received one of Thomass staff officers asking for additional assistance. He knew that if his entire division were withdrawn from the line, it would expose the flanks of the neighboring divisions, so he sought Reynoldss advice. Reynolds agreed to the proposed movement, but sent word to Rosecrans warning him of the possibly dangerous situation that would result. However, Brannan remained in his position on the line, apparently wishing for Thomass request to be approved by Rosecrans. The staff officer continued to think that Brannan was already in motion. Receiving the message on the west end of the Dyer field, Rosecrans, who assumed that Brannan had already left the line, desired Wood to fill the hole that would be created. His chief of staff, James A. Garfield, who would have known that Brannan was staying in line, was busy writing orders for parts of Sheridans and Van Cleves divisions to support Thomas. Rosecranss order was instead written by Frank Bond, his senior aide-de-camp, generally competent but inexperienced at order-writing. As Rosecrans dictated, Bond wrote the following order: "The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him." This contradictory order was not reviewed by Rosecrans, who by this point was increasingly worn-out, and was sent to Wood directly, bypassing his corps commander Crittenden.Lamers, p. 341; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 26-27; Tucker, pp. 251-54; Cozzens, pp. 357-61; Woodworth, pp. 113-14. File Thomas J Wood.jpg ] Wood was perplexed by Rosecranss order, which he received around 10:50 a.m. Since Brannan was still on his left flank, Wood would not be able to "close up on" (a military term that meant to "move adjacent to") Reynolds with Brannans division in the way. Therefore, the only possibility was to withdraw from the line, march around behind Brannan and form up behind Reynolds (the military meaning of the word "support"). This was obviously a risky move, leaving an opening in the line, but Wood had already been berated earlier that day for not promptly obeying an order, and was not inclined to question this one, even though a ride to Rosecranss headquarters would have taken less than five minutes. Wood spoke with corps commander McCook, and claimed later that McCook agreed to fill the resulting gap with XX Corps units. McCook maintained that he had not enough units to spare to cover a division-wide hole, although he did send Hegs brigade to partially fill the gap.Lamers, pp. 344-45; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 27-28; Esposito, map 114; Korn, pp. 57-58; Tucker, pp. 255-59; Cozzens, pp. 363-67; Cleaves, p. 167; Woodworth, p. 115. At about this time, Bragg also made a peremptory order based on incomplete information. Impatient that his attack was not progressing to the left, he sent orders for all of his commands to advance at once. Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart of Longstreets wing received the command and immediately ordered his division forward without consulting with Longstreet. His brigades under Brig. Gens. Henry D. Clayton John C. Brown and William B. Bate attacked across the Poe field in the direction of the Union divisions of Brannan and Reynolds. Along with Brig. Gen. S. A. M. Wood s brigade of Cleburnes Division, Stewarts men disabled Brannans right flank and pushed back Van Cleves division in Brannans rear, momentarily crossing the LaFayette Road. A Federal counterattack drove Stewarts Division back to its starting point.Woodworth, pp. 111-12; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 24-26; Tucker, pp. 261-62, 284-87; Cozzens, pp. 343-47, 368. File Chickamauga Sep20 2.png Longstreet also received Braggs order but did not act immediately. Surprised by Stewarts advance, he held up the order for the remainder of his wing. Longstreet had spent the morning attempting to arrange his lines so that his divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia would be in the front line, but these movements had resulted in the battle line confusion that had plagued Cleburne earlier. When Longstreet was finally ready, he had amassed a concentrated striking force, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood of three divisions, with eight brigades arranged in five lines. In the lead, Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson s division straddled the Brotherton Road in two echelons. They were followed by Hoods Division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law and two brigades of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws s division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw To the left of this column was Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman s division. Brig. Gen. William Preston (Kentucky) s division of Buckners corps was in reserve behind Hindman.Woodworth, p. 116; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 9, 28; Hallock, p. 75; Cozzens, p. 368; Tucker, pp. 260-61, 282; Cleaves, p. 223. Longstreet gave the order to move at 11:10 a.m. and Johnsons division proceeded across the Brotherton field, by coincidence to precisely the point where Woods Union division was pulling out of the line. Johnsons brigade on the left, commanded by Col. John S. Fulton, drove directly through the gap. The brigade on the right, under Brig. Gen. Evander McNair encountered opposition from Brannans division (parts of Col. John M. Connells brigade), but was also able to push through. The few Union soldiers in that sector ran in panic from the onslaught. At the far side of the Dyer field, several Union batteries of the XXI Corps reserve artillery were set up, but without infantry support. Although the Confederate infantrymen hesitated briefly, Greggs brigade, commanded by Col. Cyrus Sugg, which flanked the guns on their right, Sheffields brigade, commanded by Col. William Perry, and the brigade of Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson captured 15 of the 26 cannons on the ridge.Woodworth, pp. 117-19 (states that 29 cannons were on the ridge); Cleaves, pp. 223-24 (states that at least 30 guns were captured); Robertson (Summer 2008), p. 40 (26 cannons on the ridge); Tucker, pp. 264-72; Cozzens, pp. 374-76, 397-405; Eicher, p. 588. As the Union troops were withdrawing, Wood stopped his brigade commanded by Col. Charles G. Harker and sent it back with orders to counterattack the Confederates. They appeared on the scene at the flank of the Confederates who had captured the artillery pieces, causing them to retreat. The brigades of McNair, Perry, and Robinson became intermingled as they ran for shelter in the woods east of the field. Hood ordered Kershaws Brigade to attack Harker and then raced toward Robertsons Brigade of Texans, Hoods old brigade. As he reached his former unit, a bullet struck him in his right thigh, knocking him from his horse. He was taken to a hospital near Alexanders Bridge, where his leg was amputated a few inches from the hip.Cozzens, pp. 407-12; Tucker, pp. 279-80, 284, 287; Woodworth, pp. 120-21; Robertson (Summer 2008), p. 40. File Chickamauga Sep20 3.png File Chickamauga Sep20 3 detail.png Harker conducted a fighting withdrawal under pressure from Kershaw, retreating to Horseshoe Ridge near the tiny house of George Washington Snodgrass. Finding a good defensible position there, Harkers men were able to resist the multiple assaults, beginning at 1 p.m., from the brigades of Kershaw and Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys These two brigades had no assistance from their nearby fellow brigade commanders. Perry and Robertson were attempting to reorganize their brigades after they were routed into the woods. Brig. Gen. Henry L. Bennings brigade turned north after crossing the Lafayette Road in pursuit of two brigades of Brannans division, then halted for the afternoon near the Poe house.Robertson (Summer 2008), p. 41; Woodworth, pp. 121-23; Tucker, p. 287; Cozzens, pp. 410-11, 424-31. Hindmans Division attacked the Union line to the south of Hoods column and encountered considerably more resistance. The brigade on the right, commanded by Brig. Gen. Zachariah Deas, drove back two brigades of Daviss division and defeated Col. Bernard Laiboldts brigade of Sheridans division. Sheridans two remaining brigades, under Brig. Gen. William Haines Lytle and Col. Nathan Walworth, checked the Confederate advance on a slight ridge west of the Dyer field near the Widow Glenn House. While leading his men in the defense, Lytle was killed and his men, now outflanked and leaderless, fled west. Hindmans brigade on the left, under Brig. Gen. Arthur Manigault, crossed the field east of the Widow Glenns house when Col. John T. Wilder s mounted infantry brigade, advancing from its reserve position, launched a strong counterattack with its Spencer repeating rifles, driving the enemy around and through what became known as "Bloody Pond". Having nullified Manigaults advance, Wilder decided to attack the flank of Hoods column. However, just then Assistant Secretary of War Dana found Wilder and excitedly proclaimed that the battle was lost and demanded to be escorted to Chattanooga. In the time that Wilder took to calm down the secretary and arrange a small detachment to escort him back to safety, the opportunity for a successful attack was lost and he ordered his men to withdraw to the west.Lamers, p. 352; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 41-42; Eicher, 589; Tucker, pp. 288-99, 315-17; Cozzens, pp. 376-90, 392-96; Woodworth, pp. 118-19. All Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated. Sheridans and Daviss divisions fell back to the escape route at McFarlands Gap, taking with them elements of Van Cleves and Negleys divisions. The majority of units on the right fell back in disorder and Rosecrans, Garfield, McCook, and Crittenden, although attempting to rally retreating units, soon joined them in the mad rush to safety. Rosecrans decided to proceed in haste to Chattanooga in order to organize his returning men and the city defenses. He sent Garfield to Thomas with orders to take command of the forces remaining at Chickamauga and withdraw to Rossville. At McFarlands Gap units had reformed and General Negley met both Sheridan and Davis. Sheridan decided he would go to Thomass aid not directly from McFarlands gap but via a circuitous route northwest to the Rossville gap then south on Lafayette road. The provost marshal of the XIV Corps met Crittenden around the gap and offered him the services of 1,000 men he had been able to round up during the retreat. Crittenden refused the command and continued his personal flight. At about 3 p.m., Sheridans 1,500 men, Daviss 2,500, Negleys 2,200, and 1,700 men of other detached units were at or near McFarlands Gap just 3 miles away from Horseshoe Ridge.Cleaves, p. 169; Eicher, p. 590; Tucker, pp. 309, 313-14; Woodworth, p. 134; Cozzens, pp. 402-05; Turchin, p. 129; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 42-43. Robertson stated that Rosecrans, witnessing the destruction of Lytles brigade, turned toward the rear "in apparent despair," the army commanders "spirit broken." File Chickamauga Snodgrass house.jpg However, not all of the Army of the Cumberland had fled. Thomass four divisions still held their lines around Kelly Field and a strong defensive position was attracting men from the right flank to Horseshoe Ridge. James Negley had been deploying artillery there on orders from Thomas to protect his position at Kelly Field (although Negley inexplicably was facing his guns to the south instead of the northeast). Retreating men rallied in groups of squads and companies and began erecting hasty breastworks from felled trees. The first regimental size unit to arrive in an organized state was the 82nd Indiana, commanded by Col. Morton Hunter, part of Brannans division. Brannan himself arrived at Snodgrass Hill at about noon and began to implore his men to rally around Hunters unit.Cozzens, pp. 418-19; Robertson (Summer 2008), p. 44; Alf G. Hunter, files.usgwarchives.org/in/statewide/history/1893/historyo/chapterv455gms.txt Chapter V: Chickamauga campaign], reports, however, that Col. Hunter stated in an 1887 speech to veterans of his regiment that he did not see Brannan once that afternoon. Units continued to arrive on Horseshoe Ridge and extended the line, most importantly a regiment that Brannan had requested from Negleys division, the 21st Ohio. This unit was armed with five-shot Colt revolving rifle , without which the right flank of the position might have been turned by Kershaws 2nd South Carolina at 1 p.m. Historian Steven E. Woodworth called the actions of the 21st Ohio "one of the epic defensive stands of the entire war."Woodworth, p. 123. The 535 men of the regiment expended 43,550 rounds in the engagement. Stanleys brigade, which had been driven to the area by Govans attack, took up a position on the portion of the ridge immediately south of the Snodgrass house, where they were joined by Harkers brigade on their left. This group of randomly selected units were the ones who beat back the initial assaults from Kershaw and Humphrey. Soon thereafter, the Confederate division of Bushrod Johnson advanced against the western end of the ridge, seriously threatening the Union flank. But as they reach the top of the ridge, they found that fresh Union reinforcements had arrived.Tucker, pp. 351-52; Cozzens, pp. 424-25; Woodworth, pp. 123-24; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 44-45. Throughout the day, the sounds of battle had reached 3 miles north to McAfees Church, where the Reserve Corps of Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger was stationed. Granger eventually lost patience and sent reinforcements south without receiving explicit ordersTucker, 340. At 8 p.m. on September 19, Rosecrans sent an order to Granger saying, "You must help us in the fight tomorrow by supporting Thomas." to do so—the two brigades of Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman s division and the brigade of Col. Daniel McCook As the men marched, they were harassed by Forrests dismounted cavalrymen and artillery, causing them to veer toward the west. McCooks brigade was left behind at the McDonald house to guard the rear and Steedmans two brigades reached the Union lines in the rear of the Horseshoe Ridge position, just as Johnson was starting his attack. Granger sent Steedmans men into Johnsons path on the run.Tucker, pp. 340-46; Robertson (Summer 2008), p. 45; Cozzens, pp. 438-44; Cleaves, p. 172; Woodworth, pp. 123-25; Eicher, p. 590. File Horseshoe Ridge Chickamauga.jpg 2008.]] Several attacks and counterattacks shifted the lines back and forth as Johnson received more and more reinforcements—McNairs Brigade (commanded by Col. David Coleman), and Deass and Manigaults brigades from Hindmans division—but many of these men were exhausted. Van Derveers brigade arrived from the Kelly Field line to beef up the Union defense. Brig. Gen. James Patton Anderson s brigade (Hindmans Division) unsuccessfully attempted to assault the hill in the gap between Johnson and Kershaw. Despite all the furious activity on Snodgrass Hill, Longstreet was exerting little direction on the battlefield, enjoying a leisurely lunch of bacon and sweet potatoes with his staff in the rear. Summoned to a meeting with Bragg, Longstreet asked the army commander for reinforcements from Polks stalled wing, even though he had not committed his own reserve, Prestons division. Bragg was becoming distraught and told Longstreet that the battle was being lost, something Longstreet found inexplicable, considering the success of his assault column. Bragg knew, however, that his success on the southern end of the battlefield was merely driving his opponents to their escape route to Chattanooga and that the opportunity to destroy the Army of the Cumberland had evaporated. After the repeated delays in the mornings attacks, Bragg had lost confidence in his generals on the right wing, and while denying Longstreet reinforcements told him "There is not a man in the right wing who has any fight in him."Cleaves, p. 225; Esposito, map 114; Cozzens, pp. 435-36, 452-56; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 41, 43, 46; Tucker, pp. 303-04; Woodworth, pp. 122, 126-27; Lamers, p. 356. Longstreet finally deployed Prestons division, which made several attempts to assault Horseshoe Ridge, starting around 4:30 p.m. Longstreet later wrote that there were 25 assaults in all on Snodgrass Hill, but historian Glenn Tucker has written that it was "really one of sustained duration."Tucker, p. 357. At that same time Thomas received an order from Rosecrans to take command of the army and began a general retreat. Thomass divisions at Kelly field, starting with Reynoldss division, were the first to withdraw, followed by Palmers. As the Confederates saw the Union soldiers withdrawing, they renewed their attacks, threatening to surround Johnsons and Bairds divisions. Although Johnsons division managed to escape relatively unscathed, Baird lost a significant number of men as prisoners. Thomas left Horseshoe Ridge, placing Granger in charge, but Granger departed soon thereafter, leaving no one to coordinate the withdrawal. Steedman, Brannan, and Wood managed to stealthily withdraw their divisions to the north. Three regiments that had been attached from other units—the 22nd Michigan, the 89th Ohio, and the 21st Ohio—were left behind without sufficient ammunition, and ordered to use their bayonets. They held their position until surrounded by Prestons division, when they were forced to surrender.Connelly, p. 225; Tucker, pp. 353-57, 368-69; Woodworth, pp. 127-28; Cozzens, pp. 471-77, 492-509; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 47-49; Cleaves, pp. 174-75. Aftermath Thomas withdrew the remainder of his units to positions around Rossville Gap after darkness fell. His personal determination to maintain the Union position until ordered to withdraw, while his commander and peers fled, earned him the nickname Rock of Chickamauga derived from a portion of a message that Garfield sent to Rosecrans, "Thomas is standing like a rock."Tucker, p. 359. Garfield met Thomas in Rossville that night and wired to Rosecrans that "our men not only held their ground, but in many points drove the enemy splendidly. Longstreets Virginians have got their bellies full." Although he admitted that the troops were tired and hungry, and nearly out of ammunition, he added "I believe we can whip them tomorrow. I believe we can now crown the whole battle with victory." He urged Rosecrans to rejoin the army and lead it, but Rosecrans, physically exhausted and psychologically a beaten man, remained in Chattanooga. President Lincoln attempted to prop up the morale of his general, telegraphing "Be of good cheer. ... We have unabated confidence in you and your soldiers and officers. In the main, you must be the judge as to what is to be done. If I was to suggest, I would say save your army by taking strong positions until Burnside joins you." Privately, Lincoln told John Hay that Rosecrans seemed "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head."Cozzens, pp. 520-21; Esposito, map 114; Eicher, p. 592; Woodworth, pp. 129-31; Lamers, p. 361. The Army of Tennessee camped for the night, unaware that the Union army had slipped from their grasp. Bragg was not able to mount the kind of pursuit that would have been necessary to cause Rosecrans significant further damage. Many of his troops had arrived hurriedly at Chickamauga by rail, without wagons to transport them and many of the artillery horses had been injured or killed during the battle. Furthermore, the Tennessee River was now an obstacle to the Confederates and Bragg had no pontoon bridges to effect a crossing. Braggs army paused at Chickamauga to reorganize and gather equipment lost by the Union army. Although Rosecrans had been able to save most of his trains, large quantities of ammunition and arms had been left behind. Army of Tennessee historian Thomas L. Connelly has criticized Braggs performance, claiming that for over four hours on the afternoon of September 20, he missed several good opportunities to prevent the Federal escape, such as by a pursuit up the Dry Valley Road to McFarlands Gap, or by moving a division (such as Cheathams) around Polk to the north to seize the Rossville Gap or McFarlands Gap via the Reeds Bridge Road.Robertson (Summer 2008), p. 49; Hallock, pp. 82-83; Tucker, p. 393; Woodworth, pp. 132-33; Connelly, pp. 225-26, 230-33; Cozzens, pp. 517-18. The battle was damaging to both sides in proportions roughly equal to the size of the armies: Union losses were 16,170 (1,657 killed, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 captured or missing), Confederate 18,454 (2,312 killed, 14,674 wounded, and 1,468 captured or missing). These were the highest losses of any battle in the Western Theater of the American Civil War during the war and, after Battle of Gettysburg the second-highest of the war overall.civilwarhome/Battles.htm The Ten Costliest Battles of the Civil War, civilwarhome. Among the dead were Confederate generals Benjamin Hardin Helm (husband of Abraham Lincolns wifes sister), James Deshler and Preston Smith (general) and Union general William Haines Lytle Smith, p. 190. Although the Confederates were technically the victors, driving Rosecrans from the field, Bragg had not achieved his objective of destroying Rosecrans, nor of restoring Confederate control of East Tennessee.Eicher, p. 592, describes the battle as a "stunning tactical and strategic victory," but most authors temper the description of victory with the caveats of unachieved objectives, with the additional hindsight of the steady stream of Confederate defeats that followed. On September 21, Rosecranss army withdrew to the city of Chattanooga and took advantage of previous Confederate works to erect strong defensive positions. However, the supply lines into Chattanooga were at risk and the Confederates soon occupied the surrounding heights and laid siege upon the Union forces. Unable to break the siege, Rosecrans was relieved of his command of the Army of the Cumberland on October 19, replaced by Thomas. McCook and Crittenden lost their commands on September 28 as the XX Corps and the XXI Corps were consolidated into a new IV Corps commanded by Granger; neither officer would ever command in the field again. On the Confederate side, Bragg began to wage a battle against the subordinates he resented for failing him in the campaign—Hindman for his lack of action in McLemores Cove, and Polk for his late attack on September 20. On September 29, Bragg suspended both officers from their commands. In early October, an attempted mutiny of Braggs subordinates resulted in D.H. Hill being relieved from his command. Longstreet was dispatched with his corps to the Knoxville Campaign against Ambrose Burnside seriously weakening Braggs army at Chattanooga.Esposito, map 115; Robertson (Summer 2008), pp. 49-50; Hallock, pp. 87, 90; Tucker, 391; Cozzens, pp. 525, 529-35; Eicher, pp. 593, 613-17; Woodworth, p. 146; Connelly, pp. 234-35. Harold Knudsen contends that Chickamauga was the first major Confederate effort to use the "interior lines of the nation" to transport troops between theaters with the aim of achieving a period of numerical superiority and taking the initiative in the hope of gaining decisive results in the West. He states: "The concentration the Confederates achieved at Chickamauga was an opportunity to work within the strategic parameters of Longstreets Defensive-Offensive theory." In Knudsens estimation, it was the Confederates last realistic chance to take the tactical offense within the context of a strategic defense, and destroy the Union Army of the Cumberland. If a major victory erasing the Union gains of the Tullahoma Campaign and a winning of the strategic initiative could be achieved in late 1863, any threat to Atlanta would be eliminated for the near future. Even more significantly, a major military reversal going into the election year of 1864 could have severely harmed President Lincolns re-election chances, caused the possible election of Peace Democrat nominee George McClellan as president, and the cessation of the Union war effort to subdue the South.Knudsen, pp. 54-56, 63-69. The Chickamauga Campaign was followed by the Third Battle of Chattanooga sometimes called the Chattanooga Campaign, including the reopening of supply lines and the Battles of Battle of Lookout Mountain (November 23) and Battle of Missionary Ridge (November 25). Relief forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant broke Braggs grip on the city, sent the Army of Tennessee into retreat, and opened the gateway to the Deep South for Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman s 1864 Atlanta Campaign Esposito, map 116; Eicher, pp. 600-13. Much of the central Chickamauga battlefield is preserved by the National Park Service as part of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park
Posted on: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 14:00:09 +0000
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