#Bioterror #Counterterror #Busy #GoDoOtherJob published: Berkowitz et al. posit four likely methods of dissemination of chemical agents by terrorists: (1) covert contamination with bulk agent of foodstuffs or beverages selected to avoid conditions which would destroy the poison; (2) covert generation in enclosed spaces of lethal vapor concentrations from volatile agents; (3) covert dissemination in enclosed spaces of aerosols of non-volatile agents; and (4) overt attack with bursting munitions or thermogenerators (1972: IX-5). As an example of the first of these, they note that A 10-pound sack of ground coffee for institutional use prepares approximately 800 cups of coffee. Injection of 35 ml of 8-fluorooctanol into the sack before delivery to the user results in one LD50 per cup. The ground coffee would probably not appear abnormal; the brewing process will not destroy the poison; and its presence in the finished brew will not be apparent by taste, odor, or appearance. (1972: IX-5) In a somewhat eerie foreshadowing of the 1995 Tokyo gas attack, Berkowitz et al. go on to note that For vapor dissemination, of the agents investigated only Sarin is sufficiently volatile, while the involatility of the V-agents and BTX require that they be disseminated as aerosols. Finally, they point out: All the agents except BTX could be effectively incorporated into either bursting munitions or thermogenerators. It is doubtful that an unwarned and untrained target group would comprehend the nature of the threat to which it is exposed; its first reaction would likely be to interpret the explosion as a conventional bomb and attempt to render aid to the nearby victims (1972: IX-6). Most authors agree that the most feasible mass chemical attack would be one limited to the enclosed spaces of a single, discrete facility such as a hotel, office building, or convention center (Jenkins and Rubin 1978: 224)86, with a resulting casualty toll ranging between a few hundred and several thousand. At the lower end of the scale, Mullen argues: It is...doubtful that an adversary could under any conditions, with a high probability effectively target a group of people larger than a few hundred with any kind of chemical attack. If an adversary were to attempt an attack on a larger scale, such an attempt would likely be made out of ignorance concerning the logistical, dispersal, and material resources required to launch such an attack effectively. These requirements place the chemical mass destruction attack in the realm of a very large scale undertaking which, for a number of reasons, is not considered credible. On the other hand, an attack with chemical agents on a select population of individuals, such as the inhabitants of an office building or large auditorium, is an attack which is manageable by a single individual....Although the clandestine chemical attack does not appear a viable method for producing very large numbers of fatalities, an event which resulted in a few hundred fatalities could certainly be categorized as an event of mass destruction. (1978: 77) Hurwitz, by contrast, puts the likely number of casualties as the result of a chemical attack on a large auditorium at several thousand (1982: 36). Livingstone posits a number of likely scenarios against government facilities. For example: ...a truck loaded with drums or canisters containing a nerve agent like VX or Sarin could be crashed into an embassy and exploded, turning the deadly substance into a fine mist which would envelop the entire facility (1986: 143). Or, if targeted against a military base: mortar bombs, if filled with a V-series nerve agent, would force the evacuation of the entire area and probably inflict a large number of casualties. If the target were an airbase, it would, in all likelihood, be shut down for a matter of days (1986: 144). The vulnerability of even the highest-value, discrete targets has been demonstrated by various US Army mock attacks on government buildings in Washington, DC, as recounted by Lowell Ponte: One experimental team at Ft. Detrick, Maryland,....[u]sing mock-killer chemicals,...has carried out simulated terrorist attacks on the air-conditioning systems of the White House and the Capitol and on the drinking water used in one major Federal office building. All these experiments were successful, i.e. all demonstrated that a terrorist could easily kill the President and Congress by attacking the unguarded air and water systems of government buildings....Had the Army CBW teams been real terrorists, the President and entire Congress would have died. (1977: 79) Elsewhere, Ponte cites an earlier example of the same type: In a 1962 test an Army team simulated a CBW assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Posing as tourists of the sort who visit the White House virtually every day, Army agents planted vials of mock killer chemicals where the airconditioning system carried their vapors past guards and into the Oval Office. (1980: 52)87 Other possible means of delivering chemical agents to their targets, though on a smaller scale, would be through the contamination of foodstuffs or by direct contact (as in the case of the ricin-tipped umbrellas discussed in the previous section). Livingstone, for example, suggests that it would...be possible to inject...a chemical poison into a victim by means of a hypodermic needle concealed in the tip of an umbrella (1982: 111). Mullins adds that Chemical agents could be used effectively as contaminants for projectiles such as bullets, flechettes, and shrapnel (1992: 111). jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/chemterror.html
Posted on: Sun, 27 Oct 2013 04:38:15 +0000
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