Can History Appeal to the Miraculous as the Best Explanation? Below is my response to this important question, mostly taken from a book by Mike Licona (the reference is in the text below). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Objection: Premise 1) A historian works on the basis of probability. Premise 2) Because a miracle violates the laws of nature (Hume), it is therefore the least probable explanation. Conclusion: Therefore a historian cannot appeal to a miracle as the best historical explanation. My response: I think your overall point is a good one (though I disagree), and I appreciate the fact that you’ve laid it out in a clear manner. I have a few responses: 1) Miracles have indeed been defined in many ways (Licona, M., 2010, ‘The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach’. Downers Grove, IL/Nottingham: IVP Academic/Apollos. pp. 134-136, footnote 3). So similar to your definition (though I think perhaps more accurate, no offence intended) is Davis (1993) – ‘A miracles is an event that (1) is brought about by God and (2) is contrary to the prediction of a law of nature that we have compelling reason to believe is true.’ The reason I think his definition is perhaps more accurate than yours is just that the way it is phrased (‘prediction of a law of nature’) recognises that we are simply extrapolating from past experience when we talk about laws of nature – one could infer from this that past experience doesn’t necessarily establish what must happen in the future, though it is normally an accurate guide. Another definition, provided by Bartholomew (2000) and Beaudoin (2006) don’t define a miracle as being contrary to the laws of nature (at least not in the quotations Licona provides) but as simply being extra/outside of nature, from a supernatural force. My own understanding of a miracle is that, as Batholomew and Beaudoin recognise, it is from God (a supernatural source) and outside of the normal process of events. However, I would not describe this as a violation of the laws of nature, because to describe it in that way gives the impressions that outside of himself God has established certain laws that might be difficult for him to break. However (1) arguably God has not established laws of nature that operate outside of himself (quite a deist concept perhaps), but arguably he is constantly ensuring order and continuity in the universe (which we recognise as laws) by his personal active involvement (perhaps a more Jewish-Christian concept, which fits nicely with an imminent God). (2) ‘laws of nature’ suggests something that is hard to break. In reality, we draw our understanding of ‘laws of nature’ from our past experience/observation of the world/empirically – however, just because we’ve observed something in the past doesn’t mean it will necessarily happen in the future. To give an analogy, every day of my life thus far I have not gone to Utah. While that might make it unlikely for me to be in Utah tomorrow, it doesn’t mean I can’t go there should I so wish – I can. You can find out whether I’ve been to Utah through evidence – e.g. checking my email history for a flight confirmation booking. Thus with miracles – just because the ‘laws of nature’ are what we generally observe, doesn’t mean we necessarily have to apply them rigidly in cases where we have evidence to the contrary. While most events in the world are not miracles, perhaps God sometimes does do miracles (go to Utah) and leaves evidence for those miracles (historical evidence for the resurrection/email confirmation of flight booking). Another interesting question is how often miracles occur. While they are a minority of occurrences (at least under my definition of a miracle), they are perhaps not as infrequent as some (particularly those of a naturalistic persuasion) might think. In relation to the question of NT miracles, Craig Keener wrote ‘Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Account’, in which he records hundreds and I believe over a thousand(s) of miracle reports from around the world (some of which are better evidence than others). To save time, you might prefer to read this article which I think will summarise his position: huffingtonpost/craig-s-keener/miracles-in-the-bible-and-today_b_1274775.html . In a personal correspondence Licona, Keener ‘asserts there are millions of people in modern times who have claimed to have witnessed or experienced a miracle.’, though I don’t know how he comes to this conclusion. Additionally, Gary Habermas, after the resurrection, has spent most of his time study Near Death Experiences (which would point to a supernatural worldview), and if you’re interested in that topic here’s a taster article - acts17.net/2014/10/british-study-points-to-life-after-death.html . I’m not saying I necessarily buy into many of the miracle or Near Death Experience claims (though I’m open to them) – my point is that the view of many that anything supernatural (such as miracles) is extraordinarily rare is open to criticism. Concerning your point about whether more miracles the less amazing they are – in one sense yes, in that part of their amazement comes from the fact that they are less common than the normal course of events. But (1) even if all the miracle accounts in the Bible were true, and all the ones listed by Craig Keener, they would still be comparatively rare (in that they are still outnumbered by non-supernatural events) to be amazing. (2) Their amazement doesn’t depend solely on rarity, but on the great power of God seen in them, and in the great benefits that often flow from them (such as healing). Now, allow me to turn to the fundamental question of whether historians can ever conclude with a miracle. (1) As argued above, this perhaps isn’t as unthinkable as one might think, if the supernatural is more common than many people think. (2) I strongly recommend you read some of Licona’s book (which I referenced at the beginning), which, as the title suggests, deals with exactly these kinds of historiographical questions. I would be very happy to lend/give you a copy. Licona has 66 pages on ‘The Historian and Miracles’, and 18 of those are specifically on David Hume. The point you made quoting Hume is similar to Ernst Toeltsch’s historiographical ‘Principle of Analogy’ – we can only propose something to have happened in the past when it is compatible with our modern understanding of the world. In response (1) as pointed out before, perhaps miracles should be a part of our modern understanding of the world, due to the material referenced above (2) Licona points out flaws with the principle. He notes that many non-miraculous things in the past would fail the criteria. E.g. we don’t have dinosaurs or Romans walking around today, yet we can infer their existence from the data. Under the principle of Analogy/antecedent probability (Hume), we couldn’t say that a certain person won the lottery on a certain day, because such a person had never won it before. Licona also notes that antecedent probability would rule out the Big Bang, because never before had something come out of nothing. Licona also makes an interesting argument that antecedent probability is irrelevant – the fact that 99.9% of people throughout history have not risen from the dead only proves that they do not rise in non-religiously charged contexts and naturalistically. Christians don’t claim these were the conditions for Jesus resurrection .We claim it was a context charged with religious significance and it took place supernaturally. Bartholomew (2000) writes: ‘If Jesus Christ was what orthodoxy claims, he was not ‘as other men’ and hence there is no reason for assuming that what is true for all others was true for him. Hence there is no ground for pronouncing on the possibility of the resurrection from a scientific standpoint.’ Concerning the principle of analogy, Licona cites Dunn (2003): ‘The acids which the historical method uses to clean away the surface varnish and later reworkings of the original painting eat not only into such later accretions but into the original painting and the very canvas itself.’ My own position is that while the Principle of Analogy and methodological naturalism should be our first port of call, it is not an absolute, but should be abandoned when the data strongly suggests it should be (as I think is the case with the resurrection). Licona then makes some further points which I won’t go into here (I myself am not sure what I think of them). Licona provides an interesting quotation from C. S. Lewis (cited via Lewis, 1978): ‘We know the experience against [miracles] to be uniform only if we know that all the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a circle.’ Licona briefly responds to the objection that if a historian is open to the possibility of miracles then he must concede ancient miracle reports left right and centre. Not so. He notes that miracles still would need to be assessed on a case by case basis on the strength of the evidence. Interestingly at this point Licona cited Viney (1989), who, although he rejects the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, maintains that ‘the strategies of Craig and Habermas are basically sound’. Licona also quotes Ben Meyer who points out that the Principle of Analogy doesn’t actually have a grounding/justification in science/philosophy as to why it should be followed. The influence of Hume persists in history. William Lane Craig (in the context of reporting his debate with Gerd Lüdemann, a prominent critic of the resurrection) notes that people often bring up Hume’s points when discussing the resurrection as if Hume’s points have been proved, which Craig claims they have not. As an example he refers to John Erhman, who is not to his knowledge a Christian, who wrote ‘Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles.’ Interestingly, the former atheist, then deist (but not Christian), Anthony Flew (who was an eminent Humean scholar) said that the book Habermas edited with Geivett, In Defense of Miracles, is now THE book for skeptics to answer pertaining to addressing Hume’s arguments (there’s a closed stack copy in the Bod). You might find it interesting – I myself hope to read it when I get a chance. Thank you if you’ve made it thus far! Most of the above was from Licona’s book, which I’d be very happy to lend/give to you.
Posted on: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 20:14:57 +0000
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