Cash Joseph Bonas 28501 Santa Catarina Road Santa Clarita California, 91350 October 25, 2013 Joanne Remke County Public Defender California State Bar Henry Coker, Esq. 1149 South Hill St. Steven Carroll, Esq. Los Angeles, CA 90015 [email protected] Re: County Defender Failure to Defend, Simple Removal State Coker and Remke Bar, About your “Bonas” business affair, this inquires about stripping county claims to jurisdiction against him by way of simply removing it to the nearest federal citizen forum. As you know, when your county suit was filed against Bonas he was a recognized officer of the Federal Courts of California. Exhibit A. As such, it was his constitutional “officer right” to have this case taken up (or not) by the federal prosecutor and/or bench: 28 USC § 1442 – Officers of Federal Court Sued By DA-County (a) A county criminal prosecution may be removed to the nearest district court of the United States when it is filed against: (a) (3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties …. Performing Federal Reporting Duties Everyone involved knew Bonas was an officer of the federal courts when all accusations were leveled. Everyone involved had the actual papers that he was, from February 2001 to the present, “performing federal W.I.C. reporting duties”. Exhibit B. Because the numbers are enormously political, your pretend defender failed to remove; simple removal operates to immediately strip all county jurisdiction. Once removed, the whole case was kicked because it all involved the same “transactional claims” that were formally dismissed. Exhibit C. To avoid a formal suit and the media (not good PR) that might come with it, you may contact me to discuss the “But For and foreseeable income loss” directly caused by the County of San Diego since August of 2003. If you don’t call and settle direct real soon, this goes on a checkbox federal San Diego complaint. Thanks to incessant public displays of criminal arrogance by DA, Robert Trentacosta, Joanne Remke and your Appellate Court, in sync, there’s no time bar. Exhibits D-F. Kind regards, Cash Joseph Bonas Table of Proof Ex A 01-13-98 Bonas, Federal Court Officer – Northern District Papers Ex B 04-03-01 Bonas W.I.C. reporting cover, concealed and lied about by DA Ex C 08-04-03 9th Circuit’s U.S. v. Bonas Order, Dismissed with prejudice. Ex D 12-30-04 State Bar Remke’s Fraud Bonas Discipline/Disbarment publishing Ex F 09-21-06 County’s Appellate Court’s Fraud “Opinion”, aiding and abetting Ex G 11-23-12 Federal Duty to Report Price Economic Treason by County against Feds Justice Ming W. Chin California Supreme Court State Building 350 McAllister, Ste. 1313 San Francisco, Calif. 94102 33 Months Length of Time Coerced Confession The ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent … determination. State of Mind The rules on duress . . . allow the injured party to undo the transaction by avoiding it. They seek to restore the parties to the positions in which they found themselves before they made the agreement. Product of illegitimate coercion requires consideration of the state of mind of the defendant as well as the techniques used for extracting agreement. Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985). The admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements …. 33 months without being allowed to confront a single witness. Without bail or doable bail, designed by both Benches to achieve the ultimate criminal illegal objective: To induce assent on the part of a brave man or a man of ordinary firmness is voidable. Coerced Bench Confession This right was raised over and over again. Their remains no ruling on it because the Bench maliciously dodged, skipped and violently breached its duty to entertain and rule. The Bench aimed and exacted forceful violence at Bonas for calling a spade a spade – the Bench’s illegal “party” move, as a back door “party favor” to its firm friends and. More importantly, the Bench engaged in its ongoing campaign of synergistic corruption in a forbidden role as “representative” of the Bonas accusers, the firms and their big food and gas chain clients. In addressing confessions as well as pleas, voluntary cannot be defined by freedom from coercion, rather than by acknowledging appropriate levels of coercion. Determining whether a confession or plea is the product of illegitimate coercion requires consideration of the state of mind of the defendant as well as the techniques used for extracting agreement. Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (The admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendants will was in fact overborne.). More coercion may be allowable in the form of bargained for benefits in pleas than would be allowed in confessions because the plea is developed with counsels advice and with time to reflect and formalize the decision. A closer equivalence to plea bargains than confessions is suggested by contract law. Cf. Brady, supra, 397 U.S. at 752, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (plea bargains involve mutuality of advantage). The law recognizes that some degree of coercion exists in contract formation, but that the level of duress or threat may not be such that a party is unfairly (however defined) induced to enter into an agreement. Coercion is inherent in the bargaining process itself.... Every contract involves some kind of threat.... The problem is one of singling out those threats that amount to abuse of the bargaining process.... The rules on duress ... allow the injured party to undo the transaction by avoiding it. They seek to restore the parties to the positions in which they found themselves before they made the agreement. Capacity to Plea Illegal Bench Deal The rules on duress . . . allow the injured party to undo the transaction by avoiding it. They seek to restore the parties to the positions in which they found themselves before they made the agreement. Product of illegitimate coercion requires consideration of the state of mind of the defendant as well as the techniques used for extracting agreement. Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985). The admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements …. L.A. U.S. Attorney Arranged To Clip Removal L.A. U.S. Attorney Fraud Strike One, verbatim, On April 4, 2001, defendant left a … message on Stone’s partner Noonan’s voice-mail. L.A. U.S. Attorney Fraud Strike Two, verbatim, “The Cheng and Yang government is not aware of any Stone partner Noonan related county-state cases. “ L.A. U.S. Attorney Strike Three; it sent its four trial notebooks to San Diego DA to reuse against Bonas, as the county public defender knows, confirmed by DAs preliminary hearing. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985). Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985). U.S. v. SPEED JOYEROS, S.A., 204 F.Supp.2d 412 (2002). Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985). U.S. Attorney Ron Cheng and Debra Wong Yang’s Bonas appellate papers, 5. U.S. Attorney Ron Cheng and Debra Wong Yang’s appellate BONAS appellate papers, page 26.
Posted on: Sat, 26 Oct 2013 06:53:45 +0000
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