Central Afghanistan Toward Chaos (Courant 1) Over the past few years, the United States and its allies in Afghanistan have tried everything to break the resistance of the people of Afghanistan against foreign occupation. Looking at some of the strategies used during the last few years it appears that the United States considers a victory in Afghanistan is just false hope. Instead now they face the prospect of Afghanistan will be taken over by the Islamic Emirate at the time of the full withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Afghan Local Police: One strategy is to set up local forces that often vigilante, known as the Afghan Local Police (PLA) under the command of the local commanders across Afghanistan. The US seems to think that with this strategy that the local police raised familiar with the terrain and the people of their area, they will be able to identify the mujahideen and their supporters more easily and US and NATO troops will be less vulnerable to ambush and attack the mujahideen. In order to maximize effectiveness, some would say cruelty, this unity, they have been allowed to operate outside of government structures and with no meaningful accountability for the government. It is true that while on paper, these militias are fully responsible for the Kabul government, but in reality because these forces mostly operate in areas that are not controlled by government forces, they are the de facto control of these areas and without any meaningful oversight. Because they operate outside the legal framework of their government to act with ruthless in carrying out their duties. Many of the local commanders are the same people who contributed to the lawlessness in Afghanistan before the rise of the Taliban and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Emirate. It is ironic that the United States in the early years of the occupation criticized local commanders in Afghanistan. They openly accused some of these commanders commit human rights abuses, including extortion, random killings, torture and the like. Several groups of civil and human rights in Afghanistan openly talking about the need to prosecute some of these commanders in the International Criminal Court. Today, the US has been using the same commanders in their war against the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. They have been given the freedom to do all kinds of abuses, including extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, rape, indiscriminate killing of civilians, torture and the like. In many parts of the US Special Forces use this power as a dirty gloves to perform their actions in the interests of the US. If US forces arrest suspects and has no evidence against the accused they will hand over the suspects to the troops. In most cases the suspect was never seen again and her family could not figure out what happened after the suspects were arrested and handed over to the army. This does not mean that US forces did not realize what was done to the suspect after the handover them. For a full report from the US Special Forces and CIA personnel cooperation with the PLA see this article: (https://afghanistan-analysts.org/war-without-accountability-the-cia-special-forces-and-plans-for-afghanistans-future/) loss of suspects questioned after handover to local forces was carried out under the instruction of US and ISAF troops affirmative. On further on impunity militia refers to the Human Rights Watch report that follows, (hrw.org/reports/2011/09/12/just-don-t-call-it-militia-0) While the extent of US and ISAF forces are responsible for war crimes committed by local militias (because it operates under the instruction of the US) is an issue at different times, which is emphasized by the article is the implication of the local militia (PLA), which operates outside the structure of the state and control and their implications for sovereignty and prosperity of Afghanistan. As stated earlier, these local militias, for all practical purposes, operating outside state control, they are only loyal to their local commanders with little sense of responsibility to the nation or the people they are, and they do not have knowledge of international humanitarian law or Islamic law. PLA after 2014: While at the local police acting as mercenaries operating under the payroll of the US Army, the concern is what role will these militias do if US forces withdraw and the Kabul government does not have the funds to pay them. The militia did not fight for patriotism. Instead their main concern is to maximize their profits. If the commander does not receive money to operate around the main highway linking Kabul to the provincial militia then most likely it will return to their previous practices, namely extortion, kidnapping and drug trafficking to maintain their power and influence. Moreover, in the absence of government forces in the countryside, the local militia will set their own rules in the controlled area and would have refused to heed government orders. Eventually this will drag Afghanistan face the same security dilemma faced by Libya today. In a possibility that seems, that the militia would play a role in the future of Afghanistan. Some of the militia, will be allied with the Kabul will continue to operate to support the Kabul government even though they may continue their criminal activities as well as to maintain their coffers. Most of these militias operating throughout the country, in addition to receiving a salary from the government, also took money and valuables from the local population under the guise of taxation, and the like. While other militia who are not allied with the Kabul government and other parties, will only continue their criminal activities and reject any attempt by the Kabul government to control them. Yet another militia, which is surrounded by the Taliban or lured by them - may be allied with the Taliban and launch a military campaign against the Kabul government. Regardless of which path they choose, the presence and the number of them in Afghanistan will result in the complete decentralization of the Kabul government. If Kabul wants to reassert control over Afghan territory, then they have to face these local militias. Ironically, any attempt by the Kabul government (without the strong support of the US) to disarm the militia or limit their power, are likely to encourage the militia to support the Islamic Emirate / Taliban. A mature strategy? Proliferation (proliferation) militia and the expansion of the power of local commanders in Afghanistan is one example in which the US has prioritized short-term interests at the expense of long-term Afghanistan. It is interesting to consider why the US does not try to form a militia group in the early years of their occupation, but switched to this strategy after they announced the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The United States has tried a similar approach in Iraq and in 2009 Recommendations under the leadership of General David Petraeus. The tendency to create the militia when to withdraw from occupied countries usually driven by the desire to create a state as if their mission success. Preparing local militia was very successful in stalling the progress of the mujahideen in the short term, because it creates resistance at every level of military progress. However, these militias are usually funded by the huge amount of money that sooner or later will dry up. Impunity offered to local militias coupled with reduced resources creates a strong desire to get back into the militia targeting locals and extorting money from them under various pretexts. Complete control over the population and the lack of supervision, as well as encouraging the militia to be more willing to use violence on the local population. Unlike the Taliban who generally rely on local support and therefore strive to accommodate their needs, local militias have almost no desire to accommodate local residents. They usually increase the burden on the local population, away from the locals and drive them into the arms of the mujahideen or other anti-government forces. A recent article by the AAN on the progress of the Taliban in Kunduz province, (https://afghanistan-analysts.org/the-next-round-of-the-tug-of-war-over-kunduz/) shows how Local militias like this can create conditions that can encourage local residents joined into the arms of the Taliban. Moreover, it can be said that the formation of local militias can be counterproductive to the desired result by them. The presence of local militias often pushed government forces to withdraw to the main central area. Moreover, because local militias such as operating independently and without coordination from the government or each other, it is possible to defeat them piecemeal, allowing the Taliban to quickly master the areas outside urban centers and district centers. How the presence of the PLA would hurt the government back? It is said that the PLA is one example where the US strategy used to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan will result in achieving the very opposite. At least the local militias presence will serve as a double-edged sword. While the militia may be partially managed to hold the rate of movement of the Taliban, their presence also resulted in a lack of government control over remote provinces. Local militias that control these provinces are accustomed to commit atrocities against the inhabitants who will lead the locals would stay away from the militia and anti-government sentiment voiced. The role and approach them in facing local and uncoordinated revolt may prove successful, but when faced with insurgents (Taliban) are large-scale, local militias would easily melt or be defeated piecemeal. As more and more areas fell into the hands of Taliban, the Taliban became more conventional, most of the local militia will be presented with one of two choices, either fled or joined the Taliban
Posted on: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 11:57:07 +0000
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