Commentary: Views on Egypt post-30 June Egypt lost ground with international public opinion following the 3 July ouster of Mohamed Morsi. Sticking to the roadmap is the best way to redress misperceptions, writes Al-Sayed Amin Shalabi PrintEmailShare/Bookmark During his year in power, former president Mohamed Morsi wanted to prove that in spite of domestic pressures he could move on the foreign front and respond to the calls of the 25 January Revolution to revive Egypt’s regional and international influence. Thus, within the space of six months, he undertook a series of visits abroad. By taking part in the African Union congress in Addis Ababa on 26 May 2013, he sought to dispel the impression bequeathed by his predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, that Egypt was boycotting African summits. Within the Arab sphere, he called on Saudi Arabia, on 11 July 2012, and took part in the summit of Islamic nations in Mecca on 14 August 2012. Moving further eastward, he went to Iran on 31 August 2012 to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit, after which he visited China, India and Pakistan. With regard to Europe and other spheres, he toured Germany, Belgium, Italy, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. In addition, he addressed the UN General Assembly in New York. Meanwhile, his actions — from his affirmation of Egypt’s commitment to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty through his mediation of a truce between Hamas and Israel — helped ensure that his relations with the US remained smooth. On the surface, this spate of visits gave the impression of an active drive to develop a balanced and multipronged foreign policy. In fact, researchers and others who followed these movements believed that they lacked proper preparation and betrayed insufficient study of the various issues concerned. A notable example was the attempt to advance Egypt for membership in the BRICS association. In addition, in most of these visits, especially at the European level, it seemed as though his European and Russian hosts acted more in the spirit of flattery and indulgence than out of conviction. Another salient mark of the Morsi regime’s management of foreign policy was that the Office of the Presidency dominated the processes of formulating and administering it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was almost totally sidelined. As a consequence, the former president left the presidency and Egypt’s foreign policy in a state of confusion, lacking cohesion. Following 30 June, the removal of the president and his regime and the domestic repercussions this had would naturally impact on Egypt’s foreign relations and policy regionally and internationally. Suddenly, Egyptian diplomacy found itself faced with the challenge of having to confront and rectify the belief that prevailed in most parts of the world, including Africa, that the Armed Forces’ intervention on 3 July was a “military coup” against a democratically elected civilian president. The challenge was renewed after Egyptian security agencies took action against the sit-ins at Rabaa Al-Adaweya and Nahda Square in response to the violence practiced and threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood. These events caused severe tremors in Egypt’s foreign relations, especially in such influential spheres as the US and the EU, where there were calls to reassess relations with Egypt and some punitive measures were taken. Moreover, a special UN Security Council session was held to discuss the Egyptian situation. To meet this challenge to Egypt’s foreign relations, Egypt needed to set into motion a two-pronged drive, one operating at the diplomatic level and the other at the level of the media and aimed at addressing international public opinion and its various institutions and outlets, among which criticism against the new regime in Egypt has been harsh. Accordingly, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and its agencies abroad pursued all available diplomatic channels, achieving some inroads in altering erroneous perceptions among official circles abroad. Unfortunately, it appears that our media has not been successful in reaching and conveying the facts to international public opinion that, in turn, indicates a need for further study of the available means and mechanisms to achieve these ends. As we move to repair the damage to Egypt’s relations with various powers, whether in the Americas or in Europe, or closer to home in Africa, Egyptian foreign policy must also underscore the positive responses from other Arab countries — Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait above all — and take advantage of these responses in its interactions with the US and EU countries, as well as with other international powers such as China and Russia. This approach, I believe, will open up options to Egypt and spare it from having to depend on a single power. In the long term, the efficacy of Egyptian foreign policy and the resumption of positive relations with the world will be contingent on the degree of stability Egypt achieves, and in particular its progress in implementing the various provisions of the “roadmap”, namely: the promulgation of a new constitution that obtains a broad consensus, parliamentary elections open to the participation of all political forces, apart from individuals or organisations involved in violence or found guilty on judicial charges, and then presidential elections. If these measures, all of which will affirm the civil nature of the state, succeed then the world will ascertain that the purpose of the army intervention of 3 July was, in fact, to set Egypt back on the course to democracy. At that point, Egypt’s diplomatic and media discourse will be more persuasive and more influential. The writer is managing director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
Posted on: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 11:14:52 +0000
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