Disaster #Titanic (Case Study) When the R.M.S. Titanic left Southampton, England on April 12, 1912 on her maiden voyage, she was hailed as the worlds largest and most luxurious passenger ship. She left port with 2227 people onboard. Virtually unsinkable they said. A marvel of engineering and technology. State of the art. She was also built to meet any anticipated changes in lifeboat requirements by the authority at the time, the British Board of Trade. She had the facilities in place to allow for four lifeboats at every davit position but sailed with only two. So if new regulations were to come into force requiring higher capacity, the Titanic was ready. But in the mean time, why put in place something that was not mandatory and took away from the look of the ship. So she sailed in full compliance with the current lifeboat regulations, which required her to provide a capacity for only 1178 people, about 52% of the passengers onboard. Her sinking, with a loss of 1,517 lives, was a catalyst for change in ship design, marine safety and maritime law. There were two key investigations following the sinking; one in the United States and one in England which led to other initiatives. The most notable from a regulatory perspective was the convening of the first International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in London, in November 1913. SOLAS regulations, as amended over time, cover all facets of marine safety and are still in force today as part of the International Maritime Organization. Additionally from this convention, a treaty was signed for the formation of the International Ice Patrol, to be run as an agency of the US Coast Guard for the sole purpose of monitoring and reporting the status of icebergs and pack ice in the North Atlantic. It operates to this day. Other key initiatives that came from this unfortunate event were the mandatory requirement for 24 hour radio operator manning and the definition of flare use onboard ships as distress signals. This was a direct result of the SS California investigation. The SS California was estimated to have been the closest ship to the Titanic when it struck the iceberg but never responded to the flare signals or the wireless distress signals. The flares were een by the California crew but thought by their captain to be ship identification signals, not distress signals as at the time they were used for both. The wireless operator for the California had gone to bed for the night and was therefore not at his station to receive the distress signals from the Titanic. The California had stopped for the night due to reported ice in the area and had been in touch with the Titanic earlier to warn her of the ice. Her Captain did not contact the Titanic once he was told about the flares since it would have meant waking up his wireless operator. Such a cavalier attitude given the reality of the situation. And of course both investigations recommended that all ocean going vessels carry lifeboats to match the maximum capacity of personnel onboard , that all vessels conduct regular lifeboat drills and that regular lifeboat and vessel inspections would be required. These were to become part of the agenda for the SOLAS convention in 1913. The Titanic sank despite having a double bottom hull and 16 internal bulkheads that allowed for the rupture of the side hull and subsequent flooding in up to three compartments. Unfortunately, the Titanic had ruptured and flooded more that three of her compartments and slowly filled with water. The internal bulkhead designs had not anticipated this scenario and the bulkheads therefore only went to about 3 m above the water line. So, once she started to list forward due to flooding in her forward compartments, it was inevitable she was going to sink. So it was not surprising that vessel designs soon incorporated internal bulkheads that went all the way to the main deck, making each compartment essentially water tight unto itself. It is also not surprising that the double hull bottom of ships were extended around the side all the way to the water line, thus essentially providing a true double hull to the wetted portion of vessels. The cause of the accident, as all such accident investigations always discover, was a combination of events, any of which, if avoided, could have prevented the accident or the huge loss of life. The wireless operators were too busy to report ice observations back to the ships officers. The captain was running the ship at high speed at night. The vessel was not as robustly built as perhaps the captain and crew were led to believe and was easily damaged by the impact with the iceberg. The moonless, calm night prevented good iceberg visibility. There were not enough lifeboats. The captain and crew were not prepared for the emergency evacuation scenario they were faced with. The closest vessel to the Titanic did not respond to flares or wireless distress calls. The water temperature permitted immersion for less than 30 minutes before death due to hypothermia
Posted on: Sat, 29 Jun 2013 01:31:55 +0000
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