EDWARD MINNOCK, JR. – THE WIZARD OF TUY HOA – APRIL 1968 PART 1 Ed Minnock, Jr. was an Army “brat” who had traveled all over the world before he reached his teens. It was only natural that he would follow his father into the Army. After basic and ASA training, Minnock joined his father in Vietnam and became a member of the 404th Radio Research Detachment (Airborne), operating in support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. His father, Edward W. Minnock, Sr., was an Army sergeant major in military intelligence. The 173rd AB was the MACV reserve force, the “relief unit” for most of South Vietnam; if there was a problem anywhere in the country, the 173rd was sent in to backup whatever U.S. military units were already there. It might be for a few days, or a few weeks, or months, and wherever the 173rd went, a team from the 404th accompanied them. During the Tet Offensive in 1968, the 173rd Brigade had sent task forces to relieve Special Forces camps at Kontum and Dak To and then the Pleiku-Ban Me Thout area and the 404th had sent support teams with each of them. Consequently, the 404th was spread extremely thin. There were only about forty men total assigned to the unit, none of which were noncommissioned officers, and they were scattered all over South Vietnam. Ed Minnock was very bright, and by March 1968, the nineteen-year-old private was an acting operations sergeant, a position normally filled by a sergeant first class with much more experience. Minnock was in charge of four other privates operating a make-shift radio site set up in a tent. They were the only 404th intercept team left at the base camp. The nearly-empty fortification was located near Phu Hiep, a nearly vacant hamlet, about five miles south of Tuy Hoa. The group’s primary job was to monitor enemy communications in Phu Yen Province and be on the lookout for enemy activity that might pose a threat to Tuy Hoa City. The small unit had been on its own since January with few supplies and no transportation, and Minnock rarely communicated with the battalion HQ. When he had to make contact, he hitchhiked there on a helicopter or truck, or he walked. As a provincial capital, Tuy Hoa City was a primary communist target with a host of government and ARVN military targets, a prison filled with several thousand communist prisoners, and the huge U.S. airbase housing the most important F-100 wing in South Vietnam. To complicate matters, the area was crowded with thousands of refugees that had pushed their way into the city during the Tet Offensive, swelling its population to over 100,000 civilians. On 27 March 1968, Minnock began to notice differences in the “pattern” of enemy communications his team routinely monitored. Suspecting a major operation was being planned, he analyzed and reanalyzed huge amounts of data. He asked his fellow privates to focus their efforts on the event he saw developing and provide him with as much material as possible. By the 31st, he and his team had heard enough. Using the collected data, intuition, and insight, Minnock produced a comprehensive tactical analysis predicting which NVA units would make up the enemy force, the size of the force, the time of the attack, the routes the force would take during advance and withdrawal, and their primary targets. The targets included the U.S. airbase, an ARVN artillery battalion, the prison with its VC prisoners, and two important bridges. The attack was going to happen in the next ten days. Private Minnock attempted to report his findings up the chain of command within the 173rd Brigade, but his efforts did not go well. Lower-level officers would not listen to him, and he was finally forced to take his information to a rear-area colonel who had just arrived in-country. The information Minnock and his team had produced was called “special intelligence” (SI) and there were strict rules regarding the release of such information. The private outlined his facts to the colonel, and the reasons for his prediction of the upcoming attack. He suggested possible courses of action, but could not reveal the top-secret source of his information. The colonel was not impressed with him, his “wild” theories, or the Army Security Agency. Minnock had made the mistake of assuming he was briefing a senior officer with a certain amount of intellect and experience, but soon learned otherwise. The colonel perceived a mere private who could not possibly know anything of value and dismissed the young man with a stern lecture about proper use of the chain of command. Rejected, but determined to find someone who would listen, Minnock sought out the commander of the ROK 26th Infantry Regiment/Tiger Division, the Korean unit based at Tuy Hoa. The 26th Regiment was preparing to deploy its 3,000 infantrymen in a search-and-destroy operation that would leave Tuy Hoa City with few defenses. Stopping the operation was not a matter to be taken lightly by either the unit commander or the ASA private who asked to see him. Ed Minnock did not intentionally attempt to deceive the Korean commander. Even as a child he had been highly ethical, and his military father had raised him to respect authority and rank. Most of the soldiers in both the 173rd Brigade and the 404th RRD wore no rank or name tags on their uniforms, so it was not readily discernible whether Minnock was a private or an officer, and the Korean colonel did not ask. It was all in the attitude, and Edward Minnock, Jr. had no shortage of attitude or self-confidence. The commander listened to Minnock’s report, observing his demeanor, commitment, and mastery of the facts. Above all, he was impressed by the young man’s conviction and command of the situation. This young American intelligence officer was obviously a leader who knew his business. The Korean assumed that he must be an officer and never questioned it. Believing what Minnock told him, and quickly grasping the full implications of it, the commander knew what he had to do. He called his MACV advisor, explained the situation, and advised him that he was changing his regiment’s operation “to kill many NVA.” The colonel’s plan was not to intercept the NVA on their way into Tuy Hoa, but to parallel their routes, allow them to move into the area, and then spring the trap. He ordered complete radio silence; all communication would be by courier. There must be no chance that the enemy would learn of the plan. Minnock’s next step was to find a way to defend the main bridge into the city in case some of the NVA troops got past the ROK infantry. The bridge was protected by a few ARVN soldiers, but they would not stop determined NVA regulars. Minnock went to see the Army captain who commanded D Company, 16th Armor, a unit of the 173rd AB. The captain was recuperating at Phu Hiep where the 404th team was located, and Minnock knew him slightly. The private explained the situation to the captain, told him about the ROK commander’s redeployment and urged him to help block the bridge with his armored personnel carriers. The captain contacted his commander, the same newly-arrived colonel who had refused Minnock earlier; the colonel would not authorize the move. He also refused to recall the 3rd/503rd Infantry from a training exercise in an adjacent area. After some deliberation, and fully understanding what the consequences would be for him if Minnock was wrong, the D/16th captain made his decision. He would follow his gut instinct, and when the day of the attack arrived, he would have his unit’s dozen APCs positioned with their twelve .50 cal. and twenty-four 7.62mm machine guns trained on the only approach to the bridge. Three days before the attack, Pvt. Minnock encountered an old and trusted acquaintance. Capt. John Moon was from the 173rd Brigade’s Military Intelligence Co. and had recently returned to Phu Hiep. Minnock was already putting the pieces of his plan in place, but could always use more help and support. Moon listened to Minnock’s analysis, appraised the situation, and suggested they try to disrupt the 5th NVA HQ as they prepared to command their forces. Capt. Moon knew that prior to the attack, the 5th NVA would deploy its command and control into a hidden complex of bunkers that existed southwest of Tuy Hoa City. Military Intelligence had determined approximately where the HQ complex was located, but the problem was how to get to the system of caves and tunnels that were fortified under fifteen feet of earth and logs. Twenty-four hours later, Minnock and Moon launched a barrage of 200 high-explosive shells, compliments of the ROK, ARVN, and U.S. Army artillery. The U.S. Air Force then dropped drums of a napalm-like mixture, ignited it, and followed up with 500 lb. bombs. The secret command and control complex was completely destroyed. How the Minnock and Moon accomplished that feat is open to conjecture and probably better left to history. Neither man ever talked about it. TO BE CONTINUED [Based on Chapter 17, Unlikely Warriors: The Army Security Agencys Secret War in Vietnam 1961-1973 by Lonnie M. Long and Gary B. Blackburn]
Posted on: Fri, 04 Apr 2014 22:32:42 +0000
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