FINAL PART OF CHAPTER 2 OF GHANA UNDER RAWLINGS EARLY YEARS BY EMMANUEL HANSEN: Reactions to the Coup How could the Left have supported an initiative from a military which a few weeks, even days before, had harassed them? It was because they entertained the non-monolithic view of the Ghanaian military and the tendency to act downwards which enabled it to think of the possibility of working with the military, thought and entertained the idea of the military acting more as a rearguard action than a vanguard as many as may seem below. There were usual demonstrations in support of the coup and the proclamations from the chiefly class proferring support. Early in January there were repeated public demonstrations, particularly in Accra, in support of the coup (cf daily newspapers) As much as Rawlings asked for national populist support embracing all the population, public reaction to the coup was structured along class and ideological lines. It was and still is a fact of Ghanaian political life. Depending on one’s conception of what the coup implied, political organizations and social groups reacted with reference to their class interests and ideological predispositions. Thus, the progressive organizations, on the basis of the active involvement of certain individuals, identified with the Left, not the least which was Kojo Tsikata and to some extent Jerry Rawlings himself and the explicit statements of what amounted to a political manifesto which we have just outlined and which put Rawlings and the coup project firmly but broadly within the Left; they perceived the coup as a Left project, with a potential for opening up avenues for social change which they themselves had been unable to bring about, rallied behind it. Included in this was were the mass of the urban working or non-working class and the students, as well as the radical intelligentsia. It was a typical Fanonian constellation of class forces; the only class lacking was the peasantry. On the other hand, the petty bourgeoisie located in the distributive sectors of the economy, commerce or industry, in academia, in the liberal professions or in the upper layers of the bureaucracy and the Armed Forces generally greeted the coup with dismay and apprehension. Although some of them showed some disdain for corruption and ineptitude of the Limann regime, they were apprehensive of he militarist solution to Ghana’s problems. The Chiefly classes were also on the whole apprehensive, if not covertly hostile. The peasantry adopted a wait-and-see attitude but on the whole they shared the apprehension and suspicion of the chiefly classes. They had seen so many military coups, liberations, and revolutions with a claim to make their lot better but which had not made any difference, that they had become cynical. In many parts of Africa there was dismay as another constitutional government was overthrown. A similar coup of lower ranking soldiers had occurred in Liberia in 1980 and a surprising one in Guinea Bissau, and there was fear that the disease might spread to other areas, bringing instability within the sub-region. Nigeria was particularly apprehensive as there were rumours of restlessness among its own junior officers and lower ranking soldiers. In Nigeria the press was particularly hostile, although this tended to conceal the admiration of the ordinary Nigerian worker had for what he considered to be the process going on in Ghana, namely the punishment of the corrupt rich. Those who also feared that the coming back of Rawlings would signal another round of executions, as happened in June 1979 under the AFRC, Ghana and did everything they could to frustrate the initiatives of the Ghanaian revolution. Among the countries which had everything to fer from Ghana were the Republic of Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria, not to talk of Burkina Faso. Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo in particular played host to a number of supporters of the former regime as well as escaped members of the security and military intelligence who made their way to these countries in the wake of the coup, regrouped and sought to use these as a base to destabilize and eventually overthrow the government. But of all this it was the foreign reaction which was most virulent. In Africa, Libya appeared the most enthusiastic about the coup and with good reasons. Ghana’s relations with Libya had reached an all-time low when Dr Limann openly accused Gadaffi of meddling in the internal affairs of his country and announced that he would not attend the OAU meeting scheduled for Tripoli. In November 1980 President Limann had demanded the closure of the Libyan embassy in Accra for activities deemed incompatible with its diplomatic status. (see Accra radio, November 18, 1980). At the OAU summit in Nairobi Limann had been one of the most outspoken in opposing the holding of the OAU summit in Tripoli. Although a number of allegations were made of the presence of Libyan military missions in Accra at the time of he coup, these could not be substantiated and seemed part of western or rather Reagan’s campaign to discredit Tripoli, and provide an excuse for attack on Gadaffi which hey did in April 1985. Chris Atim in February led a delegation to Tripoli where he concluded an agreement on scientific, cultural and educational co-operation, and arranged for joint commercial ventures between the two countries and to set up in Ghana a Ghana-Libyan bank, similar to what Tripoli did in Uganda at the time of Idi Amin. Tripoli promised to send a shipload of fuel coming to 500,000 barrels in all. The first shipment of 24,000 arrived on 1, March. (see African Contemporary Record, p.b. 424) The government sent goodwill missions to Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Britain to solicit support. However, most of these countries remained skeptical about the new government’s ability to hold the country together, let alone respond to the serious social and economic problems. In March a Ghana delegation led by Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah left for Britain. He was able to meet the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat Sony Ramphal who was sufficiently impressed to visit Ghana in April after which he recommended Commonwealth support for the new regime. This kind of support was crucial in the re-negotiation of the Volta Aluminium Company. Rawlings had travelled to Tripoli in the summer of 1981, had reportedly met members of the Libyan leadership who had promised him finance and support. It was also said that Libya supported the Workers Banner. Libya was the first to recognize the new regime and offered help in material and moral terms. Rawlings who also made a secret trip to Tripoli in the first few days of the coup. It was such incidents which gave the impression that Libya also sent badly needed food, fuel and military spare parts and some equipment. It sent two petrol tankers to help with the fuel shortage and later was to enter into an agreement to provide fuel on concessionary basis on long-term basis. Relations with Soviet Union, Cuba and Eastern European socialist countries were friendly but not enthusiastic. The latter welcomed he change but were suspicious of the capacity of the government to match words with actions. In March a delegation led by Chris Atim was sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the whole purpose of which was to try and interest them in activities of Ghana to the level to which there were at the time of Nkrumah. A number of agreements dealing with co-operation in economic, cultural and scientific maters were signed.
Posted on: Thu, 04 Jul 2013 13:53:55 +0000
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