From The International Herald Tribune: Egyptian general remains a mystery BY KAREEM FAHIM CAIRO — When Egypt’s first elected president, Mohamed Morsi, promoted Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi to defense minister nearly a year ago, sweeping away an aging cadre of generals, many saw it as a triumph for Mr. Morsi and for a fledgling democracy. Mr. Morsi, an Islamist, had seized broad powers back from the old guard, and General Sisi, known to be pious, seemed to have a close relationship to him, even sending Mr. Morsi a laudatory telegram. ‘‘The men of the armed forces assert to your Excellency their absolute loyalty to Egypt and its people, standing behind its leadership as guardians of the patriotic responsibility,’’ it read. Mr. Morsi is now a prisoner of the military, deposed by General Sisi on July 3 after mass protests against the president’s rule. And the telegenic general, who has cast himself as protector of Egypt’s security, and its very identity, is riding a wave of muscular nationalism and pro-military sentiment that have led his adoring fans to liken him to former President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The conflicting perceptions of General Sisi — seasoned officer reluctantly answering a call to serve, ambitious man with a ‘‘sense of destiny,’’ as one person who knows him put it — leave much of Egypt wondering whether he intends to return Egypt to civilian rule, as he has promised, or to capitalize on the wave of public support by claiming power, formally or informally, for himself. The American-trained general has defied weeks of continuous sit-ins and protests by the deposed Muslim Brotherhood, overseeing the two worst incidents of killings of demonstrators since the 2011 uprising. The authorities have now ordered an end to two sit-ins in Cairo, threatening widespread bloodshed that could force the Brotherhood underground. The Brotherhood had counted on winning broader support against General Sisi after the ouster of Mr. Morsi, and then after the gunning down of scores of Islamist protesters. While the Islamists have maintained their vigils and marches around the country, General Sisi has so far managed to stir up enough support among opponents of the Brotherhood to generate backing for an even tougher crackdown. ‘‘The army stands neutral before all factions,’’ General Sisi assured Egyptians in a recent speech. But in the same speech, he asked millions of people to take to the streets on his behalf, to fight ‘‘violence and terrorism,’’ a reference to his Islamist opponents. ‘‘Shoulder the responsibility with the army and the police,’’ he said. When Mr. Morsi picked him as defense minister, the general was a rising star, having served as the chief of military intelligence while drawing notice among defense officials in the United States. He trained at the Army War College in Pennsylvania in 2005, where he seemed especially drawn to a course dealing with civilian-military relations, according to his adviser at the college, Col. Stephen J. Gerras. In a paper he wrote at the war college, General Sisi wrestled with the question of ‘‘Democracy in the Middle East,’’ the title of his paper. More searching than dogmatic, the 17-page paper seemed to be influenced heavily by the war in Iraq and was critical of American attempts to impose democracy in the region. He criticized the practices of autocratic governments without ever singling out Egypt, saying they rigged elections and controlled the news media using ‘‘outright intimidation.’’ Religious leaders ‘‘who step beyond their bounds in government matters are often sent to prison without trial.’’ The Arab world needed to craft its own version of democracy, he said, mentioning a moderate religious foundation, education and poverty alleviation as critical elements. Islamist groups needed to be included in the process, ‘‘including radical ones,’’ he said. After he became defense minister, General Sisi worked to ensure the loyalty of his military, which was still reeling from criticism of its stewardship of Egypt after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. He raised salaries and pensions, and doubled the size of apartments for officers. Training programs were revamped, and the general, who showed up to work at 5 a.m., visited soldiers nearly every day, jogging with them in shows of vigor and attention that the military publicized. An officer who had been wary of General Sisi at first, fearing he was too close to Mr. Morsi, said the general’s ‘‘daring’’ had changed his views. ‘‘He gave me the best training, he adopted a new approach towards my administrative problems and he showed me financial appreciation,’’ he said. ‘‘What more do I want?’’ At first, the defense minister ‘‘kept a very, very low profile,’’ said Hossam Bahgat, a human rights activist. ‘‘His appearances were at graduation ceremonies. There were almost no comments on politics or public affairs. There seems to have been a very studied approach to his public profile. Then, of course, things changed.’’ In November, Mr. Morsi declared his authority above the courts, sparking fears that he was becoming autocratic. In December, the president’s Islamist allies rammed through a new Constitution, ignoring the complaints about the process and the charter from non-Islamists, further polarizing the country. Mr. Morsi struggled to win cooperation from Egypt’s huge state bureaucracy, as his enemies began to circle. At the same time, General Sisi, showing a knack for politics, made new friends. When police officers went on strike, General Sisi held dinners with senior police officials and sent emissaries to negotiate the labor issues. When food poisoning sickened students at Al Azhar University, the prestigious center of Sunni Muslim thinking, Egyptians protested against the Brotherhood, which had tense relations with Al Azhar’s leaders. General Sisi stepped in, sending ovens, deep fryers and other kitchen equipment in a convoy of military trucks, to show his solidarity with the university. Mr. Morsi’s colleagues say they believe that General Sisi had been conspiring against the president for months before his ouster, undermining him with subtle jabs and more serious betrayals. In November, after the president’s power grab, General Sisi invited political leaders to come together to work out their differences. After the presidency reprimanded him, he withdrew the initiative, saying it would be held at a later date. The military later released a video that showed Mr. Morsi standing, like a supplicant, before a roomful of generals, according to a Morsi aide. ‘‘It was a violation of protocol,’’ the aide said. The president’s colleagues also believed General Sisi was meeting with activists who were lobbying to remove the president from power. The general’s politicking — with Al Azhar and political leaders — was not just a friendly gesture, Mr. Morsi’s allies say. When General Sisi announced the military intervention that toppled the president, the leaders he had courted were sitting at the general’s side. In a recent speech, General Sisi categorically rejected the allegations, saying he had never ‘‘conspired.’’ Instead, he and people who know him talk about threats the military, Egypt’s most powerful institution and a virtual state within a state, perceived from Mr. Morsi. The anger started with a slight in October, at an anniversary celebration of the 1973 war. General Sisi found himself sitting near Tarek al-Zomor, a guest of the president who had been convicted of playing a role in the 1981 assassination of Anwar el-Sadat. ‘‘He was very offended,’’ said an officer who knows the general. ‘‘Instead of sitting with officers who had shed their blood, he was forced to sit with the killer of General Sadat.’’ The military’s discomfort grew as the economy plummeted, and in particular, as a dispute with Ethiopia grew more serious over access to water in the Nile. One diplomat said that General Sisi had started to come under increasing pressure from mid-ranking officers to act. But the generals were also disturbed by investigations into their own wrongdoing. As one of his first acts, Mr. Morsi created a fact-finding commission to look into protester deaths during the revolution against Mr. Mubarak, and until June 30, 2012, the last day of military rule. The report included victim testimony alleging torture by members of General Sisi’s military intelligence branch. Mr. Morsi never publicized the report, though he did submit it to prosecutors. The president ‘‘needed the police to protect him, and he wasn’t going to make any moves against the military,’’ said Mr. Bahgat, the human rights activist. In speeches before and after ousting Mr. Morsi, General Sisi appealed to notions of Egyptian identity that he accused the Brotherhood of betraying. And he appealed to nostalgia, pledging that the army would help ensure that ‘‘Egypt remains Egypt.’’ Mayy El Sheikh contributed reporting from Cairo. ◼ Get the best global news and analysis direct to your device – download the IHT apps for free today! For iPad: itunes.apple/us/app/international-herald-tribune/id404757420?mt=8 For iPhone: itunes.apple/us/app/international-herald-tribune/id404764212?mt=8
Posted on: Sat, 03 Aug 2013 07:59:49 +0000
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