Henderson Brooks report on 1962 war [ HBR ] ============================= After more than half a century the report remains “Top Secret” . Two copies of the report were supposed to exist, one with army headquarters one with the defence secretary. A third copy has emerged, put on the internet by Neville Maxwell, Maxwell’s book, “India’s China War”, was an indictment of India’s politico-military planning. Lt Gen Henderson Brooks migrated to Australia after his retirement in the early 1960s. Maxwell too had migrated to Australia Maxwell offered the 190-page HBR[report] to five Indian newspapers, none published it. Maxwell’s website, is blocked for Indian users Indian defence ministry says: Given the extremely sensitive nature of the contents of the Report, which are of current operational value, it is reiterated that the Government of India has classified this Report as a Top Secret document and, as such, it would not be appropriate to comment on the contents uploaded by Neville Maxwell on the Web . HBR notes bureaucratic interference in decision-making, and the miscalculations of Director of the Intelligence Bureau (DIB) BN Mullick, HBR blames mainly the army. The key army villain Gen BM Kaul, who was the Chief of General Staff --- in Army Headquarters (AHQ) --- before being sent on the eve of war to command 4 Corps, 4 Corps failed miserably in Arunachal Pradesh. The question about 1962 has been: Did the political leadership provoke China into war? by ordering the army --- against the advice of the generals --- to implement a “Forward Policy”? This Forward Policy involved sending small groups of Indian soldiers, without adequate combat capability, support or backup, to occupy disputed areas in Ladakh, claiming them as Indian territory. The HBR reveals government wanted the Forward Policy, The government left the implementation to the generals. A supine AHQ, ., under weak army chief, General Thapar, pressured by a gung-ho General Kaul, overruled valid cautions presented by HQ Western Command HQ Western Command had insisted that a forward move must have adequate troop numbers, must have adequate combat support and logistics... Though the belief that pushing forward would not elicit Chinese resistance came from the Intelligence Bureau, it was accepted by AHQ. In the PM’s office on November 2, 1961, the defence minister Krishna Menon, foreign secretary MJ Desai, the army chief General PN Thapar and the Director Intelligence Bureau Mullick, took the decision to push forward troops into contact with the Chinese. Countering the army’s view that “the Chinese would resist by force any attempts to take back territory held by them,” Mullick argued “the Chinese would not react to India establishing new posts Mullick said the Chinese were NOT LIKELY TO USE FORCE AGAINST ANY OF OUR POSTSS EVEN IF THEY WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO” The AHQ in the lead up to war operated on a flawed army assessment of Chinese strength --- an outdated 1960 operational instruction, never updated, That 1960 operational instruction, said the Chinese could scrape together only a “regiment plus” about 4000-5000 soldiers in Ladakh. Lt Gen Daulet Singh head WC, was far more realistic. On August 17, 1962, WC wrote to AHQ informing AHQ that the Chinese had a “well equipped division division of 15,000 soldiers division with supporting arms deployed against LADAKH. Further WC informed AHQ , the Chinese had developed roads to all the important areas they held and thus could concentrate large forces at any given place. Against this, Indian Army was thinly spread out, with no supporting arms,worth the name of artillery, engineers and communications between the various sectors was poor Thus, in case of hostilities,, India would be defeated in detail. With war clouds gathering, HQ WC again pointed out that “it is imperative that political direction is based on military means”, HQ WC asked for a “four brigade division with adequate supporting arms”. HQ WC said it is vital that we did not provoke the Chinese provoke the Chinese into an armed clash, Lt Gen Daulet Singh recommended hold in abeyance the “Forward Policy” A week later, Lt Gen Daulet Singh further pressed this view in discussions with top AHQ generals. It is not known if army chief, General Thapar, conveyed the HQ WC assessment to the governmentt AHQ On September 5 1962 reiterated the Forward Policy, telling HQ WC that the Chinese would not resort to any large scale hostilities in LADAKH.” The HBR report says in Sep 1962 eastern army commander, Lt Gen LP Sen, was supposedly told by a senior AHQ officer that experience in LADAKH showed a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause Chinese to run away. Simultaneously, tensions were rising in NEFA, there Indian troops established the Dhola Post across the Namka Chu River. The Chinese surrounded Dhola on September 8, and firing began daily. Defence Minister Krishna Menon reviewed this situation on September 22. General Thapar warned Defence Minister Krishna Menon that action at Dhola would invite Chinese retaliation in Ladakh, Foreign Secretary MJ Desai said Chinese would not react very strongly against India in Ladakh. He said evict Chinese from NEFA , even at the expense of losing some territory in LADAKH. The AHQ accepted lying down this military assessment from a diplomat. HBR reoort says, Defence Ministry then on the request of the Chief of Army Staff, issued instructions:-… Army should prepare and throw the Chinese out, as soon as possible. The Chief of the Army Staff directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese from… NEFA, as soon as he is ready.”.” As the government was ready to accept some loss of territory in Ladakh, AHQ told HQ WC Chinese may attack some of our forward posts… the posts will fight it out and inflict maximum casualties on the Chinese. HBR report criticised these as “unrealistic” orders orders to far-flung, tactically unsound and uncoordinated small posts”, HBR report damningly said, General Staff Branch Army Headquarters was out of touch with the realities of the situation. It said events controlled actions actions did not control events.” HBR report blamed the Chief of General Staff Lt Gen BM Kaul, for not advising the government on the armys weakness the armys inability to implement the ‘Forward Policy, HBR report noted: : “There might have been pressure pressure put on by the Defence Ministry, HBR report says pressure notwithstanding it was the duty of the General Staff to have pointed out the unsoundness of the ‘Forward Policy’ without the means to implement it… HBR report notes the General Staff at NO stage submitted to the Government any appraisal on the consequences of the ‘Forward Policy’ or the basic requirement of troops and resources required before the Forward Policy should have been implemented. HBR reports General BM Kaul’s absence of military qualifications, and General BM Kaul’s cultivation of a clique within the officer cadre, HBR reported : “The General Staff, particularly the CGS Gen Kaul,l, Deputy CGS Maj Gen JS Binnu Dhillon and the DMO Brig Palit they went a step further and promoted false self belief into the Army, with the disastrous result that even field formations were infected with a sense of complacency.” HBR report recognized Lt Gen BM Kaul, with his proximity to Nehru, had superseded the army’s chain of command, HBR report spared Gen Thapar, and the eastern army commander, Lt Gen LP Sen, from the sharpest criticisms. HBR report Frontally attacked Lt Gen BM Kaul, the document notes: “This lapse in Staff Duties on the part of the Chief of the General Staff, his Deputy, the DMO, DMI, and other Staff Directors is inexcusable. From this stemmed the unpreparedness and the unbalance of our forces. These… … are key appointments and officers were hand-picked by General KAUL to fill them Lieutenant General TB Henderson Brooks was worried that his inquiry into the army’s 1962 defeat at the hands of the Chinese would be used as a whitewash job that confined itself to minor tactical questions, while ignoring the bigger issues --- questions of higher defence management --- that had actually led to national humiliation. HBR report, discloses that the army chief General JN Chaudhuri, who was appointed after the 1962 debacle after the resignation of , General PN Thapar --- advised him NOT to review the functioning of Army Headquarters (AHQ) while carrying out his inquiry. Henderson Brooks believed that excluding AHQ from his investigation would mask crucial events and paint an incomplete picture.. He says it would have been “convenient and logical” to begin tracing events from AHQ, through command headquarters, to the field formations that actually did the fighting.. HBR,reported General JN Chaudhuri’s order to exclude AHQ from the enquiry meant it could not examine The relationship between Defence Ministry and Army Headquarters or the orders given by the Defence Ministry to Army Headquarters Henderson Brooks remained determined not to let that happen. So he scrutinised AHQ decisions,indirectly TheHBR noted that, the actions and developments at Army Headquarters have had to be traced from documents available at Command Headquarters. so a number of loose ends concerning Army Headquarters could not be verifiedd HBR reported Henderson Brooks was ordered, “to go into the reverses suffered by the Army, particularly in the KAMENG Frontier Division of NEFA”, i.e. the Tawang sector He was to enquire into tactical issues --- specifically what went wrong with:- training, equipment, system of command, physical fitness of troops, the capacity to influence the men under their command.. of commanders at all levels Henderson Brooks scrutinised AHQ wherever possible, and commented on:- MoD functioning and Intelligence Bureau functioning, he also focused on Ladakh (i.e. the Western Command) as intently as on Kameng. HBR report noted. HBR report noted, It isobvious that the developments in NEFA were closely correlated to those in LADAKH, and thus, any study of NEFA operations must be carried out in conjunction For the blistering comments on political and civilian agencies successive governments in New Delhi would have chosen to keep the Henderson Brooks report “top secret.” For example, scathing it is about Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon’s fetish for keeping meetings unrecorded. The posted report notes “The Army Commander (Lt Gen LP Sen) in his report… has brought out that the Defence Minister categorically stated that in view of the TOP SECRET nature of the conference, NO minutes would be kept. This practice, it appears, was followed at all conferences that were held by the Defence Minister in connection with these operations.,. This is a surprising decision and one which could and did lead to grave consequences. It absolved in the ultimate analysis anyone of the responsibility of any major decision. Thus, it could, and did lead to decisions being taken without careful and considered thought on the consequences of those decisions.”. HBR report points out “military decisions must only be taken by those who are in the full knowledge of the military situation and can appreciate the tactical implications,” the HBR report is withering about the deeply flawed evaluations of BN Mullick, the Director IB Mullick’s was the calamitous opinion that the Chinese would not use force against Indian troops that were pushing forward into contested territory, militarily unsound too was Mullicks opinion that scarce forces should be diverted to hold areas like Taksing, Mechuka and Tuting in NEFA, this the report termed the “frittering away of forces.” HBR report is also scathing on Foreign Secretary MJ Desai Desais was unqualified incompetent gung-ho suggestions at a time when Sino-Indian tensions were boiling over after Indian jawans moved to the disputed Thagla Ridge. “The Foreign Secretary’s suggestion of establishing a post on THAGLA Ridge alongside the Chinese, viewed against the happenings in LADAKH, seems incredible.”HBR report says ... Ultimately, the HBR report reserves most of its disapproval for Army HQ [ AHQ], AHQ which neither insulated the field formations from powerful, interfering civilians, nor allowed the units to plan and execute their battle. The HBR report notes:- “(F)or proper planning and orderly progress, it is essential that lower formations , are left to execute orders without interference and undue pressure from Army Headquarters, who neither know the local conditions nor details of execution…
Posted on: Thu, 20 Mar 2014 09:18:46 +0000
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