Of all Ugandans, Museveni feared Baganda the most because they were economically strong and the economic strength was derived from the land. While at Ntare School, I observed Museveni among other students very closely. Museveni was almost always in the company of Hima, Tutsi or tutsified Bairu students. If my memory serves me right, Museveni did not participate in cricket and soccer/football the two most popular sports at Ntare School. Sports provided an opportunity to identify potential leaders. By Radio Free Buganda on Saturday, 20 July 2013 at 11:05 In debates or conversations during break time, Museveni exhibited a tendency to dominate others, giving the impression he had a complex. And it is relatively easy to see. The loss of Tutsi political dominance to Hutu in Rwanda and to Bairu in Ankole and Bahima refusal to grant Tutsi a separate district carved out of present-day Ntungamo district in Ankole at independence in 1962 bothered Museveni. Museveni wanted restoration of former Tutsi glory in the Great Lakes region and that explains in part why he developed an early interest in regional cooperation. For that reason he opposed Obote when Uganda failed to support East African political federation in 1963 (Uganda cabinet opposed the federation and Obote was bound by collective responsibility). Museveni planned a Tutsi come back starting in the early 1960s and using Uganda as a base to conquer and occupy Eastern and Central Africa initially. He had three challenges to deal with: 1. Buganda economic and strategic advantage; 2. Northern and Eastern military advantage; 3. Bairu rising intellectual and political advantage. Museveni knew very early on that Tutsi were disadvantaged demographically (they didn’t have the numbers) and wouldn’t prevail politically through democracy based on majority rule. That is why he chose the military strategy and outside support. Of all Ugandans, Museveni feared Baganda the most because they were economically strong and the economic strength was derived from the land. Baganda were also strategically located at the administrative center of Uganda and they had educated but above all people who would not allow to be dictated to by others. 1. Museveni was aware how Baganda negotiated with British officials and secured a federal government and were treated as partners with Britain, explaining why Buganda was placed under the foreign office although later changed to the colonial office; 2. Museveni was aware of how Apollo Kagwa refused to be dictated to by British officials and eventually resigned in protest; 3. Museveni was aware of how eventually Baganda rejected the offices of provincial and district commissioners which were abolished in 1944. British officials in Buganda became residents providing advice, not giving instructions; 4. Museveni was aware of how Kabaka Mutesa II (RIP) rejected a unitary government during his negotiations with Governor Cohen that would have degraded Buganda status. He was sent into exile but prevailed in the end with Buganda extracting more federal concessions out of the Namirembe negotiations of 1955; 5. Museveni knew the hard position Baganda took in negotiating for independence and how they succeeded in getting a federal arrangement within a unitary state; 6. Museveni knew how Baganda rejected Obote I and Obote II and Amin regimes; 7. Museveni knew Baganda derived their economic strength via land ownership that gave them the means to educate their children that gave Baganda a competitive advantage. At the time of independence over 45 percent of students at Makerere University were Baganda. So Museveni chose a two-pronged strategy to break the back of Baganda: 1. Use Luwero Triangle, the most economically developed area in Uganda, for guerrilla war and depopulate and destroy it in the process and grab the land at the end of the war; 2. Use Baganda to defeat Obote and use them to consolidate his position after capturing power while impoverishing them and then discard them. As noted above, Luwero Triangle was chosen deliberately as the center of the guerrilla war. It was closer to Kampala, it was economically strong with food and export crops and controlling it would cripple Obote’s government. But keeping it intact at the end of the war would cripple Museveni government as well. So, while using it, Museveni also destroyed Luwero Triangle. First, Museveni knew that depriving Baganda of their land upon which their economic strength was based, he would break their back. He therefore engineered resettlement of one million Baganda into the thick tropical forest between Buganda and Sudan (apparently for security reasons out of reach of Obote troops) that teamed with all threats to human life including disease vectors and wild animals, leaving empty areas in Luwero Triangle where traces of land ownership were destroyed even in areas that were under firm control by NRA from the start of the war. According to the 1980 population census, Luwero had a total population of 1.5 million. During the war it is estimated that 700,000 people of Luwero Triagle lost their lives. A sizeable number of Baganda did not return to the Triangle at the end of the war. Consequently roughly 50 percent of Baganda didn’t return and reclaim their land and properties. Many of those who returned could not recognize their former home areas because many landmarks had been destroyed. And in the absence of land titles there was no sure way of locating their land. Consequently many returnees were allocated land by resistance committees, possibly getting much less than they had before. Returnees could have included non-Baganda that also got land allocated to them. The question to ask NRM government is this: If 50 percent of Baganda reclaimed their land, what happened to the other half because there is no empty land in the Luwero Triangle? Attempts have been made to find an answer. As investigations proceeded, it became clear where land was going. Buganda land that belonged to UPC Baganda supporters – the richest in the area – was grabbed first by Museveni supporters as punishment for supporting Obote and Baganda opponents of UPC may have rejoiced. By 1989 land grabbing in Buganda had become extensive that a delegation met with Museveni over it. In 1990 action was taken against grabbing Baganda land but there was no enforcement mechanism so grabbing continued and possibly accelerated. The 1995 constitution stated that every Ugandan had a right to move, settle and acquire land anywhere in Uganda. At face value this sounded like a good idea that would bring about ethnic integration and promote national Unity. On closer examination, however, Museveni had a different idea – help his supporters especially Tutsi from densely populated Rwanda acquire land in Uganda as reward for bringing him to power. Many people did not understand the true meaning of this provision in the constitution. This provision of the constitution was supplemented by the notion of willing seller and willing buyer of the land. Grabbing Buganda land was preferable being strategically located near domestic markets of Kampala and Entebbe corridor and transport facilities to export markets. The rich people in Uganda especially Tutsi have ranches in Buganda which they acquired possibly by occupying land of those who lost their lives and using sticks or carrots to get land from vulnerable Baganda. In this sense, the land grabbing issue is a political one and can only be resolved by political means. If UDU with a clear land policy is given the nod by the people of Uganda, one of the priorities is to address this thorny issue, not only in Buganda but throughout the country where Tutsi are busy grabbing land. The expansion of municipal boundaries throughout Uganda was designed primarily to make land available for purchase by the rich who happen to be Tutsi or tutsified Ugandans who have cash and/or credit facilities. Museveni also chose to eliminate feared Baganda soldiers during and after the guerrilla war. There are stories to be confirmed that some of the attempted assassinations of Museveni were planned to create a pretext to arrest real and potential Baganda threats to Museveni regime. Those like Katumba Wamala that survived Museveni has used to shield him from the wrath of Baganda. That Katumba Wamala – a Muganda – is now commander of Uganda armed forces is not something that should make Baganda proud. On the contrary Baganda should be unhappy because their man is being used to clear the way for crowning Muhoozi as the next president of Uganda. Earlier, Katumba Wamala was appointed inspector general of police at a time when Baganda were beginning to flex their political muscles. When they were forming NRM/NRA Museveni made sure a Muganda – Yusufu Lule – was elected chairman to provide cover to Museveni plans. When Lule passed on a year before Kampala fell, Museveni refused to elect a successor because he knew he would not be elected. Instead as vice chairman of NRM Museveni became acting chairman until Kampala fell and by default he became president, an office that was understood would be occupied by a DP supporter and Museveni wasn’t a DP supporter but chairman of UPM. Realizing he would face the wrath of Baganda after the government had been formed, Museveni deliberately allocated senior and strategic cabinet posts to Baganda including prime minister, internal and foreign affairs ministers and finance minister. The vice chairman of NRM has been a Muganda. Later he appointed a Muganda vice president, prime minister and speaker of parliament. Ssmogerere and Mayanja were appointed second and third deputy prime ministers respectively. Mayanja-Nkangi – a Muganda – was later appointed and still is Uganda land commissioner responsible for all matters relating to land tenure/ownership so he knows who occupies Buganda land. With Kampala expanded to swallow Mengo, Museveni has appointed another Muganda Jennifer Musisi responsible for allocating land in Greater Kampala and she knows who is acquiring Baganda land. Museveni took all these actions to weaken, not to strengthen Baganda – make no mistake about it. He has carefully chosen Baganda, indigenous or tutsified, who like power and used them to advance Tutsi interests in Buganda at the expense of Baganda. Notwithstanding all these safeguards, Museveni still fears Baganda as potential danger to his designs of perpetual occupation of Uganda. The anti-Museveni organizations at home and in the diaspora and their campaigns are disorienting Museveni. In response, Museveni has taken the following steps to stay in power: 1. Make sure Tutsi or tutsified Ugandans lead every opposition political party or organization at home and abroad be it civilian or military. Ugandans therefore need to scrutinize every Ugandan who tries to lead to make sure we are not tricked again. Those who decline to disclose their profile should not be made leaders. Those who pause as deserters of Museveni like General David Ssejusa (Tinyefuza) should be greeted with a grain of salt. It could be a trick. His fleeing Uganda after more than thirty years of close relationship with Museveni could have been planned seeing that Muhoozi might not become the next president. 2. Museveni has planned to make sure Baganda stay in his political camp. Consequently, he promoted and appointed General Katumba Wamala army commander without authority. 3. Museveni is believed to have stated recently that he is going to make sure that Luwero Triangle regains its former glory. What does this mean – returning Baganda land, property and cash in the banks? Baganda should take this gesture with a grain of salt knowing that Museveni is good at talking, not at implementation. Museveni is now targeting 2016 presidential elections and he wants Baganda support. Don’t forget that. Museveni thinks he can continue to manipulate Baganda and get what he wants. Museveni would be happy if a guerrilla war was waged from Buganda or anywhere else against his regime. He would call such attack terrorism, call on neighbors, AU and UN to condemn it and respond with maximum military power, killing indiscriminately, arresting and detaining real and imagined enemies. This would give him a God send opportunity to install his son as president and create a Museveni dynasty in Uganda. So reason and comprehensive consultations should prevail before a decision is taken. Those bent on war in the first instance should think again. In any case they would need clearance first of the majority of the people of Buganda, indeed of Uganda. It’s up to Baganda and the rest to decide what is best for Buganda and Uganda respectively. By Radio Free Buganda on Saturday, 20 July 2013 at 11:05
Posted on: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 10:02:25 +0000
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