On 3 September, a meeting between Presidents Omar Al Bashir and Salva Kiir led to Khartoum suspending its threat to stop processing oil from South Sudan. The issue of Abyei, however, remained unresolved. In September 2012, the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) proposed holding a referendum on Abyei’s political future in October 2013. The Government of Sudan (GoS) continues to reject a proposal that would mean the majority of the Missiriya are excluded from participation in the referendum, and thus would almost certainly ensure that Abyei votes to join South Sudan. Meanwhile, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) is increasing diplomatic pressure on the international community to intervene in Abyei. Since the assassination of the former Paramount Chief, Kuol Deng Kuol, in May 2013, the Ngok Dinka community has refused to support the establishment of a joint local administration. The Ngok Dinka community fears that unless there are substantive moves towards a referendum, the creation of a joint administration will remove political pressure on Sudan, and lead to a stalemate, in which the question of Abyei’s political future is permanently deferred. Kuol Deng Kuol’s death, following the May 2011 invasion of Abyei, has hardened community attitudes. A recent report by Kush Inc. found 37.8% of the Ngok Dinka surveyed suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome, and 80% indicated that they were unwilling for their leaders to even hold talks with the Missiriya. The Ngok Dinka community is convinced that the implementation of the AUHIP-proposed referendum is the sole way to resolve the crisis in Abyei. There is now significant political pressure building to hold a referendum in October 2013. On 15 September, Deng Alor Kuol, the chair of the Abyei high national committee for the referendum, insisted that Abyei’s referendum would occur next month. Earlier, on 20 August, in a letter addressed to the chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Ngok Dinka community stated that a referendum on Abyei’s political future is “not contingent upon approval of or implementation by either government.” This stance reflects the urgency with which the Ngok Dinka want a resolution of the crisis in the territory, though it is a sentiment not reflected in the wording of the 20 June 2011 Addis Ababa agreement. This letter was followed by protests on 10 September in Abyei in support of a referendum. A subsequent letter to US President Barack Obama, sent on 11 September, asked him to encourage the PSC to set a definite timetable for the referendum, and urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to adopt a resolution declaring Abyei a UN protectorate if the timetable is not followed. Pressure from the Ngok Dinka community is paralleled by a concerted diplomatic effort by the GRSS. Both feel that the implementation of the referendum will not be achieved through negotiations with Sudan, and so are pressuring the PSC and the UNSC to become involved. Preparations for the referendum are also beginning inside South Sudan. On 31 July, Akec Tong Aleu, the acting governor of Warrap state, urged the Ngok Dinka to return to Abyei, and on 1 August, the Western Bahr el Ghazal branch of the Abyei Coordination Office said that more than 1,500 people have registered to be returned. These calls to return were echoed on 5 August by the South Sudanese co-chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), Edward Lino, in a meeting in Juba organized by the national referendum committee. He later told Asharq Al-Awsat that the referendum would be held whether or not Sudan agrees to it. On 24 August, President Salva Kiir ordered his government to release all state employees from Abyei so that they can return to vote in the October referendum, a measure officially passed on 4 September. The current South Sudanese strategy is to conduct a high-profile media and diplomatic campaign in advance of the general assembly of the UN on 23 September; it is expected that the countries that compose the PSC will meet on the sidelines. South Sudan wants to pressure the PSC to return to a communiqué it first issued on 24 October 2012, in which it warned that, if the parties fail to agree on Abyei’s political future, the PSC will endorse the AUHIP proposal ‘as final and binding, and will seek the endorsement of the UNSC of the same.’ Since that communiqué, the PSC has been noncommittal, and has not endorsed the AUHIP proposal, but only called for further negotiations. None of the recent statements by the UNSC suggest a measure endorsing a referendum without Sudan’s agreement is forthcoming, with a 23 August statement merely asking both sides to establish the local administration. The GoS has denounced the recent measures by the GRSS as unilateral, and in violation of the 20 June 2011 Addis Ababa agreement, which commits both sides to negotiate under the auspices of AUHIP. On 21 August, Al Khair Al Fahim, the Sudanese co-chair of AJOC, reiterated that Sudan would not recognize the results of a unilaterally declared referendum, and emphasised that the formation of a joint local administration—precisely what the Ngok Dinka refuse unless accompanied by a referendum—must be the priority, and the first step in any future negotiations. The Missiriya have also recently made similar pronouncements in response to South Sudanese activity, in statements on 25 and 26 August that reject the AUHIP proposal for an October 2013 referendum. A unilateral referendum is highly likely to lead to further clashes; several Missiriya chiefs have already promised to violently resist such an undertaking. There is now insufficient time to organize a referendum for October 2013, even if the GoS and the Missiriya were willing to take part. Absent their agreement, the Ngok Dinka and the GRSS are reliant on the PSC attempting to force the hand of the GoS by endorsing the AUHIP proposal as final and binding. Even this, however, is unlikely to suffice, as the PSC has no ability to enforce its decisions. A PSC endorsement of the AUHIP proposal, to be effective, would be reliant on a UNSC resolution supporting it. This, given the positions taken by both Russia and China in recent months, is highly unlikely. In this context, there is little chance of a referendum in the near future. Negotiations over the establishment of Abyei’s local administration remain deadlocked, with Sudan continuing to insist it should have 50 per cent of the seats on the Abyei Legislative Council, a demand that South Sudan claims breaks a gentleman’s agreement between the two countries that accorded 60 per cent of the council seats to the South. The Abyei Police Service has also not been established, though the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has now purchased equipment for the force that is currently in Khartoum awaiting transfer to Abyei. The AJOC has not met since 2-3 May. On 12 August, at a meeting with the African Union (AU) envoy Boshoko Maqati, Al Khair Al Fahim claimed that the meetings were suspended due to South Sudanese support for the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). Al Fahim further claimed that the SRF is active in eastern Abyei, and that the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) turns a blind eye to its presence. UNISFA rejects both claims. Al Fahim’s remarks seem designed to focus international attention on alleged links between South Sudan and the SRF. An investigation into the assassination of Kuol Deng Kuol is now moving forwards. A communiqué establishing the investigation was issued on 9 May at a meeting of the PSC, where it was agreed that the investigative committee would be jointly composed of members of the UN, AU, and the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. The committee was slow to be formed, however, with the AU only appointing Anil Gayan, a former Foreign Minister for the Mauritius, on 3 July. The UN is represented by the retired Nigerian general Joseph Owonibi. The committee’s work was to begin on 15 July and last for four weeks. One team arrived in Khartoum on 17 August, a month late, and reported that it carried out its investigations without obstruction. Another team stayed in Juba from 20-22 August, before leaving for Abyei to continue the investigation. Its report has not yet been delivered to the AU; its findings will not be legally binding. The Missiriya have now largely left Abyei, with approximately 140,000 pastoralists and 1.65 million livestock crossing back into South Kordofan over the last three months. As the Missiriya returned north, there were several incidents of cattle raiding. At Galar (on 1 July) and at Dokura (6 July), two Ngok Dinka were killed, and around a hundred cows stolen, of which UNISFA recovered 38. While the Missiriya customarily raid Ngok Dinka herds before returning to Sudan, members of the local community claim that attackers involved in the 1 July raid were nine soldiers from Diffra, Abyei’s sole oil field, where Sudan continues to maintain an ‘oil police’ of 120-150 troops, in defiance of multiple UNSC resolutions. Abyei Abyei There were further clashes in August, with reports that two Ngok Dinka were killed around Noong in a case of cattle theft. UNISFA has successfully disarmed groups on several occasions, including on 28 July, when fighters were disarmed near Manyang. There have also been reports of armed fighters moving through the territory of Abyei, including around Noong (27 July) and Dokura (11 August). Current rainy season conditions mean that much of Abyei is unreachable by road, and the frequency of UNISFA patrols in the territory has reduced. The organisation currently has 3,938 troops inside Abyei. While the UNSC increased its mandated military capacity to 5,236 troops at the end of May, these troops are meant to provide protection for Join Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) patrols along the rest of the border. These additional troops have not, in any event, been deployed, and JBVMM activities are currently suspended. The northern Sudanese staff that UNISFA evacuated following Kuol Deng Kuol’s death have still not returned, as the organization is unable to guarantee their safety. However, UNISFA flights from Kadugli are running again following their suspension after the SRF shelled the UNISFA barracks on 14 June. UNISFA has now shifted from a dry season deployment pattern—designed to minimize contact between Missiriya pastoralists and Ngok Dinka returnees—to rainy season deployment. The battalion responsible for the north of Abyei relocated from Tajalei and Um Khariet to Diffra, and troops in the central and southern sectors have relocated from a variety of villages to their central headquarters in Dokura and Agok, respectively. UNISFA vehicle patrols are now being supplemented with foot patrols and aerial monitoring. Within Abyei, those families that fled the territory following the death of Kuol Deng Kuol have largely returned. A tracking report by the International Organization of Migration identified 16,080 individuals in 66 villages, during a verification exercise that lasted from 15 June-15 July. This report does not aim to survey the totality of returnees to the territory. Aid agencies report that some 60,000 people have now returned to Abyei, while humanitarian food supplies are targeting 80,875 people, suggesting that the real rate of return is still higher, and that, of the 110,000 people who fled the May 2011 invasion of the territory by the Sudan Armed Forces, the majority have now returned. Many of these returnees have come back for harvest. The beginning of the cultivation season, however, has been hurt by a lack of tools and seed.
Posted on: Tue, 08 Oct 2013 07:22:10 +0000
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