Questions that Need Answers For the sake of public accountability and our safer future, there are 8 questions J&K’s government officials, ministers and politicians must answer ---------- So what next with flood waters leaving our homes and heading for the Indus? Focus on relief? Assess the loss? Plan rehabilitation and reconstruction? Negotiate big relief packages? Or something else? All of this, as a matter of fact, will be necessary. But we would be almost criminal if we miss what is fundamental to avoiding a similar calamity in the future – accountability in this catastrophe! Some government officials, police officers and politicians did some excellent work to help people in the difficult circumstances, mostly at an individual level. But the larger picture is bleak. And it will be morally unacceptable to avoid the question of holding people accountable in the government system for the sins that aggravated this monumental disaster. Unquestionably, the devastating floods that have hit Kashmir are part a natural and part a man-made disaster. It is undeniable that global climate change is triggering extreme weather conditions. From the wilderness of the Sahara Desert to the nothingness of the Pacific Ocean Islands I have seen firsthand how this world’s climate has changed. Kashmir is no exception. The rainfall J&K witnessed in the first week of September was extraordinary. There was widespread snowfall in the Pirpanjal and the Himalayan Mountains at a time when quick melting was inevitable. Then there were cloud bursts – the nature and the number of which remain unknown. All that was something we could have done nothing about! But then there was a human hand that created a big disaster out of this situation. Let us try to see those hands. Question No. 1: A report in Greater Kashmir dated 12 February, 2010 citing an Irrigation and Flood Control Ministry study, very clearly warned that the risk of a catastrophic flood was looming over Srinagar and its surrounding areas. It had very specifically mentioned the quantum of water that could swell Jhelum and the limited carrying capacity of this river and the flood spillways. Did the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi take this warning seriously? We learn the state government had sent a proposal to the central government for Rs 2200 crore for flood risk mitigation. Although the Rs 2200 crore did not come by, what we know of is a Rs 97 crore project initiated in 2010 that was aimed to address the flood threat of the Jhelum. This project had aimed at re-sectioning and berm cutting to Flood Spill Channel from Padshahibagh to Durbal–Shariefabad, Narbal, realignment of flood spill channel in Wullar, re-construction of weir at Chattabal, dredging of the outfall of the River Jhelum, flood protection of tributaries of the River Jhelum flowing in Ganderbal, Sumbal and Sopore areas. This project is said to have been stalled due to what some senior officials in the government call non-cooperation of PHE, Irrigation and Flood Control minister Shyam Lal Sharma. Action Point 1: What we need today is an inquiry by a judicial commission set up by the Supreme Court of India that must go into the details of all these circumstances and fix responsibility for all the intentional and unintentional omission and commission at the governmental level in shelving the dredging plans of the Jhelum. Nothing short of an in-depth and impartial judicial inquiry would help in fixing responsibilities and take corrective measures. Question No. 2: Global weather forecast agencies, including weather, very specifically had forecast heavy rainfall over J&K exactly for the days when it rained in advance. The Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) office in Srinagar did not issue any such widely disseminated warning. In a related development, the Central Water Commission (CWC) officials are on record to have said that they had passed early warning to the central government about a major water discharge in the state’s rivers due to the rainfall. The question that needs answer is this: J&K’s Disaster Management Policy spells out clear procedures for weather warnings to be disseminated to government systems for putting in contingency measures in place. Did that happen? If not, why not? If the central government received CWC warnings, were they passed on to J&K state? If yes, who acted upon those warnings? That needs an answer. Action Point 2: Fixing responsibilities, enhancing early warning capabilities in IMD and creating a smooth system of information dissemination and follow up on warnings from Central Water Commission. What also needs an in-depth inquiry is the role of some sitting MLAs and an official in Bagh-i-Mehtab area in interfering with the established procedures in gate keeping of flood spill ways. Question No. 3: By September 5 it was clear to the Irrigation and Flood Control Department and other government agencies that waters had raised abnormally high in the Jhelum and its tributaries. In normal circumstances one expects a multi-agency emergency command and control being set up at governmental level to facilitate information collection, analysis, dissemination and follow up measures. J&K Disaster Management Policy clearly lays down procedures to be followed at the governmental level, including at the district levels in such situations. Nothing of that sort happened. During those days it was the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah alone who was visible and talking. None of his cabinet ministers, chief secretary, commissioner secretaries and even the divisional commissioner seemed to put their acts together. Was that deliberate, as what former chief minister Ghulam Nabi Azad seems to suggest? Just as waters were rising, Chief Engineer Irrigation and Flood Control Department is on record to have said that his department had kept 500,000 sand bags on a standby to meet the eventuality of bund breaches. Would the gentleman kindly make it known where the sand bags were actually made and placed? Where were they used? Action Point 3: Assessing the quality and effectiveness of the chain of actions taken by various concerned government ministries, particularly the Irrigation and Flood Control Department between September 4 and 6. Question No. 4: Did the government systems try to forge a unified command, coordination and control system at a safe location when inundation of city centre began or they just simply evaporated, with ministers and most officials flying to Delhi, Jammu and elsewhere? Every organization is supposed to have a contingency plan for working in the event of an emergency. Understandably, a lot of government officials had to relocate from their official residences at Tulsi Bagh, Church Lane, Sonwar, and many other places in and around Srinagar. Civil secretariat was inundated. Divisional Commissioner’s office was out of bounds. Being in a flood basin, the Disaster Management Office in Srinagar was the first to inundate. It became a disaster saga in itself! The first reaction of most of the government ministers and officials was to take the flight out of Srinagar. That is unbecoming of public servants in such a situation. It may be true that Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s support systems – including his ministers and key government officials – simply evaporated. But as someone in charge and command we should have easily activated a temporary secretariat on safer ground. The best location perhaps for a temporary secretariat was the Budgam district administrative headquarters. It is too elevated for any flood to come close. It is barely 15 kms from Srinagar city centre. Its best advantage was being at a stone’s throw from the Srinagar airport. Its basic infrastructure was intact. All key ministers and officials could have been airlifted or summoned back from Jammu and Delhi there. They could have easily found enough working and residential space there for coordinating rescue and relief operations. Hundreds of mohalla committees and NGOs were doing exactly that around Srinagar airport around the same time. A government is assumed to be far more resourceful in making that possible. For a people who were marooned and with no idea to what level waters will rise, quite naturally, functional or visible government systems are a psychologically re-assuring. The first five days during floods were the most critical. People wanted boats. They wanted information. They wanted a government spokesperson on TV, radio, Facebook, Twitter or wherever to tell them what was going on. There was a complete information vacuum despite the fact that the state’s winter capital Jammu was live with power, Internet, TV, radio and everything else. A daily press briefing at Jammu was the least the government could have managed. Action Point 4: Establishing where the key ministers and government officials had been at the time of floods. This would be a critical task for a Supreme Court-appointed judicial commission. This is not a witch hunt. This exercise is important to establish people’s confidence in the system. It will be crucial for establishing some degree of democratic credibility in Jammu & Kashmir. Question No. 5: Most likely all ruling and opposition parliamentarians of J&K were out of the flood areas, and safe and hearty. Why were those people invisible? Why didn’t they pool resources in Delhi to transport 400-500 boats to salvage their people? Why they remained silent for all the mayhem days? Action Point 5: Parliamentarians must tell their people what all they did in those difficult days and why they looked invisible and silent. That is important for across-the-board accountability. Question No. 6: For at least a week between September 7 and 13 there was a complete information vacuum on the flood situation. There was no government spokesperson. No press briefings. Situation reports in such a situation are of utmost importance. Those reports needed to convey the extent of impact. Most of the news reports were putting the number of affected people at 600,000, when the number was around 5 million. At least 3 million people’s homes or businesses were inundated in water. No one was giving that number. Action Point 6: It needs to be established if the standard operating procedures (SOPs) as laid down in the state Disaster Management Policy were followed in situation reporting. If there are no such SOPs there we must re-write our DM policy. Question No. 7: For many days post-floods rescue and relief operations were for all practical reasons facilitated by the Union Home Secretary from the Srinagar airport. A parallel chain of administrative command was established where the chief minister and his cabinet seemed to be missing. How did such a situation unfold? Did Omar Abdullah’s ministers and officials disregard the established norms of reporting? Or they simply did not cooperate? Action Point 7: Establish why J&K government could not function? Was something happening to discredit it? Question No. 8: All communications – mobile phones, Internet, land phones have remained off for most of the time since September 7. Why did such thing happen? Does this mean communications companies have no contingency planning? Action Point 8: An inquiry on how communications remained cut off completely in most areas, including those unaffected by floods, for all these days. And that is it. Immunity of and lack of accountability in the government system is deep rooted in J&K than any other state in India. There is hardly a tradition of resignations on moral grounds. Making the heads to roll for the omissions and commissions that make a tragedy is not part of our political culture. If we avert the question of accountability today, the challenge is that the mistakes of this situation will be repeated when the next disaster comes knocking at our doors. Government officials and politicians will have no pressure to act when that next big disaster strikes. By skirting the question of accountability we will be again treading the beaten path – feeding the victims with some financial incentives and closing the book. Consequently, the rot in the system will remain as ever! (AHT, Dateline Srinagar, Daily Greater Kashmir, 28 September, 2014)
Posted on: Sun, 28 Sep 2014 08:41:50 +0000
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