Ryles arguments represent the only serious challenge to intellectualism — unless Stanley is picking a conveniently absent adversary in order to create the impression that he has anti-intellectualism on the run. In 1982 Gareth Evans book Varieties of Reference made several frequently cited arguments against intellectualism, none of which Stanley mentions, even though he quotes Evans widely on other matters. Stanleys position relies on the supposition that to know how to do something intelligently amounts to knowing a truth. My contention (pace Stich 1990) is that where efficacious action is concerned, truth is, at best, of secondary importance. If being able to swim is knowing a truth, as Stanley claims, then what purpose does this truth actually serve? The concept of truth is irrelevant when compared to the competences of which the ability is comprised. Stanley would presumably contend that each atom of competence is also an atom of truth. But if knowing how to do things like swimming were simultaneously the acquisition of constituent truths, then teaching by description would be the only educational method necessary. Demonstration and practice would have nothing further to impart. However, skill in describing a procedure does not bestow a skill in the performance of the procedure described. A knowledge of linguistics does not make an orator. And a witness who provides a clear description for a identikit image need have no expertise in drawing. thoughtsonartandteaching.blogspot/2014/08/intellectualism-refuted-part-ii.html#ixzz3C2olw7gl
Posted on: Mon, 01 Sep 2014 06:52:57 +0000