SANDBOX PARTHIAN EMPIRE[edit] For my Cambridge History of Iran notes, see User:PericlesofAthens/Sandbox Parthian Empire Cambridge. For my other sandboxes, see User:PericlesofAthens/Sandbox For my draft, see User:PericlesofAthens/Draft for Parthian Empire. The Persians: An Introduction (Maria Brosius)[edit] Brosius, Maria. (2006). The Persians: An Introduction. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-32089-5 (hbk). The following are sub-sections for the chapter The Parthians (Arsacids), from pages 79-138. Preliminary remarks[edit] Page 79-80: There is a general lack of Parthian historical texts which would allow us to reconstruct their history. Archaeology has aided in this, but to a small degree. Greek and Roman texts are also used, but in many cases they do not offer enough detail, mention things only in passing, and mention places which have yet to be identified. Brosius argues that the best primary sources for Parthian history are its minted coins, which have been used to piece together the chronological succession of Parthian kings. Page 80: Seleucid and Roman written sources treat the Parthian Empire with a fair degree of hostility and thus cannot be fully relied on to present an accurate history and description of Parthia. However, Han Chinese written sources are neutral and less opinionated according to Maria Brosius. Historical Survey[edit] Introduction[edit] Page 81-82: Here Brosius sets the stage by discussing the decline of the Seleucid Empire, Romes arch-nemesis and greatest political opponent becoming the Parthian Empire, and China as an emerging power under the Han Dynasty, which established diplomatic and commercial relations with Parthia. The beginnings[edit] Page 83-84: QUOTE: Parthia had been a satrapy of the Achaemenid empire, and, after its collapse, became a Seleucid province with the city of Shar-e Qumis/Hekatompylos (Chin: Ho-tu or Fan-tou) as its capital. Other cities, like Asaak, were located across the mountain ranges of the Kopet Dağ adn Binalut. Parthia bordered on Hyrcania on the southeastern shore of the Caspian Sea and the desert Dasht-e Kavir in the south, while the River Oxus probably formed a natural border in the northeast. In the 3rd century BC, more than 700 years after the migration of the first Persian peoples to the Iranian plateau, a nomadic tribe called the Parni, or Aparni, crossed into the northern border of Parthia. The Parni were an Iranian-speaking people who belonged to a larger confederation known as the Dahae. After a period of an apparently peaceful settlement in Parthia the Parni adopted the name of the province, and became subsequently known to the outside world as Parthians. With their establishment as a political power the term Parthia became a generic term for their empire as a whole, and the term Parthians for the many different peoples which inhabited it. Page 84: QUOTE: The Parni-Parthians also adopted Parthian, a northwest Iranian language, as their official language. It was distinct from another Iranian language, Middle Persian, which was spoken by the Persians of Persis. Parthian became the official court language, and remained so well into the Sasanian period. However, it must be emphasized that the Parthian empire was multi-ethnic and multilingual, where Parthian and Middle Persian were spoken alongside Aramaic, Babylonian, Greek, Armenian, Sogdian and Chorasmian, amongst others. Page 84: QUOTE: The emergence of the Parthians as a new world power in the ancient Near East was a gradual process which took over 100 years. Parthian control was first limited to the region north of the mountain range of the Kopet Dağ, with Asaak as its regional centre. It was in this city that the leader of the Parthians, Arsaces, was crowned king. Page 84: QUOTE: In line with Achaemenid and Seleucid traditions, and as an expression of his political ambition, Arsaces introduced a new dating era, the Arsacid era, in 247. Arsaces name became the designated title for the kings of Parthia, who referred to themselves as Arsaces in preference to their personal name. As the eponymous founder of the empire, Arsaces also gave his name to the royal dynasty, and references to the Arsacid dynasty, or the Arsacids, are therefore interchangeable with the denominations Parthian dynasty and Parthians. Page 84-85: QUOTE After the Parnis settlement of northern Parthia, Arsaces made a first attempt to expand southward into Margiana, a province of the Seleucid empire. In response to this military aggression the Seleucid king sent an army under the command of his general Demodamas against Arsaces and forced him into retreat. Yet some time before 246 Arsaces made a second incursion into Margiana, only to be forced out once again, this time by Diodotus, the Seleucid satrap of Bactria. Page 85: QUOTE: Unable to expand his power southward, Arsaces moved into central Parthia. His decision to do so may have been facilitated by several events which affected the Seleucids ability to launch a successful counterattack. This chain of events was triggered by the death of the Seleucid king Antiochus II in 246, which prompted Ptolemy III of Egypt to challenge Antiochus successor Seleucus II and invade Syria and Mesopotamia in the hope of expanding his power. Ptolemy IIIs invasion triggered the so-called Third Syrian War (246-241) which forced Seleucus II to concentrate his forces for the next five years on the western part of his realm. His preoccupation with the war provided an opportunity for two Seleucid satraps, Diodotus of Bactria and Andragoras of Parthia, to rebel against Seleucid rule and proclaim their independence. Seleucus II was unable to respond instantly to these rebellions. However, when Andragoras was faced with a rebellion within his own realm, he found himself without Seleucid alliance to provide military support. Arsaces used this vulnerable position to his advantage, and in 239/8 Andragoras was killed. Arsaces now controlled the entire province of Parthia and its capital Hekatompylos. Page 85-86: QUOTE: From Parthia Arsaces advanced west into Hyrcania. Potentially, he had to expect military opposition from Seleucus II or even Diodotus I, but once again, political events worked in his favour. Diodotus I died in 234, and his son and heir, also named Diodotus, entered an alliance with Arsaces. As defectors from the Seleucid empire they both recognised the advantage of mutual military support against a potential Seleucid attack. Yet, during the eastern campaign of Seleucus II, the king succeeded in expelling Arsaces from Parthia, who was thus forced to take refuge with the tribe of the Apasiacae to the north towards Chorasmia. But soon afterwards Arsaces led a victorious counterattack against Seleucus army. Due to further unrest in the west Seleucus II was unable to maintain a military presence in Parthia. Seleucid power was further threatened when a civil war broke out between 222 and 220, in which Seleucus successor, Antiochus III (223-187), was confronted with a rebellion of Molon, the governor of Media. He quashed the rebellion and brought Media back under Seleucid control. In eastern Iran the establishment of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom still rested on fragile foundations, as became apparent when, in 221, Diodotus II was killed by Euthydemus, who then assumed power. Page 86: QUOTE: Arsaces died — apparently a natural death — in 217 and was succeeded by his son Arsaces II (217-191). He continued his fathers policy, maintaining control of Parthia and Hyrcania, while confronting military reprisals of Antiochus III. In 210/9 Antiochus III launched an extensive eastern campaign, intent on regaining control of both provinces, as well as Bactria (Justin 41.5.7; Polyb. 10.28-31; 10.49; 11.34.1-11). Despite initial successes, however, Antiochus III ceased his campaign after reaching an agreement with the Parthian king. Arsaces acknowledged the supremacy of the Seleucid king, but Antiochus III recognised Arsaces rule by bestowing on him the title of king (Gr. basileus) (cf. Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 199). Under Arsaces successors Phriapatius (c. 191-176) and his son Phraates I (176-171) Parthian control remained uncontested. Establishing an empire[edit] Page 86: QUOTE: With the reign of Mithridates I (171-139/8), a brother of Phraates I, the history of Parthia entered a new phase of growing political power and geographical expansion. The death of Diodotus II signalled the end of the Greco-Bactrian alliance with Parthia. Indeed, it appears that the relationship between the two kingdoms deteriorated to the extent that sometime between 160 and 155 Mithridates I conducted a campaign against the Bactrian kingdom, taking control of two regions, Turiva and Asponius (Strabo 11.11.2). Westward expansion resulted in Parthian control of Media, where Mithridates I deposed the Seleucid governor Timarchos and installed a Parthian called Bacasis in the capital Ecbatana (Justin 41.6.7). From Media Mithridates I moved south towards Mesopotamia, where he took control of the neighboring cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon. Page 86-87: QUOTE: In the province of Elymais in Khuzestan Mithridates I found considerable opposition, however. In October/November 145 the leader of the Elymaians, Kamniskares, attacked Babylonian cities, which at that point were under Seleucid control, and was met with a counteroffensive in June/July 144. After Mithridates had taken control of Babylonia, the Elymaians attacked Apamea-Silhu in 141, demonstrating their resistance against the Parthians. This power struggle continued into the reign of Phraates II, at least until May/June 138. Page 87: QUOTE: Despite the political unrest, Babylonia recognised Mithridates I as king by summer 141, and an official investiture ceremony held in Seleucia signalled the beginning of Parthias imperial power: Page 87: QUOTE: Expressing the growing confidence of kingship, Mithridates coins minted in Seleucia showed the Parthian king no longer wearing the soft cap, but the royal diadem (see Fig. 19). Ctesiphon became the royal centre of the empire, while the foundation of Mithradatkert/Nisa in Parthia proper emphasised the provinces recognition as the homeland of the Parthians. Page 89: QUOTE: Shortly after the conquest of Media Mithridates I returned with his army to Hyrcania to fend off an attack by invading nomads from among the Scythian tribes. These tribes had been forced to give up their territory after attacks from the Tocharians, probably identical with the Yüeh-chih, who had emerged from the eastern steppes in search of new land. A result of these raids may have been the first measure to secure the Parthian frontier, the construction of a defence wall in Hyrcania, north of the Gurgan River, which extended eastward from the Caspian Sea over a distance of 170 km. Page 89: QUOTE: But the withdrawal of his army from Mesopotamia created a military weakness which allowed the Seleucid king Demetrius II Nicator (145-141) to regain control of Mesopotamia. In a way, these events epitomised the conundrum Parthian kings (and the Seleucids before them) were faced with throughout their rule: the difficulty of controlling the vast borders and territories of the empire and conducting wars on two fronts. The king was the leader of the army in war, but two fronts necessitated a military commander who could be entrusted with a sizeable army to fight the kings cause, but who would not abuse his military position to obtain power. The latent threat of wars on two fronts may explain to some extent why the Parthians endeavoured to reach a diplomatic solution before resorting to military conflict. In this case, however, a Parthian force was dispatched to fight Demetrius II Nicator, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Mithridates I treated the Seleucid king with honour and even gave him his daughter Rhodogune in marriage. This may have been a symbolic gesture which served to legitimise Mithridates political takeover of Seleucid power. Page 89-90: QUOTE: Within his thirty-year reign Mithridates I had changed the political landscape of the Near East and established Parthian imperial power. With his successful expansion of the empire, and, more importantly, his ability to maintain control over the newly gained territories, he had changed Parthia from a small kingdom east of the Caspian Sea to an imperial contender for Seleucid power. His successors, Phraates II (139/8-128) and Artabanus I (128/7-124), were able to maintain control over the empire, though they each faced threats both from the Seleucid army in the west and from nomadic invasions in the northeast. But the Seleucids finally had to acknowledge that they could not recover their former eastern provinces. Further east, the Greco-Bactrian kingdom succumbed to invading tribes, who established their power in the capital Bactra. Known as the Kushans, these tribes established an empire to the east as far as northern India and the Ganges basin. They remained a political power from 128 BC to AD 99. Consolidation of power[edit] Page 90: QUOTE: Under their king Antiochus VII Sidetes (138-129) the Seleucids were able to regain temporary control of Babylonia and Media (130-129/8), but their success was undermined by internal opposition. Their own garrisons rebelled against them, forming an alliance with the Parthians. Amidst these power struggles a new local dynasty emerged in Characene in southern Mesopotamia. Some time in the 130s a certain Hyspaosines began campaigning in southern Elymais and by 133 was regarded as an enemy of the Parthians. By 130 Susa was under Parthian control, but Hyspaosines, who had proclaimed himself king of Characene, remained in control of the region until his death in 124. Despite attempts by Mithridates II (124/3-88/7) to curb Characenes independence, it remained under the rule of kings throughout the Parthian period. Page 90: QUOTE: Mithridates IIs reign signalled a third phase of Parthian expansion and consolidation of empire. He secured Parthian control in northern Mesopotamia by curbing the power of the kingdoms of Adiabene, Gordyene and Osrhoene, and by bringing the city of Dura-Europos under Parthian control. He also regained control of Babylonia and the eastern provinces. Page 90-91: QUOTE: Parthias power was recognised in the east, when China discovered its western neighbours after a reconnaissance mission of Zhang Qian. He had been sent by the Chinese emperor Wu (140-87), and after a long absence, from c. 138 to 126, returned, having gathered information about Parthia, known in Chinese sources as An-hsi. In 121 an embassy was sent by Wu to Mithridates II to establish formal relations between the two empires: When the Han envoys first reached Parthia, the king of Parthia (Mithridates II) ordered (a general) to take a force of 20,000 cavalry and welcome them at the eastern frontier. The eastern frontier is several thousand li distant from the kings capital. Along the way (to the capital) one passes several tens of cities; settlements are continuous and the population is very numerous. Only when the Han envoys returned (to China) did (the king) send out his own envoys to accompany the Han envoys and to come and observe the size of Han territory. They brought skilful [sic] conjurers from Li-Kan (the Seleucid Empire) and ostrich eggs as a tribute for the Han (emperor). (Shih-Chih 123, 3172-3173; trans. Leslie, Gardiner 1996: 34-35) NOTE: According to this site (by the University of Washington), the Chinese characters for the Seleucid Empire, or Li-Kan, are 犂鞬 (Pinyu: Lijian; Wade-Giles: Li-chien) Page 91: QUOTE: The initial reason for Chinese contact with Parthia may have been military, for the Chinese empire was threatened by invading Hsiung-nu, Huns, the same people who had pushed the Tocharians into Greco-Bactria. Not only was there a Chinese demand for the famous Persian horses, but also for the trained skills of the Parthian cavalry. In the event, it was not a military alliance which was concluded between the two empires, but a trading agreement. Recognising a mutual demand for luxury goods, the Chinese opened a network of overland trade routes between China, Central Asia and the Iranian plateau, collectively known as the Silk Road. Page 91: QUOTE: The establishment of these trade routes, which connected China with the eastern Mediterranean coast and Asia Minor, was perhaps one of the reasons why Mithridates II wanted to gain more control over the northwestern border of his empire, for in 97 he subjected Armenia, an independent kingdom, to Parthian rule. He deposed the Armenian king and replaced him with his pro-Parthian son Tigranes. Through Tigranes, the Parthians began to establish contacts with other kingdoms of Asia Minor. Tigranes entered into an alliance with the king of Pontus, also called Mithridates, which was cemented by a marriage to the latters daughter Cleopatra, and both Tigranes and the king of Pontus then led a campaign against King Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia. A year after the Parthian subjection of Armenia a Roman delegation led by Sulla met the Parthian ambassador Orobazus at the Euphrates River, to acknowledge the river formally as the border between the two powers. Page 91-92: QUOTE: Mithridates II himself ensured his influence in the west by marrying a daughter of Tigranes, called Aryazate Automa, and by establishing an alliance with Mithridates of Pontus. Yet despite his successful foreign policy and his attempts to tie the different powers closer together, Mithridates IIs reign did not remain unchallenged. A contender for the throne, Gotarzes I (91/0-81/0), assumed the kingship of parts of the Parthian empire as an independent ruler of Babylon, and gained full political power after Mithridates death in 88/7. Before assuming the kingship Gotarzes I seems to have held a very high position in the empire, for an inscription at Bisitun refers to him as Satrap of Satraps, a title hitherto unknown, and clearly echoing the royal title of King of Kings, which Mithridates II had adopted from the Achaemenids. However, Gotarzes I, who was not a member of the Arsacid dynasty, was opposed by Tigranes of Armenia, who, on several occasions, sent forces into Parthia to contest Gotarzes power. With the accession of Sinatruces (78/7-71/0) and his son Phraates III (71/0-58/7) power was restored to the Arsacids. Enmity with Rome[edit] Page 92: QUOTE: From the mid 1st-century BC to the end of the second century AD Parthias main political and military focus was turned towards the western frontier. That this focus was a real one and not just once perceived through the dominant Roman sources seems to be proved by the fact that the Kushans made no attempt to expand their empire westward. The settlement of these previously nomadic tribes had temporarily calmed the migration into Parthian territory. Page 92: QUOTE: Rome, the new Mediterranean power in the ascent, had a political interest in the Seleucid provinces in Asia Minor and the Near East, and was able to exert its political influence in Asia Minor after the defeat of Antiochus III and the peace of Apameia in 188. Rome was a willing ally for anti-Seleucid powers as well as for anti-Parthian activities. Thus, it found eager allies in some of the Armenian kings as well as in Parthian pretenders to the throne who sought external military support. However, pro-Roman attitudes seldom penetrated deeply below the political surface. Romanised Parthian kings were never able to persuade the Parthian aristocracy to give them full political support. Page 92-94 (map on page 93): QUOTE: After the initial diplomatic exchange between Parthia and the Roman Republic in 97 in which both sides seemed to express mutual acknowledgment, tension increased over the next few decades, and Rome seemed to be increasingly determined to head for a military encounter with Parthia. The conflict of interest between the two empires lay in the control over Armenia and the kingdoms of Asia Minor. Syria became a further zone of conflict as the Parthians undertook campaigns into Syrian territory in retaliation for Roman aggression towards Parthia. What marked the Roman attitude towards the Parthians was a staggering lack of intelligence about the make-up of their empire in terms of geography, political set-up, resources and military strength. After 20 BC imperial Rome lost itself in propaganda and myth-making about Parthia as yet another inferior barbarian country, the Parthians themselves as a people on horseback lacking culture, discipline, political and moral values. Rome paid for its unwillingness to understand what Parthia and the Parthian empire meant with considerable losses in return for minor and short-lived military successes, dragging itself into an unnecessary two-frontier war it could ill-afford, to the detriment of the defence of its northern frontiers where the Roman empire was increasingly threatened by rebellions. Page 94: QUOTE: The growing Roman aggression can be sensed in the actions of the Roman commander Lucullus and those of his successors Pompey and Crassus. Rome led several campaigns against Asia Minor. After Mithridates VI of Pontus had been defeated by Lucullus he fled to his ally, Tigranes of Armenia. In 69, without considering the political consequences, Lucullus decided to attack the Armenian city of Tigranocerta. When both kings, Mithridates and Tigranes, sought the support of their Parthian ally, Lucullus pretended to adhere to the Parthian kings reminder that the Euphrates had been recognised as the border between Rome and Parthia, but secretly prepared an attack on Parthia. He was only prevented from doing so because his own forces threatened to rebel if he carried out his plan (Plut.Luc.30; Cic.Manil.23-24). Lucullus appears to have acted on his own initiative, rather than on the orders of Rome. His campaign was a spontaneous spurt of military aggression which failed to take any account of the strength of the Parthian army and to consider the potentially disastrous situation he exposed his army to. Page 94-95: QUOTE: Under Lucullus successor Pompey Rome actively supported a contender to the Parthian throne, thereby openly attacking the Parthian king Orodes II (58/7-38). With Crassus appointment as commander of Syria in 55, Rome was set to go to war against Parthia. Crassus own ambition, not only to conquer Parthia, but also take to [sic] control of Bactria and even India, expressed a fatal mixture of arrogance and ignorance about the new power structures in the Near and Further East, as well as lacking any realistic view about the logistics for such a campaign. In the event, Crassus did not advance beyond northern Babylonia. At Carrhae, ancient Harran, he was confronted by the Parthian forces and suffered a colossal defeat, losing many soldiers in battle. While Crassus advanced with his army from the south, Orodes had marched into Armenia to cut off Crassus vital ally. Crassus reached Carrhae after a long and exhausting march along the Royal Road, but instead of resting his army he ordered them to engage immediately with the Parthian forces. Crassus had given no consideration to Parthian strategy and supplies, and he was now faced with an army which may have been smaller than the Roman forces, but which was rested and extremely well equipped. The Parthian army was led by 1,000 horsemen in full mail armour, followed by 9,000 archers on horseback who shot with composite bows. To support the archers on horseback, 1,000 camels carried further supplies of arrows to secure continuous fighting. The Roman forces were unable to withstand the storm of arrows with which they were attacked, and were furthermore deceived when the Parthians seemingly retreated only to turn their bodies backwards in their apparent flight and to shoot the pursuing enemy, a tactic which became known as the Parthian shot. Page 96: QUOTE: Crassus retreated with the remaining force to Carrhae, only to be killed after failed negotiations led to an immediate attack on the Roman troops. The scale of the Roman losses was massive: of the 42,000 soldiers only 10,000 returned to safety. Of the remaining army, those who had not been killed were made prisoners of war. The Roman standards were lost to Parthia. Crassus had gone to war against Parthia lacking any profound intelligence about the empire, and Rome paid a heavy price for this folly. Parthia was now Romes prime enemy; fighting it with, or without, cause became the greatest goal of the most ambitious generals and emperors of Rome. Page 96: QUOTE: Following Caesars assassination in 44, Rome fell into civic strife between the republicans and the imperialists, culminating in the war between Caesars successor Octavian Augustus and Antony, which ended with Antonys defeat at Philippi in 42. Supporters of the Republic including the then Roman governor of Syria, Cassius, and his envoy Labienus, found themselves seeking the support of Parthia. After Octavians victory against Antony in 42, Parthia demonstrated its position against the new powers with invasions into Syria and Asia Minor. In the course of these campaigns Pacorus, son of Orodes and heir to the throne, was killed, as was Labienus, who had remained in Parthia to fight against Rome. Pacorus death caused a serious succession problem for Orodes, who, in 38, selected his son Phraates IV (38-3/2) as his successor. Phraates IV failed to use Antony as a potential support against Rome, and his refusal to enter into an alliance led to Antonys attack on Parthia with the support of Armenia. Phraates IV did not wait to offer a proper battle. His forces attacked the Roman military supplies and the baggage train, destroying the siege engines, vital for any attack on cities, and diminishing the armys food supplies. At this point, the Armenian king Artavasdes deserted Antonys cause, realising that the campaign was doomed to failure. Regardless, Antony marched on as far as Phraaspa in Media, a city probably located near the modern city of Maragheh in Iranian Azerbaijan. The siege of Phraaspa soon had to be abandoned and Antony was forced to retreat to the Araxes River. His campaign cost the lives of 24,000 Roman soldiers. Page 96-97: QUOTE: In 20 BC Phraates IV came to a diplomatic agreement with the new ruler of Rome, Augustus. Rome once again confirmed the Euphrates as the border between the two empires, and Phraates IV agreed to return the Roman standards captured during the battles with Lucullus, Crassus and Antony. Ten years later, Phraates sent four of his sons, Seraspadanes, Phraates, Rhodaspes and Vonones, as well as members of their families, to Rome. This was the first of many evacuations of members of the Persian court to Rome, and they occurred for different reasons. On the one hand this action could be taken in order to confirm an alliance between the kings of Rome and Parthia. On the other, it is possible that Parthian kings sent their sons to the Roman court in order to ensure their upbringing and survival away from their own court. However, in Rome this was used as a splendid piece of propaganda, presenting the members of the Parthian royal family as hostages. Their presence in Rome was used as a means to demonstrate Parthias acceptance of Romes political supremacy, if not moral superiority. It tied in perfectly with the way Augustus had marketed the return of the Roman standards in 20 BC: in word and image this event was presented as a major diplomatic achievement on the part of Augustus, in which he had persuaded the Parthian king to accept Roman rule. The famous statue of Augustus from Prima Porta shows the emperor wearing military dress; the central motif on his breastplate is the return of the standards by a Parthian. In contrast to the erect stature of the recipient, the figure of the Parthian is curved, his hair in disarray, and his many-folded Parthian clothing untidy (see Fig. 20). Page 97: QUOTE: Roman coins were issued which showed a man in Parthian dress, presumably representing the king himself, in a kneeling position, offering the Roman standard with his right hand, the left hand in open submission (see Fig. 21). Page 97: QUOTE: A triumphal arch was built to commemorate the historic event, and by 2 BC the standards were housed in the temple of Mars Ultor, Mars the Avenger, built specifically for that purpose. For Rome, Augustus had achieved the impossible: the takeover of Parthia without a war. It was the beginning of a myth created by Augustus which was to cloud the judgment of subsequent emperors with regard to Parthia, and shrouded the Parthian empire and its real political and military force in mystery. It was a brilliant piece of spin, based on no fact. Roman supremacy had to be demonstrated to the (Roman) world, and that was precisely what Augustus did. Page 97-99 (images on page 98): QUOTE: Phraates political connection with Rome ultimately can be seen as one of the causes of the considerable dynastic upheavals which were to plague Parthia for the next two centuries. First, in the question of royal succession he gave preference to a son born not to a daughter of the Parthian aristocracy, but to a foreigner, a woman called Musa, whom Phraates IV had accepted as a gift from Augustus. She succeeded in securing the throne for her son, thereby elevating herself to the status of kings mother (Jos.Ant.18.2.4). Her ambitions went even further. She married her own son and thus became recognised as queen. But the resentment of the Parthian nobility towards the selection of a king not of full Arsacid descent was soon to be apparent. Phraates V survived only four years on the throne before he was killed, and the Parthian nobility placed Orodes III on the throne. His reign ended two years later, and was followed by a stream of successors, beginning with an Arsacid, Vonones I (AD 8/9), one of the sons of Phraates IV who had been sent to Rome. But the hopes of the Parthian nobility to get a pure Arsacid back on the throne were dashed when they realised that Vonones I had adopted more Roman manners than they considered acceptable. They therefore backed another candidate, Artabanus II (10/11-38), who had a maternal link to the Arsacid dynasty. Eventually Artabanus II was able to defeat Vonones I and proceeded to restore Parthias relationship with Rome. Armenia remained the bone of contention between Rome and Parthia, and while Artabanus IIs diplomacy in the matter led to a renewal in AD 18/19 of the earlier agreements made between Rome and Parthia, his interference in Armenian politics in AD 35 led once again to an eruption of hostilities. The political situation was worsened by the Parthian nobilitys dissatisfaction with Artabanus II, which led them to seek Roman support in order to place another of Phraates descendants on the Parthian throne. For a brief period of time this caused some dynastic upheavals, but by the spring of 37 Artabanus could reassert his position. When he died a year later, his son Vardanes (AD 38-45) was able to secure his succession. Page 99-100: QUOTE: Politically Parthia had pushed itself into a difficult corner. This was mainly for two reasons: first, the latest hostility between Parthia and Rome over Armenia, and second, perhaps more damaging, the considerable power wielded by the Parthian nobility, whose status and influence had risen to such a degree that they could make or break the king. In this power game Rome was a key player, offering itself as a potential supporter of one side or another, without losing sight of its own interests. It meant that Rome took advantage of the debacle of Parthian internal political factions as much as it could. A temporary reprieve was achieved only in AD 63, when the Parthian king Vologeses I (51-76/80) concluded a treaty with Rome in which both sides took a share of control over Armenia — Parthia, because it secured the right to appoint the Armenian king from among the Parthian royal family, and Rome, because it maintained political supremacy over Armenia. Tiridates, an Arsacid and king of Armenia, travelled with the royal family to Rome to receive his kingship from Nero, which was publicly celebrated in a lavish ceremony. One of his daughters remained in Rome, possibly as a confirmation of the alliance (Tac.Ann.15.30). Page 100: QUOTE: In the struggle of royal succession, kings and contenders for the throne appeared on the Parthian political stage until the reign of Vologeses IV (147/8-191/2) brought a degree of political calm back to Parthian rule. All the while hostilities with Rome continued to flare up over Armenia, culminating in the great eastern campaign of Trajan between 114 and 117, in which Ctesiphon was taken, and territories east of the Euphrates River came under Roman occupation. Roman success was short-lived, however, for by the winter of 115 most of the newly conquered regions were in rebellion from their Roman oppressors and had killed or expelled their garrisons. Hadrian, who succeeded Trajan after his death in 117, immediately implemented a return to a status ante quem, ordering that the new territorial acquisitions be returned to Parthia. The main reason for Hadrians decision was the fact that Rome did not possess sufficient military resources to maintain a presence east of the Euphrates. Page 100: QUOTE: Rome staged three further attacks on Parthia. One was led in 165 by Avidius Cassius, who was able to take Seleucia and Ctesiphon, only to retreat soon afterwards after the outbreak of an epidemic. During the reign of Vologeses V (191/2-207/8) the emperor Septimius Severus led a war against Parthia between 195 and 199. His army was able to take the cities of the western part of the Parthian empire once again: Seleucia, Babylon and Ctesiphon. Hatra, as it had done before, withstood the Roman siege. Page 100-101: QUOTE: The last Roman attacks on Parthia occurred between 216 and 218 under Caracalla and Macrinus. The whole campaign ended in disaster for the Romans and the humiliating demand to pay the Parthians a sum of money amounting to 200 million dinars and additional gifts (Dio Cassius 79 [78.27.1]). In total denial of the historical facts even this disastrous defeat was presented in Rome as a victory, and coins were minted bearing the legend VIC(TORIA) PART(HICA), Victory over Parthia. Page 101: QUOTE: The end of the Parthian empire was not, however, brought about by Rome, but by internal opposition. The king of Persis, Ardashir, son of Papak ruler of Istakhr, rose in rebellion and challenged the last Parthian king, Artabanus IV (213-224). On 28 April 224 Artabanus IV and his son were defeated and killed in battle. Ardashirs victory opened a new chapter in the history of ancient Persia, which he entered as the founder of the Sasanian dynasty. King and court[edit] Introduction[edit] Pdc 24586.jpg Coin of Arsaces I of Parthia.jpg Page 101: QUOTE: Arsaces I, the founder of the Parthian empire, was the primus inter pares of the clan leaders of the Parni, a position which allowed him to claim kingship. His coronation in 247 BC in Asaak officially marked that status. If the early Arsacid coins can be dated securely to Arsaces reign, the obverse pictured the king wearing the distinctive Iranian soft cap with cheek flaps, the bashlyk (Gr. kyrbasia). The image on the reverse shows a man seated on a backless chair wearing a soft cap and the riding costume, a tunic worn over trousers, and holding a bow in his outstretched hand. It was consistently maintained on coins throughout the Parthian period. The image is reminiscent of fourth-century Achaemenid coins representing satraps of the western Asiatic provinces, as can be seen on the coins of Datames, and may have served as a model for the early Arsacid coins. It has also been suggested that the figure depicts Arsaces I himself, wearing the traditional costume, while the bow symbolises his royal power. These two interpretations are not incompatible, however, for Arsaces may well have chosen an image whose tradition went back to Achaemenid coins, but which was given a contemporary meaning as an image of the founder of the Parthian empire. The accompanying Greek legend reading Arsaces basileus, Arsaces, the king, perfectly complements this combination of Achaemenid and Seleucid iconography (see Fig. 22). As successors of both empires the Parthians adopted symbols of power and iconography of kingship from both realms. Page 101-102: QUOTE: Following the reign of Mithridates I and Parthias establishment as an empire Arsacid kingship became more pronounced and imperial sentiments more strongly expressed. The Parthian kings laid claim to their legitimate succession from the Achaemenids as well as from the Seleucids. The latter, after all, had been rulers of former Achaemenid territory for almost 100 years, and therefore, at least to some extent, had been the inheritors of Persian power, while at the same time they had introduced Hellenistic ideas of kingship to Iran. Greek epithets echoed the Seleucid royal form of address in the kings full royal title: Arsaces, King of Kings, the Benefactor, the Just, the Manifest, the Friend of the Greeks. The royal diadem replaced the soft cap as one of the royal insignia. In the late Parthian period the diadem could be exchanged for or complemented by the upright tiara, a high, rounded headdress, richly embroidered and set with pearls and jewels. Page 102-103: QUOTE: Owing to the absence of any extensive Parthian royal inscriptions which would shed light on the importance of divine support for the Parthian kings, it is difficult to assess to what extent the Arsacids regarded their kingship as divine. The problem is enhanced further became virtually nothing is known about the religion of the Parthians. Mazdaism had developed into an early form of Zoroastrianism, but it is not clear to what extent the Arsacid kings adhered to the religion. We know that royal fires were lit for the Arsacid kings, and possibly for other members of the royal family. As was the practice during the Achaemenid period, these fires were probably extinguished at the kings death to mark the beginning of the official mourning period, and new fires were lit at the accession of the new king...Parthian rock reliefs and coinage suggest that the practice of religious sacrifice offered before a fire altar continued to be an important form of public representation of kings and local rulers. Page 103: QUOTE: Elements of Seleucid kingship which were incorporated into Arsacid kingship are discernible not only in the adoption of Greek epithets of the royal title, but also in the more public representation of the royal family in, for example, the inclusion of the names of the kings wives in official documents. The appearance of the kings family in the kings entourage, in the train of the kings migrations between royal residences and on campaigns, followed a long Near Eastern tradition. Page 103: QUOTE: The Arsacid kings maintained several royal capitals in the empire, concentrating on two regions, Parthia and Mesopotamia. Arsaces I built the city of Dara on Mount Apaortenon near Abivard (Justin 41.4.1-4), a site not yet discovered, while Mithridates I founded Mithradatkert/Nisa. The city was known as the burial place of the Parthian kings (Isidore of Charax, Parth.Stat.12). In the 1st century AD Vologeses I founded a further city, Vologesocerta, in Mesopotamia. Old capital centres were also maintained. Shar-e Qumis/Hekatompylos was the centre of the early Parthian empire, and remained a royal residence even after Ctesiphon became the representational city of the Arsacids and was regarded by the Romans as the Parthian capital. Here the coronation and the official investiture ceremony were held. According to Chinese sources the Parthian capital was called Ho-tu or Fan-tou, thought to be Hekatompylos in Parthia (Leslie, Gardiner 1996: 34 n.13). Hekatompylos, Ecbatana in Media, and Seleucia were the official mint centres of the empire. Succession to the throne[edit] Page 103-104: QUOTE: The heir to the throne was selected from among the sons of the Arsacid king, and ideally the choice would fall on the first-born son. Arsacid kings were polygamous, but it seems that an heir born to a wife belonging to the Arsacid dynasty was preferred (Herodian 4.10.5). This accounts for interfamilial marriages, i.e. the kings marriage to nieces and sisters, though it is not clear whether the latter were marriages between full siblings. Regarded as strengthening the dynastic line, brother-sister marriages were known from the Ptolemies, and are attested in the marriages between Ptolemy II and Arsinoe and between Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra II. They are less well attested among the Seleucids for whom we only know of the brother-sister marriage between Antiochus, son of Antiochus III, and Laodice. Since hardly any details are known about the descent of the Parthian royal wives it is not possible to reach an accurate view on this issue. The case of Musa, a foreigner and a gift of Augustus to Phraates IV, who was elevated to queen, and then, by marrying her son, affirmed her status as the kings wife, appears to have been an extreme case of dynastic marriage and cannot be taken as the norm. Page 104: QUOTE: With Parthias rise to empire the Parthian nobility took a more prominent role in the royal succession. They had the right to approve of the chosen king and the head of one of the aristocratic families, the Suren, had the privilege of crowning the king. The Parthians selected and eliminated royal successors according to their assessment of the quality and political stability of the ruling king. While descent from the Arsacid dynasty was the principal factor for choosing a successor, individual kings could be dropped when their attitude did not suit the Parthian nobility. Thus resentment was caused when a successor was considered to be Romanised, or simply when a king no longer suited the politics of the aristocracy. It was this power of the nobility which contributed to no small degree to the dynastic instability of the later Parthian empire, as the existence of kings and counter-kings became a frequent appearance on the Parthian political stage. The fact that investiture was a vital point of royal rule is reflected in the investiture reliefs, such as that of Orodes at Tang-e Sarvak, and of the Elymaian king Kamniskares at Khung-e Nouruzi. Page 104-105: Brosius concludes that a hierarchical structure of nobles based on seniority and merit existed at the Parthian court due to titles such as batēsa and āzādān, QUOTE: which differentiate between different groups of noble freemen. The nobility could act as advisers to the king. Page 106: QUOTE: The appearance, in the Parthian period, of the court minstrel, the so-called gōsān, gives some indication for the performance of story-telling, recitation of literature and poetry at the royal court, and presumably, at the courts of the regional kings. The performance of the minstrel could be accompanied by a musical instrument; the stories were composed in verse, though it is not possible to determine whether they were written down, or whether the minstrels were trained in an oral transmission of court literature. The tradition survived down to the Sasanian period, when Persian literature was committed to book form in the fifth century, and thus found its way into the early Islamic literature, where Parthian elements of storytelling can be identified in the Shahnameh, the Book of Kings, of Firdowsi. END QUOTE: Here Brosius explains the story of Vis and Rāmin, which I will not include in the article. Royal women[edit]
Posted on: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 04:46:33 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015