Seventy years ago today July 29, 1944 Father Kenny goes to war Villiers- Fossard, Normandy, France: After having formed 2 years prior, their training taking them to all three coasts of the United States, as well as nine months in England, Chaplain Kenny Lynch and the rest of the 32nd Armored Regt. of the 3rd Armored Division enter combat for the first time. The 32nd landed in Normandy, on Omaha beach 4 days prior on 6/25/44. They were the first element of the 3rd Armored Spearhead Division ashore. Attached to the 29th Infantry Division, the first task givien to them was the town of Villiers- Fossard. (Kenny was fond of and known to spend quite a bit of time with Artillery outfits attached to his Regt. So I thought fit to use this:) What follows is a first hand account by William J. Camey of the Division Artillery section: After completing the beach landing on 24 June, Combat Command A (CC A) of the Division was committed on 29 June in an attack to take out a German salient in our lines near the town of Villiers-Fossard, three or four miles north of St. Lo. This pan of Normandy is the bocage country of apple orchards, small fields with high earthen hedgerows, and sunken roads. German infantry could get good defensive positions with overhead cover from artillery air bursts by digging into the hedgerows. Due to the nature of the terrain tanks have limited mobility and visibility is limited making artillery fire adjustments difficult. Also an infantry company commander on the attack could find it very difficult to know the location of his platoons. At 0900 Combat Command A began the attack with two task forces abreast. Each task force had a 105mm self-propelled artillery battalion in direct support. I was running the Division Artillery Fire Direction Center and had three more 3rd Armored Artillery Battalions in general support under my control as well as a call on battalions of XIX Corps Artillery. We had worked together as a team for two and one-half years but this was the first combat action. Things went relatively smoothly at first. However, the terrain and profuse vegetation made it almost impossible to know the exact location of some of our units. One duty of a forward observer is to keep his fire direction center informed of the location of his supported leading elements. This information, which is vital for the safety of the command is then relayed to the Division Artillery Fire Direction Center. Our leading element reports were not good for several reasons. First, in this compartmented terrain it was sometimes impossible to see them, and even if one did, to get a correct map reference. Normally, map coordinates for enemy forces and for adjusting fire are given by radio in the clear. Map coordinates for friendly forces are given using a simple map code. The reporting of leading elements was a low priority when you are getting shot at, when you didnt know for sure where the friendlies were, and when these dubious results had to be encoded. The Division Commander, Major General Leroy Watson, and Division Artillery Commander, Colonel Fredric J. Brown, had an observation post on a small hill where they could watch the action. I had a telephone line to them. In mid-afternoon, an observation post was hit with a major tank infantry counterattack. We learned later the counterattack was mounted by elements of one of the best divisions the Germans had in Normandy, Panzer Lehr Division. One of the direct support battalions requested a T.O.T. (Time on Target) laid down just in front of their leading elements. Time on Target is an artillery concentration fired so that the first volley of maybe 100 guns burst on the target at the same time. The technique is most effective. In spite of not having the most accurate frontline reports, I believed that it would be safe to shoot. I arranged for all five 3rd Armored Division Battalions to fire plus five battalions from XIX Corps, approximately 150 guns, everything from 105mm to 240mm. I assigned concentration areas to each battalion by map coordinates. A battalion concentration will cover an area of 300 to 400 yards in diameter so a ten battalion T.O.T. would cover an area about the size of a country club golf course. I called Colonel Brown and told him that it was close to our front lines but that I thought it would be safe to shoot. Ten battalions, 10 volleys hit the counterattack with devastating effect - 1500 artillery rounds exploding in less than five minutes. Even before we ceased firing we got reports of short rounds. One battery of the 30 firing made an error of 1000 yards and was shooting into an engineer company in reserve, causing casualties. Normally with short rounds a cease-fire is called, and every fire direction center and battery check their data. With this many battalions involved, it could take 30 to 45 minutes before firing could resume. The attack was stopped but not broken. The German troops were reorganizing to press home their attack. I had a terrible decision to make. If I ordered a cease-fire the 3rd Armored Division, and part of XIX Corps, would be without artillery support for a critical 30 to 45 minutes. The veteran German troops could very well have overrun our leading formations in their first combat action and caused severe casualties. If I ordered the concentration fired again, I would cause more American casualties. I really had no choice, however. I ordered the T.O.T. retired, and the same battery fired short again causing additional American casualties. The counterattack was broken, but I still agonize over this decision. After the action, Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Richardson, whose 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Armored Regiment was in the thick of things with Col. Truman E. Boudinots Task Force X, was interviewed. Richardson had belly crawled through a bocage country field to a hedgerow, on the opposite side of which was a German tank. What kind was it?, he was asked. I dont know, Richardson replied, but it had a gun as long as a telephone post. At first hearing this may not have sounded particularly informative, but wait. There were only two German tanks in general use with this appearance. One was the Mark IV Panther, of which there were considerable numbers, the other the Mark V Tiger, with relatively few in action in our area. Thus, the odds were about three or four to one that it was a Panther. Either one, it could more than deal with one of our tanks as to firepower. For such a short action our losses were considerable: 333 enlisted men, 18 officers and 31 tanks. No small loss. One thing the Germans were quick to learn our secret weapon was our artillery. Soon prisoners were asking about our automatic artillery after one battery was getting off a round every 10 seconds. )whew! If you made it this far, the next post is: What exactly does a Regimental Chaplain do?
Posted on: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 22:34:33 +0000
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