Ten misleading comments by Toby Cadman, foreign counsel of the Jamaat accused at the Bangladesh war crimes tribunal মার্চ 5, 2013 এতে 9:12pm Toby Cadman, is one of three UK lawyers representing the 10 Jamaat-e-Islami accused at the Bangladesh international crimes tribunal of international crimes during the countrys 1971 War of Independence, and by far its most active and public representative of the three. Opendemocracy.net has just published an article by him on the International Crimes Tribunal and the political situation in Bangladesh subsequent to the death sentence imposed on Delwar Hossain Sayedee. (opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/toby-m-cadman/bangladesh-justice-damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-dont ) As a lawyer for the Jamaat accused he is paid to represent their interests – and so, much of the content of the article is, in that context, unsurprising. From my unpartisan perspective of a person who has been following the tribunal since it was established (bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot/), I tend to agree with many of the points set out in the article concerning inadequacies in the actual tribunal process (about which I have written elsewhere). However his analysis of Bangladesh, and in particular of the current situation post-Sayedee verdict, is highly misleading. Below I set out the ten most serious inadequacies in his analysis - in the order in which they are made in the article. The most serious of the misleading comments are numbered 4 to 10 where he totally mischaracertises both the Shahbag protests and the violence taking place in Bangladesh. The article fails in particular to either mention or condemn the violence conducted by the Jamaat in any way, which for a lawyer, who talks about upholding the rule of law, is to say least, very unfortunate indeed. He says, ‘I have become a thorn in the side of a government hell bent on destroying any political opposition.’ To argue that the government is ‘hell bent on destroying any political opposition’ is a significant exaggeration. It is correct to say that in the course of this government, many political leaders of the main opposition party the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have been arrested in questionable circumstances and the political activities of the Jamaat-e-Islami itself, a key ally of the BNP, have also been severely constrained, with party officers having effectively been closed. However, the country continues to have a thriving democracy, and the BNP and other opposition parties continue to operate. Perhaps the reference to ‘destroying the political opposition’ refers to the 10 Jamaat leaders currently detained at the the International Crimes Tribunal. In the past, Cadman has suggested that their detention is simply due to the fact that they are oppostion leaders. Whilst the detention of these leaders may well be politically convenient for the Awami League government, there is no doubt that they are the appropriate people for the tribunal to subject to a judicial process relating to their alleged role in war crimes in 1971. Their detention for investigation on alleged war crimes can not therefore be described as simply trying to destroy the Jamaat. 2. ‘The central problem in all of this is that the people of Bangladesh … are deeply divided by the issue of war crimes.’ This is not true. They are not divided that war crimes were committed during 1971, not divided about the fact that the Pakistan military were the principal offenders in the killing of the hundreds of thousands who died during the war, not divided on the fact that the Jamaat-e-Islami supported the Pakistan military during the war, with some members of the party involved more actively in supporting the military. You will find few people in Bangladesh – perhaps just the members of the Jamaat-e-Islami - who will not accept these assumptions, and that is because they are historically based. In fact the Jamaat-e-Islami, in its arguments in court, now do accept the first two of these points – that atrocities were committed during the war and the Jamaat supported the Pakistan military. They only questions that they raise concern the exact role played by the Jamaat in the war and in particular the involvement of particular individuals in alleged war crimes. Perhaps there is more truth to the idea that the country is ‘divided’ on the war crimes tribunal itself - but even in relation to this, there remains wide popular support for tribunals holding trials of those alleged to have committed war crimes in 1971. Even the BNP says that it supports tribunals – only questioning the particular standards adopted at these tribunals. 3. He says, ‘The demonstrations in Shahbagh are .... ultimately seeking the abolition of a democratic political party due to its Conservative Islamic beliefs and due to its perceived anti-liberation position in 1971 by supporting a unified Pakistan.’ It is true that the Shahbag protesters want the banning of the Jamaat. This maybe, for many, a contentious demand, however Cadman fails to provide some context. Immediately after the 1971 war, the Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamic parties were banned – it was not allowed as all parties organized on the basis of religion were constitutionally banned. The ban was due, in particular, to the role played by the religious parties in Bangladesh during the 1971 war, where they supported the Pakistan military. Jamaat was only allowed to function again as a party after the assassination in 1975 of Sheikh Mujib, the country’s first president. In this context, with the constitution having reverted back to the former 1972 text on this issue, it is reasonble for a party like Jamaat to be under the spotlight. 4. He says, The danger in what is occurring on the streets of Dhaka today is that mob rule prevails There is no ‘mob rule’ on the streets of Dhaka. If Cadman is referring to ‘Shahbag’ as mob rule, he is completely misdescribing it. It is first of all a peaceful protest in a specific cross roads of Dhaka involving people from all walks of life including children. Whilst, its demands for hangings may be described by some kind of ‘mob justice’, it is definitely not mob rule. If there is any thing that can be described as ‘mob rule’ going on in Bangladesh, it is the response of the Jammaat-e-Isalmi and its youth wing to the sentencing to death of Sayedee. This resulted in mobs of their member/supporters with sticks in their hands setting fire to buses, buildings, houses etc, including some vicious attacks on the police. 5. He says, The country is descending dramatically and rapidly towards civil war. This is a constant refrain from those supporting the Jamaat – but this is not a civil war. It is certainly the case that the Jamaat (and perhaps the opposition more widely) is seeking to create an anarchic situation in Bangladesh. The Jamaat strategy for survival at the moment seems to be the creation of a scenario where the army is forced to move in to keep civil order and a new government dispensation takes over. 6. He says, The current Government is doing little to stem the flow of violence. If anything, by supporting the protesters, it is throwing fuel on the flames of discontent. This is kind of Orwellian. It appears that when Cadman refers to violence, in this sentence he is referring to the Shahbag protestors – but these protestors are not involved in any kind of violence. The only violence that is being proactively committed is by the Jamaat and its supporters. It is certainly true that in response to these protests the police are responsible for shooting dead dozens of protestors – and it certainly correct that there is an argument that the police are failing to use reasonable force in dealing with the protestors – but in the main it appears that the threat of violence and the actual initial acts of violence are coming from the Jamaat and its supporters. Whilst it is true that the government should take steps to ensure that its police do not respond in a trigger hanppy way to protesters, It is primariy for the Jammat and its supporters to ‘stem the flow of violence.’ 7. He says, The big question is what would have been the response of the Shahbagh demonstrators had Sayedee not received the death sentence. Well, whatever the response would have been, it is pretty clear from the way Shahbag has conducted itself the response would have been a peaceful one – and not violent like the Jamaat. 8. He says, It is clear that the Tribunal Judges were under such pressure to respond to the public calls for blood that, had they not responded as such, it is not inconceivable that it could have been their own blood spilt on Shahbag. Whilst it may well be true that the tribunal was under great pressure as a result of Shahbag, it is preposterous to suggest that Shahbagh represented any phyicial threat to the judges. 9. He says, ... it is quite conceivable that Bangladesh will descend into bitter sectarian conflict. The bitter sectarian conflict which Cadman is talking about is in my view what the Jamaat – the accused of which Cadman is representing - appears to be wanting. Perhaps he should be advising his clients to stop their violent protests if he actually concerned about the bitter sectarian conflict. 10. He says, The Sayedee conviction … should serve as a warning that the Government of Bangladesh is driving the country deeper into sectarian conflict, and that the violence on the streets of its major cities is likely to increase. It is true that there are a series of tribunal judgments on their way, and then of course appellate division decisions – all of which are flashpoints for potential protests. But, whether or not there is violence on the streets it is upto the Jamaat and its supporters.
Posted on: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 12:03:09 +0000
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