The 26th September 1944 British & Polish paratroopers evacuate Oosterbeek (Arnhem of A bridge too Far film fame). The Battle of Arnhem was a famous Second World War battle in which the Germans defeated an Allied attack that stretched too far from its support. It was fought in and around the Dutch towns of Arnhem, Oosterbeek, Wolfheze, Driel and the surrounding countryside from 17–26 September 1944. After sweeping through France and Belgium in the summer of 1944, the Allies were poised to enter the Netherlands. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery favoured a single thrust north over the branches of the Lower Rhine river, allowing the British 2nd Army to bypass the German Siegfried Line and attack the Ruhr. To this end, the Allies launched Operation Market Garden on 17 September. Paratroopers were dropped in the Netherlands to secure key bridges and towns along the Allied axis of advance. Farthest north, the British 1st Airborne Division, supported by men of the Glider Pilot Regiment and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, landed at Arnhem to secure bridges across the Nederrijn. Initially expecting a walkover, British XXX Corps planned to reach the British airborne forces within two to three days. The British forces landed some distance from their objectives and were quickly hampered by unexpected resistance – especially from elements of the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. Only a small force was able to reach the Arnhem road bridge while the main body of the division was halted on the outskirts of the city. Meanwhile, XXX Corps was unable to advance north as quickly as anticipated and failed to relieve the airborne troops according to schedule. After four days, the small British force at the bridge was overwhelmed and the rest of the division became trapped in a small pocket north of the river – where they could not be sufficiently reinforced by the Poles or XXX Corps when they arrived on the southern bank, nor by the RAFs resupply flights. After nine days of fighting, the shattered remains of the airborne forces were withdrawn in Operation Berlin. With no secure bridges over the Nederrijn, the Allies were unable to advance further and the front line stabilised south of Arnhem. The 1st Airborne Division had lost nearly three-quarters of its strength and did not see combat again. By September 1944, Allied forces had successfully broken out of their Normandy beachhead and pursued shattered German forces across northern France and Belgium. Although Allied commanders generally favoured a broad front policy to continue the advance into Germany and the Netherlands, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery proposed a bold plan to head north through the Dutch Gelderland, bypassing the German Siegfried Line defences and opening a route into the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr. Initially proposed as a British and Polish operation codenamed Comet, the plan was soon expanded to involve most of the First Allied Airborne Army and a set piece ground advance into the Netherlands, codenamed Market Garden.[1] Montgomerys plan involved dropping the U.S. 101st Airborne Division to capture key bridges around Eindhoven, the 82nd Airborne Division to secure key crossings around Nijmegen, and the British 1st Airborne Division, with the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade attached, to capture three bridges across the Rhine at Arnhem. Although Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton commanded the First Allied Airborne Army, his second in command Lieutenant-General Frederick Browning took command of the airborne role. The British Second Army, led by XXX Corps would advance up the Airborne corridor, securing the Airborne Divisions positions and crossing the Rhine within two days. If successful the plan would open the door to Germany and hopefully force an end to the war in Europe by the end of the year With the 6th Airborne Division still refitting after Operation Tonga, the task of securing the Rhine Bridgehead fell to the 1st Airborne Division under the command of Major General Roy Urquhart. The division was made up of three brigades of infantry (two parachute, one glider borne), supporting artillery and anti-tank batteries and substantial Royal Engineer units, as well as supporting elements such as Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Army Medical Corps units.[3] Most of the division had seen action in North Africa and Sicily,[4] particularly the 1st Parachute Brigade and 1st Airlanding Brigade.[4] However, this was the first time the division had fought together as a complete formation.[5] The division was also substantially reinforced by the addition of 1,200 men of the Glider Pilot Regiment, providing Urquhart with the equivalent of two battalions of infantry for the operation.[6] Smaller additions included a Dutch commando team and American communications teams.[7] Urquhart also had the 1st Independent Polish Brigade under his command, who would also be joining the British in the operation to seize the bridges.[8] The Division was required to secure the road, rail and pontoon bridges over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem and hold them for two to three days until relieved by XXX Corps.[9] From the beginning, however, Urquhart was severely restricted in how he could prepare and deploy his troops for the upcoming battle. The U.S. IX Troop Carrier Command were limited in their availability; with two more major drops taking place at the same time, there were insufficient carrier aircraft available to fly the entire division to the Netherlands in one lift. Additionally, Major General Williams—commander of IX Troop Carrier Command—decided that it would only be possible for one air lift per day,[10] meaning it would take three days to deliver the entire Division and Polish Brigade to the area. A limited number of areas suitable for glider landings and a reluctance from troop command to fly too near to Arnhem, exposing them to flak from Deelen airfield after the drop,[11] meant that Urquhart was forced to pick drop zones (DZ) and landing zones (LZ) up to 8 mi (13 km) from Arnhem itself, on the north side of the river.[12] With the need to secure the bridges, towns and drop zones for subsequent supply drops, the 1st Airborne would need to defend a perimeter of some 18 mi (29 km) whilst waiting for XXX Corps Urquhart decided to land Brigadier Gerald Lathburys 1st Parachute Brigade and Brigadier Pip Hicks 1st Airlanding Brigade on the first day of the operation.[12] The Airlanding Brigade plus 1st Airlanding Light Regiment Royal Artillery, Royal Engineer and medical units and Divisional HQ would land on LZs S and Z and move to secure the drop zones and landing zones for the following days drops, whilst the three battalions of the parachute brigade would arrive at DZ X and follow three separate routes into Arnhem to secure the bridges.[13] The 2nd Battalion—under the command of Lt. Col. John Frost—would follow the riverside roads to the centre of Arnhem (codenamed the Lion route) and secure the main road and railway bridges, as well as a pontoon bridge between the two. The 3rd Battalion of Lt. Col. Fitch would head through Oosterbeek to Arnhem (Tiger route), assist in the capture of the road bridge and take up positions in the east of the town.[13] Lt. Col. Dobies 1st Battalion would follow Leopard route north of the railway line to occupy high ground north and north west of Arnhem.[13] The whole advance would be led by a troop of Reconnaissance jeeps from the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, under Major Frederick Gough on Leopard who would attempt a coup de main on the road bridge.[14] On the second day, Brigadier Shan Hacketts 4th Parachute Brigade would arrive at DZ Y, accompanied by extra artillery units and remaining elements of the Airlanding Brigade on LZ X. Hacketts three battalions would then reinforce the positions north and north west of Arnhem.[12] On the third day, the Polish Parachute Brigade would be dropped south of the river at DZ K.[12] Using the road bridge, they would reinforce the perimeter east of Arnhem, linking up with their own artillery who would be flown in by glider to LZ L. 1st Airlanding Brigade would fall back to cover Oosterbeek on the western side of the perimeter and 1st Parachute Brigade would fall back to cover the southern side of the bridges.[12] Once XXX Corps had arrived and advanced beyond the bridgehead, the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division would be flown into Deelen airfield to support the ground forces north of the Rhine.[15] The remaining units of the division would follow XXX Corps on land in what was known as the sea tail.[12] The whole operation would be re-supplied by daily flights by Nos. 38 and 46 Group RAF[16] who would make the first drop on LZ L on day 2, and subsequent drops on DZ V.[17] Intelligence[edit] Due to poor intelligence, the British were told to expect only limited resistance from German reserve forces. A serious challenge to their operation was not expected and many men believed that their work would lead to the ending of the war.[18] Some—anticipating a period of occupation in Germany—packed leisure equipment in their kit or in the sea tail.[19] The optimistic mood prior to the operation would have tragic consequences however. Brownings intelligence officer—Major Brian Urquhart—obtained information from the 21st Army Group in Belgium and Dutch resistance that German armour was present around Arnhem. This was backed up with aerial reconnaissance that he ordered to be flown.[20] Browning however was dismissive and ordered his chief medical officer to have Urquhart sent on sick leave.[21] In fact, SHAEF was aware that there were almost certainly two Panzer divisions at Arnhem but with the operation looming chose to ignore them.[20] Such information would have been gleaned from Ultra intercepts that the Allied Airborne Army was not privy to and therefore could not act upon themselves.[20] The Allied liberation of Antwerp on 4 September had caused a rout of German reserve troops in the Netherlands, nicknamed Mad Tuesday.[22] However the Allied pause at the Dutch border gave the Germans time to regroup and reorganise,[23] although it would make subsequent attempts to clarify the exact German forces opposing the Allies extremely difficult.[22] Feldmarschall Walter Model—commander of Army Group B—had moved his headquarters to Arnhem and was re-establishing defences in the area and co-ordinating the reorganisation of the scattered units[24] so that by the time the Allies launched Market Garden there would be several units opposing them. To the west of Arnhem was Kampfgruppe Von Tettau, a force equivalent to seven battalions made up of all manner of German units (including Das Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, rear echelon and Waffen-SS troops) under the command of General Hans von Tettau at Grebbeberg.[25] This included the SS Non-commissioned officer school SS Unteroffizierschule Arnheim and the 16th SS Training Battalion under the command of SS Sturmbannführer Sepp Krafft whose unit would play a crucial role in the opening phases of the battle. Within Arnhem itself, the town garrison was under the command of Major-General Friedrich Kussin. Additionally, Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrichs II SS Panzer Corps—comprising the remains of Walter Harzers 9th SS and Heinz Harmels 10th SS Panzer Divisions—had moved into the area north of Arnhem to refit and reorganise.[27] Although badly mauled after escaping the Falaise pocket, the Korps was made up of seasoned veterans and made available significantly more forces to the Germans than the allies had been led to expect.[28] The divisions were also specially trained in anti-airborne operations; during their formation both divisions had undergone month-long anti airborne exercises whilst waiting for their heavy equipment, and had also spent the last 15 months studying the best reactions to a parachute attack in classroom and field exercises.[29] The 9th SS had a Panzergrenadier brigade, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, two batteries of self-propelled guns and a company of tanks.[30] Exactly how many men were available after the withdrawal from Normandy is unclear. Some sources suggest that the 9th had up to 6,000 men,[31] others suggest that the combined total of the 9th and 10th SS was only 6,000–7,000 men.[27][30] There were also Dutch units allied to the Germans present at Arnhem. These formations recruited from Dutch nationals (mainly criminals, men wishing to avoid national service or men affiliated with the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging) and were incorporated into the German Army.[32] At Arnhem, the partly Dutch SS Wachbattalion 3 was attached to Kampfgruppe Von Tettau[33] and the 3rd Battalion of the 34th SS Volunteer Grenadier Division Landstorm Nederland training at nearby Hoogeveen was quickly attached to Harzer’s 9th SS Panzer Division when they arrived at the battle on 20 September.[34] As the battle progressed, more and more forces would become available to the Germans. Adolf Hitler—stunned by the attack—agreed that the defence of the Netherlands should receive absolute priority and over the course of the battle reinforcements would stream in; from Wehrkreis VI, the Wesel area and General Friedrich Christiansens Armed Forces Command Netherlands.[35] Model arranged for units to be sent straight to the units in action in order to avoid long-winded logistics, and rushed in specialist street fighting and machine gun battalions.[36] Each day of the battle, the German military strength increased whilst the British supplies diminished. By 21 September, the fifth day of the battle, German forces outnumbered the British by 3:1 and continued to increase Arnhem was a victory for the Germans[168] (albeit tempered by their losses further south[170]) and a major defeat for the British army.[171][172] The Allies withdrew from the southern bank of the Rhine and the front stabilised on the island between the Rhine and Waal rivers. Although the Germans counterattacked in October they were repulsed[173] and subsequently the front line in the Netherlands would not move until after the winter.[174] However, the bridgeheads across the Maas and Waal served as an important base for subsequent operations against the Germans on the Rhine[175] and the strike into Germany.[174] Many military commentators and historians believe that the failure to secure Arnhem was not the fault of the airborne forces (who had held out for far longer than planned), but of the operation as a whole.[176] John Frost noted that by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge[177] and was unable to understand why Browning had ordered U.S. Army Brigadier General James M. Gavin of the 82nd Airborne Division to secure the Groesbeek Heights before Nijmegen Bridge.[178] In his analysis of the battle, Martin Middlebrook believed the failure of Browning to give the 82nd US Airborne Division a greater priority in capturing the bridge at Nijmegen was only just behind the weakness of the air plan in importance.[179] Likewise, in his assessment of the German perspective at Arnhem, Robert Kershaw concluded that the battle on the Waal at Nijmegen proved to be the decisive event[170] and that Arnhem became a simple matter of containment after the British had retreated into the Oosterbeek perimeter. After that, it was merely a side-show to the crisis being enacted on the Waal.[170] Heinz Harmel asserted that The Allies were stopped in the south just north of Nijmegen – that is why Arnhem turned out as it did.[170] Gavin himself commented that there was no failure at Arnhem. If, historically, there remains an implication of failure it was the failure of the ground forces to arrive in time to exploit the initial gains of the [1st] Airborne Division.[180] The air plan was a major weakness in the events at Arnhem itself. Middlebrook believes that the refusal to consider night drops, two lifts on day 1, or a coup-de-main assault on Arnhem bridge were cardinal fundamental errors; and that the failure to land nearer the bridge threw away the airborne forces most valuable asset – that of surprise.[181] Similarly Frost believed that the distance from the Drop zones to the bridge and the long approach on foot was a glaring snag[2] and was highly critical of the unwillingness of the air forces to fly more than one sortie in the day [which] was one of the chief factors that mitigated against success.[182] The Allies failure to secure a bridge over the Lower Rhine spelled the end of Market Garden. While all other objectives had been achieved, the failure to secure the Arnhem road bridge over the Rhine meant that the operation failed in its ultimate objective.[174] Field Marshal Montgomery claimed that the operation was 90% successful[183] and the Allies did possess a deep salient into German occupied territory that was quickly reinforced.[174] Milton Shulman observed that the operation had driven a wedge into the German positions, isolating the 15th Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This complicated the supply problem of the 15th Army and removed the chance of the Germans being able to assemble enough troops for a serious counterattack to retake Antwerp.[175] Chester Wilmot agreed with this, claiming that the salient was of immense tactical value for the purpose of driving the Germans from the area south of the Maas and removing the threat of an immediate counterattack against Antwerp.[184] Kershaw views the situation differently, observing that the north flank of the west wall was not turned and the 15th Army was able to escape. Dr. John Warren of the American Historical Division of the United States Air Force believed that the Allies now controlled a salient leading nowhere.[185] John Waddy is of the belief that the strategic and tactical debate of Market Garden will never be resolved.[186] Although a disaster for the British 1st Airborne Division,[187] their fight north of the Rhine is considered an example of courage and endurance[188] and one of the greatest feats of arms in the Second World War.[172] Allied units[edit] The battle exacted a heavy toll on the 1st Airborne Division from which it would never recover. Three quarters of the formation were missing when it returned to England, including two of the three brigade commanders, eight of the nine battalion commanders and 26 of the 30 infantry company commanders.[189] Some 500 men were still in hiding north of the Rhine, and over the coming months many of these were able to escape: initially in Operation Pegasus.[167] New recruits, escapees and repatriated POWs joined the division over the coming months, but the division was still so much weakened that the 4th Parachute Brigade had to be merged into the 1st Brigade, and the division as a whole could barely produce two brigades of infantry.[189] Between May and August 1945, many of the men were sent to Denmark and Norway to oversee the German surrenders there[190] but on their return the division was disbanded.[191] The Glider Pilot Regiment suffered the highest proportion of fatal casualties during the battle (17.3% killed).[192] The regiment was so badly depleted that during Operation Varsity RAF pilots were used to fly many of the gliders.[193] As glider operations were phased out after the war, the regiment shrank and was eventually disbanded in 1957.[191] The Polish brigade was withdrawn to Nijmegen and helped defend the airborne corridor before returning to England in early October.[194] Shortly afterward, the British began making Sosabowski and the Polish Brigade a scapegoat for the failure at Arnhem, perhaps to cover their own failings.[195][196] On 17 October, Montgomery informed Alan Brooke—Chief of the Imperial General Staff—that he felt the Polish forces had fought very badly at Arnhem and that he did not want them under his command.[191][197] Author David Bennett observes that Montgomery had almost certainly been fed gross misinformation that supported his own prejudices.[197] A month later, Browning wrote a long and highly critical letter of Sosabowski to Brookes deputy.[191][198] In it, he accused Sosabowski of being difficult, unadaptable, argumentative and loth to play his full part in the operation unless everything was done for him and his brigade.[195][198] It is possible that Browning himself wanted to make Sosabowski a scapegoat, although it may equally have been the work of officers of the 43rd Division.[199] Browning recommended that Sosabowski be replaced - suggesting Lieutenant Colonel Jachnik or Major Tonn - and in December the Polish government in exile duly dismissed him in a move almost certainly made under British pressure.[196][200] Although it may be fair to say that Sosabowski was difficult to work with,[196][201] his scapegoating is judged as disgraceful by many historical commentators.[195][200][202] Brian Urquhart—who had done so much to warn his superiors about the dangers of Arnhem —described the criticism of Sosabowski and the brigade as grotesque and that his dismissal was a shameful act. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arnhem
Posted on: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 20:18:58 +0000
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