The Battle of Gumbinnen, 20th August 1914 Following an initial action by the German Eighth Army at Stalluponen on 17th August 1914, the Battle of Gumbinnen was initiated by Eighth Armys commander General von Prittwitz, during the early hours of 20th August 1914. Somewhat encouraged by the success of I Corps under the impatient, aggressive General Hermann von Francois in snapping up 3,000 Russian prisoners at Stalluponen, before pulling his corps back to Gumbinnen, 15 km to the west of Stalluponen, Prittwitz, encouraged by Francois, decided to press ahead with an assault against the Russian First Army under Rennenkampf at Gumbinnen. Aware that General Samsonovs Russian Second Army was slowly winding its way northwards from the south, Prittwitz decided to engage Rennenkampfs forces, advancing across a 55 km front, at the first available opportunity. Eighth Armys strength was estimated at approximately 150,000, set against Rennenkampfs 200,000. After assigning a corps to guard Eighth Armys rear, he dispatched three corps plus a further division to the line south of Gumbinnen, around 40 km inside the East Prussian border. The German offensive was launched somewhat in haste, certainly before two of his corps was in readiness. General Mackensen, whose XVII Corps was sited in the centre and General von Below, to the south did not achieve a full state of readiness until some four to eight hours after Francois had commenced the attack in the north with I Corps at 4 am on the morning of 20th August 1914. As for the additional division dispatched by Prittwitz, it arrived too late to see any action whatsoever. Although Rennenkampfs forces defended with vigour, his right wing crumpled during mid-afternoon after running short of shells, with Francois forcing a Russian 8km retreat. This encouraged Mackensen to conduct an advance when his own forces were ready to attack at 8am, Below following at midday. Alerted however by Francoiss earlier attack, effective Russian deployment of heavy artillery wreaked havoc among Mackensens troops, forcing him to withdraw some 24km, with Below, in disorder. Francois, aware that the German centre and right were in disarray, was similarly obliged to authorise a retreat; in the process the Russians managed to capture 6,000 prisoners during the German retreat. Prittwitz, panicked by the effectiveness of the Russian counter-attack, and concerned that Samsonovs advancing southern Second Army would combine to envelop Eighth Army, despite Rennenkampfs apparent unwillingness to pursue his foe, ordered a general withdrawal to the River Vistula. This effectively conceded the entire Russian invasion of East Prussia. Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of Staff in Berlin, was furious at Prittwitzs capitulation. Promptly recalling Prittwitz and his deputy von Waldersee to Berlin, an effective dismissal> Von Moltke brought the imperturbable Paul von Hindenburg out of retirement and gave him command of Eighth Army, assigning as his Chief of Staff the bold, aggressive Erich Ludendorff, who had latterly impressed during the German capture of Liege. Fortunately for Hindenburg, the retreat to the Vistula had not been fully executed when he arrived in the east on 23rd August 1914. Consulting with Ludendorff and Colonel Hoffmann, Prittwitzs deputy chief of operations, he resolved to reverse Prittwitzs strategy of withdrawal, choosing instead to launch an offensive against Samsonovs approaching Second Army. This action resulted in possibly the greatest German triumph of the war, at Tannenberg.
Posted on: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 05:57:04 +0000
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