The “Former Comrades” Narrative There is a growing body of - TopicsExpress



          

The “Former Comrades” Narrative There is a growing body of writings by retired, jailed, or sidelined jihadis who are critical of bin Laden. Many were legitimate mujahedin who voluntarily fought alongside the Afghans during the war against the Soviet Union (1972–1992), and so their views are firsthand, are well informed, and need to be included in any research on bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The three men whose works I have chosen to review briefly are intelligent and heroic, and they often condemn bin Laden. What- ever the differences between them, their criticism is based on three common factors: (a) their views did not prevail in jihadi councils; (b) they failed to achieve a personal goal, and/or their preferred jihad leader lost out; and (c) they reject bin Laden’s tactical modus operandi. Again, each of these men is an authentic mujahedin and has much to contribute to our understanding of the Islamists’ movement; but each also has an axe to grind. The Algerian mujahedin Boudejema Bounoua—aka Abdullah Anas—fought bravely as an insurgent in Afghanistan, although his record hardly merits Lawrence Wright’s calling him the “greatest exemplar of Arab Afghan warriors.”3 He was Shaykh Abdullah Azzam’s organizational partner and son-in-law; and he expected to win control of Azzam’s NGO and funding and recruiting networks after the shaykh’s assassination in November 1989. Anas’s views on the handling of non-Afghan Muslim volunteers mirrored Azzam’s, and, like Azzam, he believed Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Massoud was the only Afghan who could lead the country after the Soviets withdrew. Mas- soud, Anas said, was “a first rate military planner who was by nature a simple person who had the knack for creating a spirit of camaraderie among his Arab and Afghan soldiers.”4 None of these things came to pass for Anas. As Steve Coll correctly points out, bin Laden thwarted Anas’s plans “to take control of Azzam’s jihad and recruiting and sup- porting network.”5 Anas now has political asylum in Britain and from there snipes at bin Laden.6 Anas’s criticism follows predictable lines. Osama bin Laden had broken with Azzam over the handling of foreign Muslim volunteers to fight in Afghanistan. Azzam and Anas favored dispersing them among the Afghans, and bin Laden wanted them concentrated. Bin Laden had sidelined Anas after Azzam was killed, and bin Laden had ulti- mately aligned with the Taleban in the post-Soviet civil war, thereby opposing Massoud—whom Anas and Azzam had championed—and arranging his assassination. Anas believes bin Laden was successful not because of the Saudi’s organizational and political skills, but because the Egyptian Islamists who had won his heart and mind had come between him and Abdullah Azzam, and he added that Azzam had warned that al-Zawahiri was a “troublemaker.”7 Bin Laden, Anas also infers, was one of the Arab volunteers who “had chosen to remain in Peshawar over going into Afghanistan.”8 Bin Laden not only lacked bravery but also organizational skills (“as an organizer—completely a catastrophe”)9 and had “no private circle or an infrastructure of camps depots, and supplies.” Indeed, bin Laden had had nothing until he met the Egyptians.10 Hashim al-Makki—aka Abu Walid al-Masri and Mustafa Hamid— fought in the anti-Soviet jihad and is regarded as an important theorist by the mujahedin. While he stoutly denies ever having been an al-Qaeda member,11 al-Makki is fervently anti-American and shares OSAMA BIN LADEN AS SUBJECT | 5 6 | OSAMA BIN LADEN Shaykh Azzam’s and bin Laden’s belief in the need for military activity against the West. “I had agreed with Shaykh Abdullah Azzam,” he wrote, “that jihad was the only means left for the Islamic nation to defend its religion and interests in facing the forces that are working against it, that the main battle of the Muslims is their battle with the Jews and their Crusader allies.”12 Al-Makki’s criticism of bin Laden pivots almost entirely on his respect and affection for Taleban leader Mullah Omar and his Islamic Afghan state, and the negative impact bin Laden had on both. Al-Makki worked as Al-Jazirah Television’s Kandahar bureau chief from 1998 to 2001, and there he became close to Mullah Muhammad Omar.13 Although al-Makki claims that Omar believed the media was “immoral” and depended “mainly on lies,” the Taleban chief hired al-Makki to publish the Arabic-language version of the Taleban’s monthly journal, the Emirate. Al-Makki grew to respect Omar, a man of “quiet but firm character,” and is said to have been the first foreign Muslim to swear allegiance to him, and to devote himself to aiding the Taleban’s Islamic state.14 Al-Makki seems to have made no public criticism of bin Laden before 9/11, but after that event and the Taleban’s fall he became open about his “reservations” about bin Laden’s approach and its “overall consequences,” as well as what he saw as the “extreme weaknesses” of bin Laden’s political and military capabilities.15 In retrospect, he wrote, bin Laden “was not qualified to lead [al-Qaeda].”16 In addition, he complained of bin Laden’s “crazy attraction” to the media, and the international media in particular, which had caused Omar endless problems with the United States and other powers right at the moment that the Taleban was still consolidating power.17 He accused bin Laden of wanting “absolute individual leadership”; damned him for making “jihad synonymous with the explosive belt and the car bomb”; and condemned his rashness—bin Laden was, he wrote, “fond of jumping in the air” without caring whether “his feet will hit the ground after that or not.”18 Because of bin Laden’s faults, al-Makki concludes, the Taleban was defeated and Afghanistan, the Islamic state that “historically holds the strongest fortresses in Islam,” was lost.19 Oddly, al-Makki does not condemn the 9/11 attacks; he focuses on the trouble bin Laden caused Mullah Omar, “this pious man, . . . [who] became a fugitive in the mountains of Afghanistan after he gave up everything . . . so he may not sacrifice any of the Muslims who sought his protection.”20 Veteran Arab Afghan Abu Musab al-Suri’s stock is currently very high among Western analysts of al-Qaeda and Islamist militancy.21 Al-Suri—aka Umar Abd al-Hakim; true name: Mustafa bin Abd al- Qadir Setmariam Nasar—is often termed the “successor” to bin Laden, the Islamist leader with the right approach to keeping the movement going. That approach features autonomous individuals and cells staging small, independent, and dispersed attacks around the world rather than large 9/11-like attacks. This, al-Suri argues, would prevent the West from destroying the attackers because the latter would lack “fixed bases or traceable organizational ties.”22 Such a plan is, of course, old hat. Terrorist groups have used this tactic for decades both in a national context—the IRA and ETA in Europe, for example—and internationally in the activities of Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal. None has amounted to more than a pin prick nuisance. Success would require some sort of systematic and coordi- nated approach, which is anathema to al-Suri and others who cham- pion the dispersed strategy. And, in any event, this is a secondary tack used by al-Qaeda since the 1998 formation of the “World Front against the Crusaders and Jews,” and was recommended in al-Zawahiri’s 2001 book Knights under the Banner of the Prophet. Bin Laden has encour- aged this type of attack, but believes—unlike al-Suri—that although such attacks can produce casualties, as well as consternation among law enforcement agencies, they can never produce victory. Al-Suri was close to bin Laden for a number of years, working with him on strategy and media operations; he was an al-Qaeda member from 1988 until 1992.23 He tended to be aggravated by bin Laden’s refusal to accept all his ideas, and proceed “irrespective of my opin- ion,” as al-Suri complained.24 Al-Suri also seems to have regarded him- self as smarter and more capable than bin Laden, although al-Suri’s excellent biographer Brynjar Lia points out that his fierce criticism of bin Laden stems in part from a deep, abiding dislike and distrust of Saudis.25 Like others of bin Laden’s Islamist rivals—including, at one point, Ayman al-Zawahiri—al-Suri attacked bin Laden for playing to the international media to publicize his war plans and to incite Muslims. OSAMA BIN LADEN AS SUBJECT | 7 8 | OSAMA BIN LADEN This, al-Suri claimed, focused Western anger on Mullah Omar’s regime—of which he was an ardent supporter—and thereby undercut the non-Afghan mujahedin’s reliance on Taleban hospitality.26 Bin Laden’s frequent media interviews angered Mullah Omar, al-Suri wrote in July 1999: “I think our brother has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause.”27 Al-Suri claimed the solution to the problem was to compile the advice of “knowledgeable and experi- enced people” (including himself, of course) and send a delegation to force bin Laden to apologize to Mullah Omar.28 This did not occur, and al-Suri’s criticism of bin Laden largely disappeared after 9/11. Al-Suri was captured in 2005, reportedly by Syrian authorities, and remains incarcerated.29 Notwithstanding the opposition to bin Laden of former comrades like al-Suri, they were never possible Western allies. Their quarrels with bin Laden involve timing and tactics; they do not believe bin Laden is a bad Muslim or has an unworkable strategic aim. “Is there anyone who does not know the value of this man, bin Laden,” al-Makki has asked, “his valor, generosity, piousness and heroism, his devout worship and jihad?”30 Al-Makki also echoes bin Laden in condemning U.S. intervention in the Muslim world. “We will continue this fight . . . [until] they . . . leave us free to decide what is in the interest of our people.”31 For his part, al-Suri shares al-Makki’s anger over bin Laden’s role in the Taleban’s downfall, but he regards bin Laden’s creation of the World Front against Crusaders and Jews as “a great step forward,” and is reported to have praised the 9/11 attacks, believing they had a positive “mobilizing affect” and “immensely improved” prospects for mujahedin unity.32 He was seeking to mend ties with al-Qaeda when he was captured.
Posted on: Sun, 04 Jan 2015 02:26:48 +0000

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