The Legal Implications Of Sanusi’s Suspension Yunus Abdulsalam — February 28, 2014 On February 20, 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan suspended Malam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi from his office as the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The presidency premised the suspension on the allegation of “financial recklessness”. Expectedly, the Nigerian polity became frenzied as the suspension raised eyebrows, culminating in a labyrinth of accusations and counter-accusations between those in support of and against the suspension. For the discerning, it can be observed that having failed to find an apt legal justification to back-up its action either from the 1999 constitution of Nigeria (as amended) or the Central Bank Act (2007), the presidency had to travel outside these principal (and the most relevant) statutes to embark on a voyage of discovery for legal authority to support its action. The presidency eventually found a ‘legal basis’ in the Interpretation Act to hinge its action on. However, upon a cursory look at Section 1 of the Interpretation Act, the position of the Presidency appears to have been dislocated by the same section of the Act. For the avoidance of doubt, this section of the Interpretation Act provides thus: “This Act shall apply to the provisions of any enactment except in so far as the contrary intention appears in this Act or the enactment in question”. What can be critically deciphered from this provision is that recourse need not be made to the Interpretation Act when the CBN Act as laid down the procedure for appointment and removal (in whatever form) of the Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria. In other words, since the CBN Act as enshrined the modus-operandi as per the removal (in whatever form) of the governor of CBN, the provisions of the Interpretation Act is superfluous and, as such, not applicable as a legal basis for the presidency to fortify its position. While by the virtue of Section 11 (2) of the CBN Act, it is the undisputable position of the law that the president needs two-third support of the Senate to secure removal of the governor of CBN, it is desirable to make some salient posers in deciding whether the president can outrightly suspend the governor of the CBN: Can the president remove a minister in his cabinet without the ratification of the Senate? In the same vein, can the president remove the governor of CBN without the support of the Senate? Can the president outrightly suspend the governor of CBN without approval of the Senate the same way he is statutorily allowed to do same to a minister in his cabinet? If yes, isn’t it possible for the president to circumvent Section 11 (2) of the CBN Act and, thereby, suspend the CBN governor to suit his (president’s) whimsical desire and capricious motives? If the President can suspend the governor of CBN outrightly, wouldn’t the status of the governor of CBN be reduced to [that of ] a ‘yes man’ at the expense of the autonomy of the institution of the Central Bank of Nigeria – which is integral to the economic development and political stability of the country? Unlike many other enactments which explicitly permits the president to suspend the arrowheads of the respective MDAs, does the zero provision for suspension of the governor in the CBN Act act as a lacuna or rather a genuine reflection of the spirit and intendment of the CBN Act, so as to safeguard the autonomy of the CBN? Whatever angle one may wish to look at it, the unassailable truth is that the cardinal intent of the CBN Act as enshrined and evidenced in Section 1 (3) of the Act, seeks to entrench the independence of the institution of the CBN, whereby the removal of the governor (under whatever guise) will be so rigid, so as to insulate the CBN leadership from the short-term political pressures and fear of falling out of grace politically. Of course, the CBN cannot be fully dependent or otherwise on government, since it is the government (and not the CBN) that holds the final responsibility for the economic and financial policy of Nigeria. Nevertheless, substantial degree of independence of the CBN is fundamentally important in the interest of economic development and political stability of the country. By and large, it is axiomatic that such implied-cum-unqualified power of the president to suspend the CBN governor is alien to our jurisprudence and equally constitutes a flagrant affront to the spirit and intendment of the CBN Act (2007). More so, the president’s unprecedented action portends gloom for the economic development and political stability of the country. Therefore, there is need to challenge such action in the court of law (as Sanusi has done) before we find ourselves in a country where the leadership of the CBN will deem it convenient to compromise and sacrifice its core responsibility to the nation’s economy on the altar of political expediency.
Posted on: Fri, 28 Feb 2014 20:02:44 +0000
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