The Secret CIA History of the Iran coup, 1953 Published – November 29, 2000 Edited by Malcolm Byrne For more information contact: Malcolm Byrne 202/994-7000 or [email protected] www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/ Washington, D.C., November 29, 2000 – The CIA history of operation TPAJAX excerpted below was first disclosed by James Risen of The New York Times in its editions of April 16 and June 18, 2000, and posted in this form on its website at: nytimes/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html This extremely important document is one of the last major pieces of the puzzle explaining American and British roles in the August 1953 coup against Iranian Premier Mohammad Mossadeq. Written in March 1954 by Donald Wilber, one of the operations chief planners, the 200-page document is essentially an after-action report, apparently based in part on agency cable traffic and Wilbers interviews with agents who had been on the ground in Iran as the operation lurched to its conclusion. Long-sought by historians, the Wilber history is all the more valuable because it is one of the relatively few documents that still exists after an unknown quantity of materials was destroyed by CIA operatives – reportedly routinely – in the 1960s, according to former CIA Director James Woolsey. However, according to an investigation by the National Archives and Records Administration, released in March 2000, no schedules in effect during the period 1959-1963 provided for the disposal of records related to covert actions and, therefore, the destruction of records related to Iran was unauthorized. (p. 22) The CIA now says that about 1,000 pages of documentation remain locked in agency vaults. During the 1990s, three successive CIA heads pledged to review and release historically valuable materials on this and 10 other widely-known covert operations from the period of the Cold War, but in 1998, citing resource restrictions, current Director George Tenet reneged on these promises, a decision which prompted the National Security Archive to file a lawsuit in 1999 for this history of the 1953 operation and one other that is known to exist. So far, the CIA has effectively refused to declassify either document, releasing just one sentence out of 339 pages at issue. That sentence reads: Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair. In a sworn statement by William McNair, the information review officer for the CIAs directorate of operations, McNair claimed that release of any other part of this document other than the one line that had previously appeared in Wilbers memoirs, would reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States. Clearly, the former official who gave this document to The New York Times disagreed with McNair, and we suspect you will too, once you read this for yourself. The case is currently pending before a federal judge. (See related item on this site: Archive Wins Freedom of Information Ruling Versus CIA) In disclosing this history, the Times initially reproduced only a summary and four appendixes to the original document. It prefaced each excerpt with a statement explaining that it was withholding the main text of the document on the grounds that there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran. Eventually, the Times produced the main document after excising the names and descriptions of virtually every Iranian mentioned. In posting the main body of the history on June 18, 2000, the Times technical staff tried to digitally black out the unfamiliar Iranian names, but enterprising Web users soon discovered that in some cases the hidden text could be revealed without much technical savvy. The Times quickly pulled those portions of the document and reposted them using a more fool-proof redaction method. The Archive is reproducing the latter versions of the document, even though most of the individuals known to be named in the history are either already dead or have long since left Iran. The posting of this document is itself an important event. Although newspapers regularly print stories based on leaked documents, they far more rarely publish the documents themselves, typically for lack of space. The World Wide Web now offers a tremendous opportunity for the public to get direct access to at least some of the sources underlying these important stories — much like footnotes — rather than relying on second-hand accounts alone. The Times performed a valuable public service in making available virtually the entire Wilber history. Its precedent should be a model for future reporting that unveils the documentary record. Although the Times publication was not without controversy, mainly over the unwitting revelation of Iranian names, fundamental responsibility for their exposure rests with those officials at the CIA who, despite compelling public interest and the filing of a lawsuit, insisted that virtually the entire document had to remain sealed. As Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists put it: If the CIA had exercised a more discerning classification policy and had declassified the bulk of the report, then there would have been no leak to the New York Times, and no subsequent disclosure of agent names. Instead, through overclassification, [Director of Central Intelligence George] Tenet failed in this case to fulfill his statutory obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. As a brief substantive introduction, the Archive is reproducing a preliminary analysis of the document by Prof. Mark Gasiorowski (Louisiana State University), the most prominent scholar of the coup, and a member of the Advisory Panel of the Archives Project on Iran-U.S. Relations. It takes the form of a response to a request for his take on the document from the listserv Gulf2000, directed by Dr. Gary Sick of Columbia University. From June 7-8, 2000, the Archive co-sponsored an international conference in Tehran on Iran and the great powers during the early 1950s, specifically focusing on the Mossadeq coup. ---------------------------------------------------- Secrets of History: the CIA in Iran nytimes/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html By JAMES RISEN The Central Intelligence Agencys secret history of its covert operation to overthrow Irans government in 1953 offers an inside look at how the agency stumbled into success, despite a series of mishaps that derailed its original plans. Written in 1954 by one of the coups chief planners, the history details how United States and British officials plotted the military coup that returned the shah of Iran to power and toppled Irans elected prime minister, an ardent nationalist. The document shows that: Britain, fearful of Irans plans to nationalize its oil industry, came up with the idea for the coup in 1952 and pressed the United States to mount a joint operation to remove the prime minister. The C.I.A. and S.I.S., the British intelligence service, handpicked Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi to succeed Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and covertly funneled $5 million to General Zahedis regime two days after the coup prevailed. Iranians working for the C.I.A. and posing as Communists harassed religious leaders and staged the bombing of one clerics home in a campaign to turn the countrys Islamic religious community against Mossadeghs government. The shahs cowardice nearly killed the C.I.A. operation. Fearful of risking his throne, the Shah repeatedly refused to sign C.I.A.-written royal decrees to change the government. The agency arranged for the shahs twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlevi, and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the father of the Desert Storm commander, to act as intermediaries to try to keep him from wilting under pressure. He still fled the country just before the coup succeeded. nytimes/library/world/mideast/iran-cia-intro.pdf --------------------------------------------------- 50 Years After the CIA’s First Overthrow of a Democratically Elected Foreign Government We Take a Look at the 1953 US Backed Coup in Iran democracynow.org/2003/8/25/50_years_after_the_cias_first democracynow.org/topics/1953_iran_coup ia600303.us.archive.org/26/items/dn2003-0825_vid/dn2003-0825_512kb.mp4 After nationalizing the oil industry Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence. We speak with Stephen Kinzer author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup And The Roots of Middle East Terror and Baruch College professor Ervand Abrahamian. [Includes transcript] Click here to read to full transcript democracynow.org/2003/8/25/50_years_after_the_cias_first#transcript This month marks the 50th anniversary of America’s first overthrow of a democratically-elected government in the Middle East. In 1953, the CIA and British intelligence orchestrated a coup d’etat that toppled the democratically elected government of Iran. The government of Mohammad Mossadegh. The aftershocks of the coup are still being felt. In 1951 Prime Minister Mossadegh roused Britain’s ire when he nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh argued that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves which had been exclusively controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The company later became known as British Petroleum (BP). After considering military action, Britain opted for a coup d’état. President Harry Truman rejected the idea, but when Dwight Eisenhower took over the White House, he ordered the CIA to embark on one of its first covert operations against a foreign government. The coup was led by an agent named Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The CIA leaned on a young, insecure Shah to issue a decree dismissing Mossadegh as prime minister. Kermit Roosevelt had help from Norman Schwarzkopf’s father: Norman Schwarzkopf. The CIA and the British helped to undermine Mossadegh’s government through bribery, libel, and orchestrated riots. Agents posing as communists threatened religious leaders, while the US ambassador lied to the prime minister about alleged attacks on American nationals. Some 300 people died in firefights in the streets of Tehran. Mossadegh was overthrown, sentenced to three years in prison followed by house arrest for life. The crushing of Iran’s first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah, who relied heavily on US aid and arms. The anti-American backlash that toppled the Shah in 1979 shook the whole region and helped spread Islamic militancy. After the 1979 revolution President Jimmy Carter allowed the deposed Shah into the U.S. Fearing the Shah would be sent back to take over Iran as he had been in 1953, Iranian militants took over the U.S. embassy–where the 1953 coup was staged–and held hundreds hostage. The 50th anniversary of the coup was front-page news in Iranian newspapers. The Christian Science Monitor reports one paper in Iran publishing excerpts from CIA documents on the coup, which were released only three years ago. The U.S. involvement in the fall of Mossadegh was not publicly acknowledged until three years ago. In a New York Times article in March 2000, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitted that the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. In his book All the Shah’s Men, Kinzer argues that [i]t is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax [the name of the coup] through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York. Stephen Kinzer, author All the Shah’s Men, An American Coup And The Roots of Middle East Terror Prof. Ervand Abrahamian, Middle East and Iran Expert at Baruch College, City University of New York . Author of numerous book including Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (University of California Press, 1993). 1953 Iranian coup détat en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ajax#U.S._role
Posted on: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 04:41:11 +0000
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