The Wall Street Journal published an article on the 30th October 2014 on the recent Sino-India stand-off at Chumar, Ladakh. This was accompanied by a Q&A where Ma Jiali, of the China Reform Forum (a think-tank of the Communist Partys Central Party School) and I, responded to the WSJs questions. Reproduced below are the Q&A published by the Wall Street Journal on the 30th October 2014, which might be of interest. The Wall Street Journal asked two experienced foreign-policy analysts—one in India and one in China—for their thoughts on the recent military standoff on the two countries’ disputed border. Here is what Ma Jiali, an India watcher at the China Reform Forum, a think-tank affiliated with the Communist Party’s Central Party School, and Jayadeva Ranadé, president of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy in New Delhi and a member of the Indian government’s National Security Advisory Board, had to say. WSJ: What are the historical roots of the dispute? What role did the 1962 war play? Ma Jiali: The roots of the China-India border dispute stem from Britain’s expansion policies during its colonial rule over India. The 1962 Sino-Indian war cast a pall over bilateral ties, especially from India’s perspective, because as the defeated side, the Indian public came to bear an enduring grudge. Jayadeva Ranadé: If one were to put a date on when the border dispute became “active,’” it would be in 1950 with the occupation of Tibet by Chinese troops. China thereafter began pushing the limits of the frontier beyond what the former Tibet regime had agreed to with the British. In my view, though, there were two other equally important factors. First, that [former Chinese Premier] Zhou Enlai had formed a very negative opinion about Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, which was reinforced at the Bandung Conference and which he conveyed to Mao Zedong. Mao mentioned this in a telegram to Stalin with the observation that this would limit China’s relations with India. Second, was the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and the impending split between the two communist parties, at which stage China felt the Soviet Union was “closer” to India than to its “fraternal” partner China. Deng Xiaoping, incidentally, is reported to have said in early 1979, at the time of the Chinese attack on Vietnam to “teach it a lesson,” that Mao’s decision to attack India had kept the border tranquil for almost 20 years. The 1962 war has certainly aggravated suspicions and left a lasting mark on the relationship. On the other hand, it galvanized India to modernize and equip its armed forces. WSJ: What messages were India and China trying to send each other during the recent troop movements around Chumar? Was one side or the other to blame? Ma: The Sino-Indian border has never been formally demarcated, and both sides have differing interpretations of the Line of Actual Control. India’s move to build fixed outputs in the disputed area therefore prompted a strong Chinese response. Ranadé: The intrusions at Chumar in Ladakh were undoubtedly deliberate and carefully calibrated. The trigger was China attempting to build a road into the Chumar area. The intrusion’s message was reinforced by the visit to Colombo—for the first time ever in such distant waters—by a Chinese Song-class attack submarine. Both overlapped with Xi Jinping ’s first visit to India as China’s president. The intrusion at Chumar needs to be viewed in the backdrop of the visit two months earlier by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who categorically ruled out that China would yield its current position regarding the border issue, and the earlier intrusion in the Depsang Plains in Ladakh in April 2013 immediately preceding the first visit to India of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang . The latter was followed up by an article in the official Chinese media laying claim to entire Ladakh. In terms of the military stand-off at Chumar, both sides showed restraint, but India sent a clear message that such actions would henceforth meet with a response. It was publicly raised by India’s Prime Minister as the first point in his statement and in the press statement issued later by India. As far as China is concerned, it has used both these intrusions to send a multiplicity of clear messages. These are: to assert its perceived sovereignty and territorial claims; caution India against drawing closer to the U.S., Japan or Vietnam as China could exert military pressure on India at a place and time of its choosing anywhere, including along the countries’ long border, which India would have to defend on its own; and to subordinate its interests to China’s economic aspirations. The last was, in fact, spelled out by Xi Jinping in his speech in New Delhi on Sept. 18. WSJ: What are the strategic interests of China and India in these areas—all of which are remote, inhospitable and sparsely inhabited? Ma: The border dispute involves territorial and sovereignty issues for each country, as well as sensitive nationalistic sentiments, and therefore bears great significance. Especially during British colonial rule, India seized territory by piecemeal encroachment and wholesale annexation of parts of China’s Tibetan region and imposed the illegal McMahon line on China. Therefore, whether viewed from a political or territorial standpoint, [the disputed area] is of strategic interest to China. Ranadé: China views the Ladakh region and the adjoining area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir as important for its security interests and the safety of its strategic investments. These are the Karakoram Highway and projects under construction, or planned, in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to link up eventually to Gwadar port near Karachi. This was evidenced way back in 1963 when China concluded an agreement with Pakistan by which Pakistan illegally ceded over 5,000 square kilometers of territory in the Shaksgam Valley to China. That China recognized the territory’s disputed status and had no claim of its own at that time is clear from the undertaking included in the agreement to re-negotiate the arrangement with the sovereign entity whose claim is finally recognized. As far as India is concerned, the region of Ladakh is inhabited and has been under Indian administration since independence. It is of military and strategic importance in the event of conflict with Pakistan or China and is an issue of national sovereignty. Legally, the region of Ladakh was part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which formally and legally acceded to the Indian Union in 1950. WSJ: Is a border deal between India and China likely in the foreseeable future? Does either side have incentive to compromise? Ma: The China-India border dispute involves a very large swath of territory, so the differences aren’t easy to resolve. At the moment, both sides have agreed on the political guiding principles for resolving the dispute, and the next step would be talks on the resolution framework. Both sides need to adhere to a spirit of mutual accommodation and accord due respect to history, present circumstances and public sentiment within both countries, and seriously explore a pathway for resolving the dispute. Whether this can be resolved within the foreseeable future, depends on whether both sides can bring strong political will to bear, whether both sides possess strong and powerful leadership, and whether public sentiment on both sides is mutually accommodative. Ranadé: A peacefully negotiated, reasonable border agreement would certainly be beneficial to both countries and remove a major obstacle impeding the development of bilateral relations. At the same time, despite decades of negotiations, there has been negligible tangible progress, with China declining to exchange maps which could be the basis for discussions and negotiations. There has also been no indication either of any willingness by Chinese leaders to settle the dispute. On the contrary, the appearance in Chinese media of articles like ‘Six Wars that China must Fight in the Next Five Decades’ and assertions that China will ultimately have to resort to war to settle outstanding border and territorial disputes, suggest that China’s leadership is no hurry to settle. WSJ: What kind of deal would be acceptable to China? What for India? Would China be willing to relinquish claims to Arunachal if India were to abandon its claim to Aksai China? Ma: China believes that the crux of the Sino-Indian border dispute lies in the eastern segment [areas now in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh]. The Chinese hope that the Indians can make meaningful concessions on the eastern segment, while the Chinese make necessary adjustments on the western segment [Ladakh]. Ranadé: There was a ‘package deal’ proposed by Deng Xiaoping through an Indian journalist in the late 1970s, which envisaged China allowing India to retain Arunachal Pradesh in exchange for Aksai Chin in Ladakh. While this “deal” now appears to be off, a change in the geopolitical situation or in the subcontinent, could see its revival. The emergence of the present strong leadership and government in India and India’s growth might prompt Beijing to rethink the earlier proposal in due course. In any case, China has larger interests in the form of substantial investments in the general Aksai Chin area. WSJ: Can economic relations between India and China really flourish if the boundary issue remains unresolved and the border situation is tense? Ma: Any impediments to China-India trade ties are mainly due to structural issues. Generally speaking, the border dispute doesn’t have much impact on trade. Ranadé: Until the border issue is resolved or China meticulously refrains from intrusions and aggressive actions along the border, suspicion in India about China’s intentions will remain high. This will place limits on the extent to which China-India economic ties can develop. In any case, India is looking for high-value advanced technological investment and considerable infusions of capital, both of which would probably come from countries like the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, Taiwan and South Korea. China can invest in the infrastructure sector, but has shown no signs so far of doing so in a substantive manner. It is probably waiting for India to endorse its three major economic initiatives which, if signed, will currently be to India’s detriment.
Posted on: Sat, 01 Nov 2014 12:24:57 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015