The case for Power-Sharing in Guyana by Dr David Hinds (EXCERPT OF A PRESENTATION I MADE AT THE WALTER RODNEY MEMORIAL LECTURE 19 JULY 2001, TOWER HOTEL, GEORGETOWN) The case for Power-Sharing in Guyana assumes the following: (1) that the various race groups, especially Africans and Indians, want to stay together as a nation; and (2) that the guiding principles of the nation are peaceful co-existence, cooperation and mutual respect. No group in a plural society voluntarily accepts the leadership of another group. The situation is compounded when that minority is a large one, as is the case in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Unless a formula can be found to include these groups in the decision making process, nationhood will always be an elusive dream. And if there is no collective sense of nationhood, there can be no political stability and economic development. Guyana is a compelling witness to that truth. As Lewis points out, the democratic problem in a plural society is to create political institutions which give all the various groups the opportunity to participate in decision-making, since only then can they feel that they are full members of a nation, respected by their numerous brethren and giving equal respect to the natural bond which holds them together. (p.66) Selwyn Ryan (1993:149) advocates some form of power sharing in Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana “where no one group wins everything or loses everything in the process” Clarence Ellis argues for power sharing as “the best mechanism for achieving inclusiveness in our racially divided and increasingly unstable society.” Kwayana urges that Power Sharing “offers domination to neither leader, neither people, nor race, only human equality, not even equality of numbers.” Tim Hector feels that power sharing would lead among other things to more government accountability. Only a government of national unity can, in the present economic and historical context raise the productivity of labor, and therefore national wealth. A Government of National Unity ensures the return of accountability, therefore a widening of the tax base, automatically becomes possible. This guarantees that with the inclusion of the opposition, people can have justifiable faith that their tax dollars will be spent as determined by their elected representatives with full accountability for every tax dollar. This process, and this process alone, probity in government, will unlock the mysteries of the spirit of progress and development Elements of Power Sharing According to Arend Lijphart, a definition of Power-Sharing or Consociational democracy includes the following elements: (1) Government by a grand coalition of political parties and leaders representing the significant segments of a plural society. Such a grand coalition can take the form of a grand coalition cabinet and/or a coalition of top office holders such as a Multi-Person presidency or Prime-Ministership. (2) Mutual veto by the different segments. (3) Proportional representation as the method of arriving at political representation, top civil service appointments and allocation of public funds for economic development. (4) Autonomy for the different segments to run their internal affairs. There are a few points to be noted here. First, Power Sharing is likely to be most effective if it is constitutionally mandated. In this regard Executive Power-Sharing is not a simple coalition or marriage of convenience. As is pointed out above, it is a grand coalition cabinet comprising the representative parties and Cabinet positions are divided in proportion to the percentage of votes acquired at election. What differentiates Power Sharing from the simple coalition is that the former is constitutionally mandated while the latter is not. Second, any grand coalition must be premised on an agreed national direction that includes agreement on a broad national developmental program. Given the limited choices at the disposal of small countries like Guyana, this is not a very difficult task. Third, the leaders of the various segments must have a deep and abiding commitment to the unity of the nation and must be prepared to uphold the laws and the democratic process. Cooperation and compromise must be the guiding principles and must be predicated on a willingness of the leaders of one segment to work with the other segments. But even as the leaders try to cooperate with each other, they must hold their respective constituencies together In this regard, the leaders must be more tolerant than their followers and must have the ability to strike compromises in the interest of the nation even when those compromises are not popular with their `followers. These leaders must, according to Lijphart perform a difficult balancing act. Leaders must therefore be bold, creative, and above all must have the trust of their followers. Lijphart also makes the point that while it important for leaders to carry the masses along, it is doubly important for them to get the support of the second level leadership of the parties. Another category that the leaders must consider when making decisions is the non-political groups such as religious associations and ethnic organizations. Next to leadership, the size of the various segments is most crucial to Power-Sharing. In particular, the presence of a majority segment is seen as being unfavorable since the majority segment always has an eye on maintaining or reverting to Winner-Take-All. On the other hand, in cases where the two segments are of approximately equal size, the leaders tend to be more disposed to dialogue and negotiations. The fact that one side cannot easily overrun the other is enough reason for compromise. Guyana does have a majority segment--Indians make up about 51% of the population with Africans making up about 44% according to the last census. The mixed races for the most part identify with themselves with the African Segment. Because the Indian segment is a bare majority that is not considerably larger than the African segment, there is somewhat of a balance. While the PPP has used the Indian majority to argue for Majoritarian Democracy, given the almost equal size of the African segment, it has found it difficult to govern in both of its stints in office. Further, the fact that the African segment dominates the military, and police apparatus and the civil service, it is able to wield considerable power outside the government. Almost all the countries where Power-Sharing has been successful, the populations are relatively small. The advantage of small population size is that there is not an elaborate decision-making process and the leaders tend to know each other on a one on a one basis. Of course small populations have their disadvantages - there is limited economies of scale and the pool of talent is smaller. However, for the purpose of consensus a small population is advantageous. Guyana has a population of approximately three-quarters of a million. Its leaders know each other personally and the decision making process is quite straightforward. The grand coalition formula has been used by western homogeneous societies during times of emergencies such as war. Most western countries experience a show of unity by the political parties. In instances such as during World War II, Britain actually formed a Grand Coalition Government or National Government. While the crisis in these societies tends to be temporary, thus needing temporary arrangements, the crisis in plural societies is permanent or as Lijphart says it is the nature of the society that constitutes the crisis Since the “single dominant” leader characterizes the Presidential system of government, it is in principle incompatible with Consensus democracy. However, it could be used with some alteration. One variation is the joint presidency or multi-person presidency where the various segments are represented with each having a veto over the other. An example of this arrangement is the seven- member Swiss Federal Council that is representative of the electoral strength of the four major parties, the different Cantons, and the regions. Another variation is the alternating presidency whereby the parties/segments rotate the presidency by either terms or the individual terms are split, which Lijphart calls diachronic grand coalition. This arrangement works best in situations where there are two major segments such as in Guyana. Although Colombia is not a consensus democracy, it used this arrangement for the period 1958-74. In the Swiss Federal Council the presidency is rotated annually among the members. Yet another variation is the Lebanese Model of linking the presidency with the executive positions such as the Prime Minister, Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister in a kind of ruling coalition. A key element of Consensus Democracy is Separation of Powers, especially between the executive and the legislative. Such clear separation ensures that each branch serves as a check on the other. It also allows the legislative branch to function as a kind of opposition to the executive branch and mediator among the segments. Where there are deadlocks in the cabinet, these matters could be referred to the legislature for resolution. For such a system to work best cabinet members cannot be members of the legislature. Success and Failure Some critics have argued that because consensus democracy has declined in countries such as Austria and Holland, it has failed. But in fact, this decline is a reflection of the success of the model in minimizing the divisions in those societies. By the same token the breakdown of Power-Sharing in Lebanon was not the result of its failure but the result of external pressure on the country. Power Sharing lasted for 32 years in Lebanon 1943 -1995, during which time the four main religious segments -Christian, Suny Moslem, Shiite Moslems and Greek Orthodox shared the governance of the country. Despite several instances of conflict, including a civil war in 1958, the system survived. In the case of the South Africa the parties agreed beforehand that it was going to be an interim government. Clearly the presence of the grand coalition played a pivotal role in halting the violence and facilitating a smooth transition from apartheid. Another successful case of Power-Sharing was in Malaysia 1955-1969. This arrangement broke down when the three main parties that formed the Grand Coalition lost a sizable portion of their popular support to other parties in the 1969 elections. One may argue that this was a good development except that these other parties were communal parties, which influenced the civil disorder. One of the problems with Malaysia was that despite the Power-Sharing arrangement most of the national symbols were reflective of the Malay segment, which comprised 53% of the population. This, in addition to the electoral system - single member district - gave a disproportionate representation of the Malays in the Grand Coalition. These two factors no doubt eliminated the other segments and influenced the eventual breakdown of the system. Had the system been reviewed and adjusted to meet the changes in the society, the civil disorder may have been prevented. The one real failure of Consensus Democracy was in Cyprus 1960. Despite having the perfect consensus constitution, the country erupted in civil war after only a few years. The major reason for this breakdown was the fact that there was a very large majority Greek segment (78%). The Turks comprised a mere 18%. But the Turks were awarded the Vice-Presidency, three out of ten cabinet seats and five out of 50 parliamentary seats! The same ratio applied to the Civil Service while there was a 6:4 ratio for the police and army. In addition the Vice President had equal powers to the Greek President and an equal veto over the cabinet and legislature on matters of defense, security and Foreign Affairs. The Turks therefore were over represented and tended to stick to the letter of the constitution. The Greeks on the other hand had reluctantly accepted the constitution at the time of Independence and their attempt to alter the constitution to achieve stricter proportionality sparked the civil war that led to the breakdown of Power-Sharing. But apart from the internal dynamics, the situation was influenced by the fact that both Greece and Turkey intervened on the sides of their respective nationals. Answering the Critics Now, to some of the arguments that have been raised about the weaknesses or unworkability of Power Sharing. GRIDLOCK Gridlock is inherent in any system of governance. While situations of crisis and emergency demand prompt decision-making, hastily executed decision-making is contrary to democratic governance as it downplays democratic tenets such as consultation, extensive deliberations, compromise and consensus. Even the Westminster Model which is the least gridlocked of the political systems has certain built-in delay mechanisms such as the House of Lords suspensory veto whereby that body can hold up passage of a bill for up to six months. True, an all-party cabinet moves gridlock into the executive branch, but the same gridlock exists in single party executives where various factions of the party invariably battle over policy. Gridlock has the potential of frustrating decision-making but the threat of gridlock also forces compromise, if not consensus. It expands the scope for broad discussion and deliberation that make for more broad-based decisions. This is most crucial for seriously divided societies such as Guyana as such an exercise does two important things (a) it institutionalizes a culture of working together and (b) it produces decisions that have the support of the various factions. Finally extreme gridlock occurs in any system from time to time over fundamental issues. This is good for democracy for decisions on fundamental issues must by democratic necessity invite inputs from as wide a cross section of society as possible. If cabinet fails to settle an issue, then the parliament must be empowered to settle it. In the case of Guyana one must note that we have been gridlocked for almost six decades, in particular since 1997. The government has been unable to get much done as the opposition has used its street power and support within the state apparatus to frustrate decision-making. The current confusion between government action and the work of the dialogue committees is a case in point. Had the PPP and the PNC been in the cabinet together, there would have been less confusion and time consumption. Institutionalization of Racial Voting Patterns Again the charge ignores the Guyanese reality. Racial voting patterns have been institutionalized for a long time now and can hardly be further institutionalized. Any corrective measure must start with that admission and must in the first instance move to create conditions to prevent this racial voting pattern from giving rise to racial violence, discrimination and domination. Whether power sharing will solve our racial problems and/or change racial voting is speculative, but what is certain is its ability to neutralize the consequences of racial voting by forcing the contending forces to work together for the common good. It would be more correct to say that power sharing will not immediately get rid of racial voting. But it does encourage the less hard core racial voters to vote for a third force, as such a vote would not be seen as a “wasted vote”, given the fact that the intensity of the competition for racial control of the government will be lowered considerably. The creation of this third force will be crucial as it will serve as a balancer in the system; thus reducing the threat of extreme gridlock. Abolishing of Opposition This is perhaps the most glaring benefit of Power Sharing for Guyana. Government in Guyana has meant government by one race and opposition has meant opposition by the other race. This equation has served to create instability and erase the other races, especially the Amerindians, from the political mix. Opposition has really been an exercise in destabilization of the government; the opposition has functioned more as a parallel government than a government in waiting. Under power sharing, the place for opposition is the legislative branch, which has to be translated into a real oversight of the executive branch. In this regard there has to be more separation of powers then currently obtains whereby a minimum of ministers sit in parliament. This would allow for a fresh set of eyes and minds to look at bills when they reach the parliament. Dividing Office among Elites What’s new? We operate under a representative form of democracy which given the size of the population, is much more manageable than direct democracy. People elect their representatives who do not generally reflect their class interests given our history of elite domination of political parties. However, in Guyana’s case, these elites represent the racial desires of their followers to control governmental power. Elite control of power is a given in Guyana. But a “vertical power sharing” or devolution of power to the local governments can counterbalance this. In this regard, the return to village government is key to power sharing. This allows for both racial and class empowerment – racial because of the racial homogeneity of our villages and class because more working class people are likely to be elected to village councils. Power Sharing is not anti- Westminster Power Sharing is not anti-Westminster in principle. It really is a modification of Westminster as it seeks to tailor the model to the peculiarities of segmented societies. The casualties here are the majoritarian and winner-take-all principles--principles that presuppose a political culture that is not part of our heritage. But other aspects of Westminster such as parliamentary or legislative supremacy are retained. In fact our current system has strayed from the principle of legislative supremacy, where the parliament hires and fires the executive. Our system is a Presidential-Parliamentary system based on executive supremacy along the lines of the French system. The President and cabinet are not answerable to Parliament in any institutionalized manner. What we have is “legislative pretense,” where the executive basically controls the process with little or no check by the legislature. A crucial example of this is the fact that there can be no legislative vote of confidence in the executive. Some Concrete Proposals The Power Sharing Government shall be based on the following principles: Proportional Representation Separation of Powers Checks and Balances Central Government The Executive Branch The Executive branch shall comprise a two or three person Executive Presidency and a Cabinet. The Presidency There shall be a three-person Executive Presidency including the representative of the parties with the three highest numbers of votes at the election. The party with the highest number of votes shall hold the Presidency, and the one with the second highest shall hold the Prime Ministership and Vice Presidency and the one with the third highest will hold the Deputy Prime Ministership and Second Vice Presidency. The latter must garner at least 10% of the vote to be included in the presidency. If no single third party gets that number of votes, but a coalition of parties does, then they shall choose some one to represent them. If the minor parties together do not meet the 10 percent threshold, there shall be a two-person presidency There shall be no special elections for these offices, each official shall have a veto, and belong to the cabinet. Powers of the President Commander in chief of the armed forces and Minister of Defense Perform the ceremonial functions of the Head of State. Represent the country at international functions. Powers of the Prime Minister Chairperson of the Cabinet Leader of Government Business in the House (but with no voting powers) Minister of Home Affairs and National Security Powers of Deputy Prime Minister Chair of the House of Civil Society Vice-Chair of Cabinet Minister of Economic Planning and Development Joint Powers 1. Approve or veto bills passed by Parliament 2. Nominate magistrates and judges, Police Commissioner, Head of the armed forces and the top governmental officials. 3. Appoint and fire Cabinet Members 4. Report to the Parliament on the State of the Nation twice per year. 5. Decide on the size of the cabinet, but it shall not exceed 20 members. Cabinet Cabinet shall be a coalition of all parties that qualify for seats in the parliament and shall be proportionally allocated. No party shall hold more than three of the following ministries: Finance, Economic Planning Development, Home Affairs and National Security, Foreign Affairs, Education and Health. Cabinet decisions shall be based on consensus, but should there be a vote, decisions must have the support of two-thirds of the cabinet. Should Cabinet be unable to make a decision, the matter shall be returned to parliament for resolution. Members of the Cabinet may sit in the National Assembly and introduce government bills, but they cannot vote. Legislature There shall be a bicameral legislature including an elected People’s House of Representatives and an appointed Chamber of Civil Society. Election to the PHR shall be based on a mixed system of Proportional Representation and First Past the Post (FPTP) system. The Peoples House of Representative shall comprise elected members, and non-voting members of the Cabinet and the Regional Councils. Powers Remove any member of the Executive Branch, including Cabinet Ministers, through a vote of no confidence, which must be initiated by at least one-third of the Lower House and passed by a three-quarters majority. Override executive vetoes with a three-quarters vote. Pass bills that relate to all areas of life in the country. Settle any unresolved disagreements within the Executive Branch with a three-fifths vote. Elect a speaker with a three-fifths vote. Approve Executive nominations for the Judicial Branch and other top appointments. Chamber of Civil Society The Chamber of Civil Society shall comprise representatives of Civil Society Organizations including the TUC, Women’s organizations, Guyana Bar Association, Guyana Council of Churches, The Private Sector Commission, and Youth Organization. Review and endorse bills passed by the People’s House of Representatives. Hold a bill for up to three months pending review by the House of Representatives. Local Government The primary local government unit shall be the Village and Town Councils whose elections shall be based on a mixed electoral system. Powers The Power to tax. Dual control with the Central Government over Education, Sanitation, and Public Works including drainage and irrigation and road repairs. Regional Councils Comprising representatives of Village and Town Councils. Representatives shall sit as non-voting members of the House of Representatives. Powers Oversight of Village Councils. Approve budget of Councils. Link between the Village and Town Councils and the Central Government. Dr. David Hinds, a political activist and commentator, is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Caribbean and African Diaspora Studies at Arizona State University. More of his writings and commentaries can be found on his Youtube Channel Hinds Sight and on his website guyanacaribbeanpolitics
Posted on: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 11:14:00 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015